HomeMy WebLinkAbout2026_08_03 OSawyer_Flock CamerasFrom:Oceana Sawyer
To:awatkins@cityofpt.us
Cc:Well Organized; Liliana Paredes; jmauro@cityofpt.us; ahoward@cityofpt.us; citycouncil@cityofpt.us;
mdressler@jeffersonhealthcare.org; Kees Kolff; bmccomas@jeffersonhealthcare.org;
mready@jeffersonhealthcare.org; prhoden@jeffersonhealthcare.org; Board of Health; jeffbocc;
erin.rolfes@kroger.com; stephanie.winans@stores.qfci.com
Subject:The Use of Flock Cameras at QFC Port Townsend
Date:Monday, August 3, 2026 10:24:43 AM
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Well Organized/ Nourishing Beloved Community
POB 1659
Port Townsend, WA 98368
August 3, 2026
Austin Watkins
City Attorney
City of Port Townsend
250 Madison Street
Port Townsend, WA 98368
awatkins@cityofpt.us
RE: Automated license plate reader surveillance at 515 Sheridan Street — request for legal review and
City action
Dear Mr. Watkins:
On behalf of Nourishing Beloved Community (NBC), Well Organized of Jefferson County (WO) and
Jefferson County Immigrant Rights Advocates ("JCIRA") regarding automated license plate reader
("ALPR") cameras manufactured by Flock Safety that have been installed at the QFC store at 515
Sheridan Street. We understand these cameras surveil a parking area shared with, and adjacent to,
facilities of Jefferson County Public Health and Jefferson Healthcare — a public hospital district serving
the whole of East Jefferson County – and now JCIRA as well.
We respectfully ask the City and Jefferson County to review their respective policies and legal obligations
regarding private automated license plate reader systems adjacent to JCIRA, Jefferson Public Hospital
District and Public Health facilities; determine whether any City or County access to this data exists;
evaluate whether the installation complies with applicable state and local law; and work collaboratively
with community partners to develop local safeguards that protect patient and client privacy and access to
essential services.
Our objective is not simply to identify legal concerns, but to encourage a constructive dialogue about how
emerging surveillance technologies intersect with privacy, healthcare access, and community trust. We
believe these interests can coexist, and we welcome the opportunity to work collaboratively with the City,
Jefferson County, Jefferson Healthcare, and other community partners to identify practical solutions that
protect both public safety and the rights of those accessing essential services.
1. Who we are, and why this camera reaches our work.
JCIRA assists community members in East Jefferson County with the completion of immigration
documents, and collaborates with NBC to operate a weekly food bank. Both activities are conducted
without charge.
We flag this at the outset because the Legislature has singled out both of these activities for protection
from ALPR surveillance, as set out in Part 3 below. The people who come to JCIRA for help completing
an application, and the people who come to us for groceries, are in substantial part the same people who
receive medical care at 515 and 834 Sheridan Street. A camera logging arrivals at that block is logging
the movements of a population the Legislature has expressly determined should not be tracked.
2. The camera captures a record of who seeks medical care in this county.
An ALPR is not a security camera. It photographs every plate that passes, builds a timestamped location
record for every driver — the overwhelming majority of whom are suspected of nothing — and uploads
that record to a commercial network.
Because of where this camera sits, the record it builds is not merely "who shopped for groceries." It is a
log of vehicles arriving at the site of the only hospital in East Jefferson County. Jefferson Healthcare's
patients include people seeking reproductive health care, gender-affirming care, behavioral health
treatment, and substance use disorder services. Many arrive with no realistic alternative; there is no
second hospital to drive to. A patient who wishes to keep a medical visit private now has no way to do so.
These circumstances warrant more than the City's review alone. We ask Jefferson County and the Public
Hospital District to review their own policies, procedures, and any agreements relating to private
surveillance systems located adjacent to public facilities. As stewards of essential public services, they
have an important role in protecting patient privacy, maintaining public trust, and ensuring individuals can
access healthcare, public health services, and other essential community resources without unnecessary
concern about surveillance.
3. The Legislature has drawn a line, and this camera sits on the wrong side of it.
Engrossed Substitute Senate Bill 6002, the Driver Privacy Act, took effect March 30, 2026 and is codified
as a new chapter in Title 10 RCW. Section 3(4) provides that it is unlawful for any agency to collect ALPR
data on the premises, immediate surroundings, or access to or from facilities that provide protected health
care under chapter 7.115 RCW, or at facilities conducting an immigration matter as defined in RCW
19.154.020, schools, places of worship, courts, or food banks.
RCW 19.154.020(2) defines an "immigration matter" broadly, to include any proceeding, filing, or action
affecting a person's immigration or citizenship status arising under federal immigration law or the actions
of USCIS, DHS, DOJ, the Department of State, the Department of Labor, or the Board of Immigration
Appeals. JCIRA's document-completion assistance falls within that definition. Our weekly food bank is
separately and independently enumerated in Section 3(4).
**We state plainly what Section 3(4) does not do.** It binds "any agency," which Section 2 defines as
state and local agencies. It does not, standing alone, prohibit Kroger or QFC from operating a camera.
We are not asking the City to assert otherwise, and we think a claim that overreads the statute would be
counterproductive for everyone.
What Section 3(4) does do is establish, as a matter of enacted Washington policy, that ALPR collection
around hospitals, immigration-services providers, schools, places of worship, courts, and food banks is
intolerable. The Legislature made that judgment and left private operators to be addressed elsewhere.
That is an argument *for* the local ordinance we request below, not against it. It is also the reason a
private camera producing exactly the dataset the Legislature prohibited agencies from gathering is a
matter of legitimate municipal concern.
4. The Act's operative constraints on the City are immediate.
Two provisions bind Port Townsend directly and now:
- **Section 5(4):** an agency may obtain privately held ALPR data only pursuant to a valid, court-issued,
probable cause warrant. Any standing access, hot-list arrangement, courtesy login, or informal request
channel between the Port Townsend Police Department and a privately operated Flock camera is
inconsistent with this requirement.
- **Section 3(3):** it is unlawful for an agency to use an ALPR system for immigration investigation or
enforcement, consistent with RCW 10.93.160, or in connection with protected health care services under
chapter 7.115 RCW, or to track activity protected by the First Amendment and Article I, Section 7.
Other Washington jurisdictions moved promptly. Bellingham Police terminated access agreements with
Lowe's and Home Depot the day after the bill was signed. Edmonds, Lynnwood, and Mountlake Terrace
have ended or suspended Flock programs. We ask the City to state on the record whether PTPD holds
any access of any kind to this camera or to any network containing it, and if so, to end it. A warrantless
door into private ALPR data is not made lawful by the fact that a private party opened it.
5. My Health My Data may reach the private operator directly.
RCW 19.373 defines "consumer health data" to include precise location information that could reasonably
indicate a consumer's attempt to acquire or receive health services. The Act separately makes it unlawful
for any person to implement a geofence around an entity providing in-person health care services where
the geofence is used to identify or track consumers seeking health care, to collect consumer health data,
or to send related messages. The statutory radius is 2,000 feet.
A persistent ALPR trained on the approach to a hospital campus is, functionally, a virtual perimeter that
identifies and tracks people arriving for care. We ask your office to evaluate whether the installation falls
within that prohibition. Unlike the Driver Privacy Act, whose Consumer Protection Act provision at Section
10(2) reaches only persons who contract with agencies authorized to use ALPR systems, the My Health
My Data Act's Consumer Protection Act hook applies to regulated entities generally, including private
retailers.
6. Federal immigration access to Flock data is documented, not hypothetical.
The University of Washington Center for Human Rights found through public records that at least eight
Washington law enforcement agencies enabled direct data sharing with U.S. Border Patrol during 2025,
and that Border Patrol appeared to access the networks of at least ten additional Washington
departments that never authorized such searches. Out-of-state agencies conducted numerous searches
of Washington-collected Flock data. This occurred despite the Keep Washington Working Act, RCW
10.93.160.
Flock's assurances about software filters are assurances about a vendor's own product configuration,
made by a company with a commercial interest in the answer, and subject to change. The demonstrated
pattern is that access routes existed which participating agencies did not know about and did not
approve. Given the documented history of unintended data sharing, local governments should not rely
solely on vendor assurances where the consequences of error could include unlawful immigration
enforcement or a family separated.
7. The chilling effect is already the harm.
We do not have to wait for a search to be run. Our organization is hearing from residents who are
weighing whether to drive to a medical appointment, pick up a prescription, come to our food bank, or ask
for help with a filing. When a person skips a clinic visit or a food distribution because of a camera, the
injury is complete regardless of whether any data is ever queried.
Requested action
We respectfully ask the City to:
1. Determine and publicly disclose whether PTPD has, or has ever had, any access to Flock data
generated at 515 Sheridan Street or to any network containing it, and terminate any such access.
2. Issue written guidance to PTPD confirming that privately held ALPR data will be sought only pursuant
to a probable cause warrant, per Section 5(4), and that ALPR use for immigration enforcement or in
connection with protected health care is prohibited per Section 3(3).
3. Confirm whether PTPD operates any ALPR system requiring registration with the Attorney General
under Section 5(a), and whether that registration has been completed.
4. Review the installation for compliance with the City's land use, permitting, sign, and design review
requirements, and confirm whether any permit was issued.
5. Evaluate the installation under RCW 19.373's geofencing prohibition and communicate the City's
conclusions to Kroger/QFC and to Jefferson Healthcare.
6. Bring to Council an ordinance regulating privately operated ALPR within city limits that extends the
Section 3(4) protections to private operators — barring collection on the premises, immediate
surroundings, or access routes of health care facilities, immigration-services providers, schools, places of
worship, courts, and food banks — together with notice, retention limits, and a prohibition on sharing with
federal immigration authorities.
7. Coordinate with Jefferson County, Jefferson Public Hospital District, and other affected public entities
to review the impact of private ALPR systems located adjacent to healthcare and public facilities, evaluate
existing privacy protections, and identify appropriate safeguards that protect patients, clients, and
community members accessing essential services
We respectfully request a written response outlining the City's conclusions and any actions it intends to
take regarding the concerns raised in this letter.
Should your office determine that a meeting would be helpful, we would welcome the opportunity to meet
with you to discuss these issues further. We are also prepared to address the City Council during public
comment. If necessary, we will submit public records requests regarding communications between the
City, Flock Safety, and Kroger concerning this installation, although we hope that information can be
shared collaboratively.
Again, although this letter is addressed to the City Attorney, we have copied Jefferson County, Jefferson
Public Hospital District No. 2, and other affected public entities because the issues presented extend
beyond municipal policing. We encourage these agencies to undertake similar reviews of their own legal
obligations, policies, and operational relationships relating to privately operated ALPR systems adjacent
to public facilities.
Thank you for your attention.
Sincerely,
Nourishing Beloved Community
Well Organized of Jefferson County
cc:
Liliana Paredes, Executive Director, Jefferson County Immigrant Rights Advocates
John Mauro, City Manager
Port Townsend City Council
Board of Commissioners, Jefferson County Public Hospital District No. 2
Jefferson County Public Health
Store Leader, QFC #00106
Kroger Co., Office of Corporate Affairs
County Commissioners
--
Oceana Sawyer
Program Director
Nourishing Beloved Community
Well Organized/BLMJC
Building resilient community for and by People of the Global Majority