Loading...
HomeMy WebLinkAbout1-R - 2019 11 13 Ruling - Denying ReviewCQlll7Tin^C'^ {^uui{T OF AppcAl cDiy!5l0.3luALS M(5W0n3 PM l:3S ■>IATEOrSTAl n Y ntPiiY^ :'CN IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION II JEFFERSON COUNTY, Respondent, V. MICHAEL D. ANDERSON, Petitioner. No. 53559-9-II RULING DENYING REVIEW Michael Anderson seeks discretionary review of the superior court’s decision affirming his district court infraction for violating Jefferson County’s solid waste ordinance as to solid waste, including but not limited to junk vehicles, found on his Maude Street property. He seeks discretionary review under RAP 2.3(d), under which this court may grant review of a superior court decision reviewing a decision of court of limited jurisdiction only: (1) If the decision of the superior court is in conflict with a decision of the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court; or (2) If a significant question of law under the Constitution of the State of Washington or of the United States is involved: or (3) If the decision involves an issue of public interest which should be determined by an appellate court; 53559-9-11 (4) If the superior court has so far departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or so far sanctioned such a departure by the court of limited jurisdiction, as to call for review by the appellate court. First, Anderson argues that the superior court’s affirmance of the district court’s finding of an infraction is in conflict with Cannabis Action Coalition v. City of Kent, 180 Wn. App. 455, 482, 322 P.3d 1246 (2014), which held that an administrative regulation that conflicts with a state statute is invalid. He contends that Jefferson County Code section 8.10.100, which defines “[sjolid waste” to include “junk vehicles or parts thereof conflicts with RCW 70.95.030(22), which defines “[sjolid waste” to include “abandoned vehicles or parts thereof.” But RCW 70.95.030(22) defines “solid waste” to mean “solid . . . wastes including, but not limited to . . . abandoned vehicles or parts thereof.” RCW 70.95.030(22) permits Jefferson County to include “junk vehicles” in its definition of “solid waste.” The superior court’s ruling that the Jefferson County definition is not preempted does not conflict with Cannabis Action Coalition or any of the other cases cited by Anderson. Second, Anderson argues that the superior court erred in not finding his operation of an auto repair facility on the Maude Street property was a legal nonconforming use. But he did not raise that issue in his appeal from the district court infraction and so cannot raise it for the first time in this motion. Third, Anderson argues that the superior court’s affirmance of the district court’s findings that he had moved junk vehicles and solid waste to the Maude Street property were not supported by substantial evidence. But Anderson admitted moving vehicles, which had been found to be junk vehicles in a nuisance proceeeding as to the Old Hadlock 53559-9- property, to the Maude Street property. And there were other forms of solid waste, beyond junk vehicles, found on the Maude Street property. The superior court did not err in affirming the district court’s findings. Anderson does not show that the superior court’s decision conflicts with any appellate decisions. Nor does he demonstrate a significant question of constitutional law, an issue of public importance or that the superior court departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings. Anderson fails to show that discretionary review is appropriate under RAP 2.3(d). Accordingly, it is ORDERED that Anderson’s motion for discretionary review is denied. DATED this day of _____________ _______, 2019. Eric B. Schmidt Court Commissioner cc:Joan Best Philip C. Hunsucker Elizabeth L. Ensign Hon. Jill Landes Hon. Keith C. Harper