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Home My WebLink AboutZON2008-00091 ( ON c JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 41111.0 621 Sheridan Street•Port Townsend •Washington 98368 6 . ` — 360/379-4450 . 360/3.79-4451 Fax www.cojefferson.wa.us/commdevelopment Staff Report and Recommendation on UDC Amendment, JCC 18.30.150, Signs To: Jefferson County Planning Commission, and Interested Parties Fr: Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager Date: April 23, 2008 Re: DCD report and recommendation on proposed UDC amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards, specifically 18.30.150: Signs. Background Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code (JCC) regulates signs. On February 20, 2007 the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners(BoCC)discussed with planning and building staff the need for changes to this section of the JCC. Staff findings: 1) Using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a "Board-Initiated Control,"found at RCW 36.70.640 (please see attached), the BoCC decided that it was in the public interest to amend the Sign Ordinance contained in JCC 18.30.150. During discussions, Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining Section (2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as "yard sale"or"no trespassing';(g)political signs;and (i) real estate signs in one clause. It was moved and voted upon unanimously to forward the Sign Ordinance to the Planning Commission for review, combining (2)(f)(g)and (i) in one clause, to include language that clarifies when zoning review is required and when it is exempt, and further, that(2) Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited;" 2) On April 18, 2007, staff recommended to the Planning Commission that political signs be exempt from size limitations per the zoning code, and that political signs receive a separate subsection: JCC 18.30.150(2)(g). The Planning Commission heard public comment, deliberated, and voted 8-0-0 to accept staffs recommendation; 3) The Planning Commission is required to hold a public hearing and consider public comments on this issue before making a recommendation to the BoCC, in accordance with RCW 36.70.850 and JCC 18.45,090(3); 4) On October 13, 2006, Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f), which limits the size of political signs to eight square feet, based on the conclusion of law that the code "violates plaintiffs rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it limits or interferes with constitutionally protected speech"; and 5) An argument used as legal authority and precedent for the Clallam County decision is Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wn.2d 737, 746, 854 P.2d. 1046 (1993), in which it was determined that"Free speech is protected under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the • Washington State Constitution. And political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Article I, Section 5 of the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 6) The Growth Management Act(GMA) contains guidance for controls placed on development or land use activities by counties. The use of the "Board-Initiated Control"with respect to JCC 18.30.150 (Signs)is consistent with GMA at RCW 36.70A.030(7). The Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan ensures consistency with GMA with respect to JCC 18.30.150 at LNP 1.2, wherein the rights of private property owners are protected, and at LNP 1.8, wherein it is ensured "that land permitting processes are predictable and timely." 7) Notice of the public hearing was provided via a legal notice published on April 23, 2008, in the official newspaper of record, the Jefferson County-Port Townsend Leader, in accordance with JCC 18.45.090(2)(b). Department of Community Development Recommendation Dtomeht thendment to JCC 18.30.150 should)( consist only of exempting political signs from CD size saff limitationsrec m , and nds t that a a e separate am subsection 18.30.150(2g) should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows: 18.30.150(2)(g) Political messages Staff recommends further that the Planning Commission hold a public hearing on Signs on May 7,2008, its first regular meeting in May, and that, following the public hearing, the Planning Commission deliberate and formulate a recommendation to the BoCC. During deliberation the Planning Commission will enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with and in consideration of the required Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.050(4)(b)(i), JCC 18.45.080(1)(b), and JCC 18.45.090(3). The Planning Commission will then develop and present to the BoCC a recommendation, which, in concert with the DCD staff recommendation, comprises the official recommendation from the Planning Agency. Attachments: • Planning and Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 • Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) • Proposed line-in/line-out code revision • Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 • Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 • Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 • Collier v. City of Tacoma Penn 9 42 36.70.690 36.70.630 Official controls—Board to conduct hear shall be sent to the*department of community development ing,adopt findings prior to incorporating changes in rec- by September 30, 1990. ommended control. If after considering the matter at a pub- On or before June 30,1991,each municipality that plans lic meeting as provided in RCW 36.70.620 the board deems a and zones under this chapter shall have adopted an ordinance change in the recommendations of the planning agency to be or ordinances that are necessary to implement the findings of necessary,the change shall not be incorporated in the recom- this review,if the findings indicate that such changes are nec- mended control until the board shall conduct its own public essary,or shall notify the*department of community devel- hearing, giving notice thereof as provided in RCW opment as to why such implementing ordinances were not 36.70.590,and it shall adopt its own findings of fact and adopted. [1989 c 335§6.] statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing *Reviser's note: Powers,duties,and functions of the department of and its own analysis of findings considered by it to be con- community development and the department of trade and economic develop- trolling. [1963 c 4§36.70.630.Prior: 1961 c 232§5;1959 went were transferred to the department of community,trade,and economic c 201 §63.] development by 1993 c 280,effective July 1,1994. Findings—Purpose—Severability-1989 c 335: See notes following 36.70.640 Official controls—Board may initiate, RCW 35.63.170. When it deems it to be for the public interest,the board may Definitions for RCW 36.70.675: See RCW 35.63.170. initiate consideration of an ordinance establishing an official control,or amendments to an existing official control,includ- 36.70.677 Accessory apartments. Any local govern- ing those specified in RCW 36.70.560.The board shall first ment,as,defined in RCW 43.63A.215,that is planning under fprefer the proposed official control or amendment to the plan- this chapter shall comply with RCW 43.63A.215(3). [1993 c pip ning agency for report which shall,thereafter,be considered 478§ 10.] ?1,J and processed in the same manner as that set forth in RCW 3630.630 regarding a change in the recommendation of the 36.70:678 Conditional and special use permit appLi- plantiing agency. [1963 c 4§36.70.640.Prior. 1959 c 201 § cations by parties licensed or certified by the department 64.E of social and health services or the department of correc- tions—Mediation prior to appeal required. A.final deci- 36.70.650 Board final authority. The report and rec- sion by a hearing examiner involving a conditional or special ommendation by the planning agency,whether on a proposed use permit application under this chapter that is requested by control initiated by it,whether on a matter referred back to it a party that is licensed or certified by the department of social by the board for further report,or whether on a matter uiiti and health services orthe department of corrections is subject ated by the board,shall be advisory only and the final deter- to mediation under RCW 35.63.260 before an appeal may be mination shall rest with the board. [1963 c 4 §36.70.650. filed. [1998 c 119§3.] . Prior: 1959 c 201 §65.] 36.70.680 Subdividing and platting. The planning 36.70.660 Procedures for adoption of controls Lim- agency shall review all proposed land plats and subdlvision& ited to planning matters. The provisions of this chapter and make recommendations to the board thereon with refer- with references to the procedures to be followed in the adop- ence to approving,or recommending any modifications nec- lion of official controls shall apply only to establishing offs- essary to assure conformance to the general purposes of the cial controls pertaining to subjects set forth in RCW comprehensive plan and to standards and specifications 36.70.560. [1963 c 4§36.70.660.Prior: 1959 c 201 §66.] established by state law or local controls. •[1963 c 4 § 36.70.680..Prior: 1959 c 201 §68.] 36.70.670 Enforcement—Official controls. The board. may determine and establish administrative rules and proce- 36.70.690 County improvements. No county shall dures for the application and enforcement of official controls, improve any street or lay or authorize the laying of sewers or and may assign or delegate such administrative functions, connections or other improvements to be laid in any street powers and duties to such department or official as may be within any territory for which the board has adopted an offs- appropriate. [1963 c 4§36.70.670.Prior: 1959 c 201 §67.] cial control in the form of precise street map or maps,until the matter has been referred to the planning agency by the 36.70.675 Child care facilities--Review of need and department or official having jurisdiction for a report thereon demand—Adoption of ordinances. Each county that does and a copy of the report has been filed with the department or official making the reference unless one of the following con- not provide for the siting of family day care homes in zones that are designated for single family or other residential uses, ditions apply: and for the siting of mini-day care centers and day care cen- (1) The street has been accepted, opened, or has other- ters in zones that are designated for any residential or corn- wise received legal status of a public street; mercial uses,shall conduct a review of the need and demand (2)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on for child care facilities,including the cost of any conditional the official controls applicable to the subject; or special use permit that may be required.The review shall (3)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on be completed by August 30, 1990. A copy of the findings, a subdivision(land plat)approved by the board. [1963 c 4§ conclusions,and recommendations resulting from the review 36.70.690.Prior:. 1959 c 201 §69.] 2007 21 36.70547 36.70.547 General aviation airports—Siting of light for solar energy systems. [1979 ex.s.c 170§11;1963 c incompatible uses. Every county,city,and town in which 4§36.70.560.Prior 1959 c 201 §56.] • there is located a general aviation airport that is operated for Severability-1979 e=.s.c 170: See note following RCW 64.04.140. the benefit of the general public,whether publicly owned or privately owned public use,shall,through its comprehensive "Solar energy system'defined:RCW 36.70.025. plan and development regulations,discourage the siting of incompatible uses adjacent to such general aviation airport. 36.70.570 Official controls—Adoption. Official con- Such plans and regulations may only be adopted or amended trols shall be adopted by ordinance and shall father the pur- after formal consultation with: Airport owners and manag- pose and objectives of a comprehensive plan and parts ers,private airport operators,general aviation pilots,ports, thereof. [1963 c 4§36.70.570.Prior 1959 c 201 §57.] and the aviation division of the department of transportation. All proposed and adopted plans and regulations shall be filed 36.70.580 Official controls-Public hearing by com- with the aviation division of the department of transportation mission. Before recommending an official control or amend- within a reasonable time after release for public consideration ment to the board for adoption,the commission shall hold at and comment.Each county,city,and town may obtain tech- least one public hearing. [1963 c 4§36.70.580.Prior 1959 nical assistance from the aviation division of the department c 201 §58.] • of transportation to develop plans and regulations consistent with this section. Any additions or amendments to comprehensive plans or 36.70.590 Official controls—Notice of hearing. development regulations required by this section may be Notice of the time,place and purpose of the hearing shall be adopted during the normal course of land-use proceedings. given by one publication in a newspaper of general circula This section applies to every county, city, and town, lion in the county and in the official gazette,if any,of the whether operating under chapter 35.63,35A.63,36.70, [or] county at least ten days before the hearing.The board may 36.70A RCW,or under a charter. [1996 c 239§2.] prescribe additional methods for providing notice. [1963 c 4 §36.70.590.Prior. 1959 c 201 §59.] • 36.70.550 Official controls.. From time to time,the • planning agency may, or if so requested by the board shall, .. 36.70.600 Official controls—Recommendation to cause to be prepared official controls which,when adopted •. board—Required vote. The recommendation to the board by ordinance by the board,will further the objectives and . of any official control or amendments thereto by the planning . goals of the comprehensive plan.The planning agency may agency shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than a also draft such regulations,programs and legislation as may, majority of the total members of the commission. Such in its judgment,be required to preserve the integrity of the approval shall be by a recorded motion which shall ineptly- , comprehensive plan and assure its systematic execution,and . rate the findings of fact of the commission and the reasons for the planning agency may recommend such plans,regulations, . its.action and the motion shall refer expressly to the maps, • programs and legislation to the board for adoption. [1963 c 4 " descriptive and other matters intended by the commission to §36.70.550.Prior. 1959 c201 §55.] constitute the plan, or amendment, addition or extension thereto.The indication of approval by the commission shall 36.70.560 Official controls—Forms of controls. Off- be recorded on the map and descriptive matter by the signs- vial controls may include: tures of the chairman and the secretary of the commission and (1)Maps showing the exact boundaries of zones within of such others as the commission in its rules may designate. each of which separate controls over the type and degree of [1963 c 4§36.70.600.Prior. 1961 c 232 §.3; 1959 c 201 § , permissible land uses are defined; 60.] (2)Maps for streets showing the exact alignment,gradi- ents,dimensions and other pertinent features,and including 36.70.610 Official controls—Reference to board. A specific controls with reference to protecting such accurately copy of any official control or amendment recommended defined future rights-of-way against encroachment by build- pursuant to RCW 36.70.550, 36.70.560, 36.70.570 and ings,other physical structures or facilities; 36.70.580 shall be submitted to the board not later than four- (3)Maps for other public facilities,such as parks,play- teen days following the action by the commission and shall grounds, civic centers, etc., showing exact location, size, be accompanied by the motion of the planning agency boundaries and other related features,including appropriate approving the same,together with a statement setting forth regulations protecting such future sites against encroachment the factors considered at the hearing,and analysis of fmdings by buildings and other physical structures or facilities; considered by the commission to be controlling. [1963 c 4§ (4)Specific regulations and controls pertaining to other 36.70.610.Prior: 1961 c 232§4; 1959 c 201 §61.] subjects incorporated in the comprehensive plan or establish- ing standards and procedures to be employed in land devel- 36.70.620 Official controls—Action by board. Upon opment including,but not limited to,subdividing of land and receipt of any recommended official control or amendment the approval of land plats and the preservation of streets and thereto,the board shall at its next regular public meeting set lands for other public purposes requiring future dedication or the date for a public meeting where it may,by ordinance, acquisition and general design of physical improvements, adopt or reject the official control or amendment. [1963 c 4 and the encouragement and protection of access to direct sun- §36.70.620.Prior. 1959 c 201 §62.] 20 2007 ' 18.45.050 application fee shall be required for applications received by the deadline set forth in subsection for suggested amendments. (2)(a)of this section,shall not be processed. [Ord. (2) Application Deadline—Form. 2-06§ 1] t (a) Deadline. All applications for formal site-specific and suggested amendments shall be 1845.050 Compilation of preliminary docket. submitted to DCD by March 1st of the current cal- (1) Preliminary Docket—Contents.The.prelim- endar year in order to be considered during that inary docket described more fully in subsections year's amendment process; except that county- (2) through(4) of this section shall consist of the sponsored proposals to amend the capital facilities following: element of the Comprehensive Plan may be (a) All proposals for formal site-specific . P P � accepted later than other proposed amendments amendments; because of their relationship to the county's annual (b) All proposals for suggested amend- budget process. ments;and (b) Application Form.All proposed amend- , (c) When applicable, all amendments rec- meats(i.e.,both formal site-specific and suggested) ommended by the planning commission during its shall be submitted to DCD on forms provided by periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan. the department and shall include the following (2) List of Suggested Amendments.Bach year, information,as determined by the administrator to the administrator shall maintain for public review be necessary to evaluate a particular proposal: the annual list of suggested amendments made by . (i) Name and address of applicant; citizens, the board of county commissioners or (ii) A description of the proposed Com- members of the board of county commissioners, prehensive Plan amendment and any associated de- county staff,county departments or other agencies. velopment proposals, if applicable..Formal site- By the end of the second full business week of specific or project-related amendments shall in- March of each year, this list of suggested amend- elude plans, information and/or studies that accu- meats shall be compiled into a preliminary docket. rately•depict existing and proposed use(s) and JCC 18.45.060 sets forth the process for selecting 'improvements. Proposed site-specific or project- which suggested amendments will be placed on the related.Comprehensive Plan'amendments that do final docket to be formally reviewed during the not specify proposed use(s) and potential impacts annual review process. will be assumed to have maximum impact to the en- (3) Formal Site-Specific Amendments. The . vironment and public facilities and services; preliminary docket shall also include all formal (iii) Proposed . amendatory language, site-specific applications for Comprehensive Plan preferably shown in a"bill"format(i.e.,new Ian- amendments.Formal site-specific applications for guage underlined; language proposed for deletion amendments that are properly and timely filed in strikeouts); under JCC 18.45.040(2)(a) shall be placed on the (iv) An explanation of the rationale for final docket for consideration during the current the proposed amendment; annual amendment process. • (v) An explanation of how the proposed (4) Planning Commission Periodic Assessment amendment and, associated development pro- _ —Recommendations. posal(s),if any,conform to,conflict with,or relate (a) Periodic Assessment — Timelines. The . to the criteria set forth in JCC 18.45.080(1)(c)and. planning commission shall review, and if neces- (1)(d),as applicable; sary, recommend revisions to the Comprehensive (vi)•If color copies,maps or other visuals Plan during the periodic assessment,in accordance are desired the applicant shall submit 20 color cop- with RCW 36.70A.130.The planning commission ies; shall complete its assessment of the Comprehen- (vii) A completed SBPA checklist sive Plan by November 1st of the year prior to the including the supplement sheet for nonproject assessment. Any amendments recommended by a actions if the application is for a formal site-spe- majority vote of the planning commission shall be • cific amendment;and forwarded to the administrator by March 1st of the (viii) Any additional information reason- year in which the periodic assessment is con- ably deemed necessary by the administrator to ducted.The administrator shall place all such rec- evaluate the proposed amendment. ommended amendments on the preliminary docket (3) Failure to Comply — Bffect. Applications to be considered during the final docket selection i that do not include the information required under process set forth in JCC 18.45.060. subsection(2)(b) of this section, or which are not (Revised 2106) 18-260 Jefferson County Code 18.45.060'' (b) Criteria Governing Planning Commis- notice of the joint workshop meeting shall be given sion Assessment.The planning commission's peri- by publication in the county's official newspaper at ' odic assessment and recommendation shall be least one time 10 days prior to the date of the meet- based upon,but shall not be limited to, an inquiry ing and by posting a copy of the meeting notice.at into the following growth management indicators: the county courthouse,which shall include a state- (11) Whether growth and development as• meat of the purpose of the joint workshop. envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan is occurring (3) Planning Commission Hearing—Report and faster or slower than anticipated, or is failing to Recommendation.The planning commission shall materialize; hold a noticed public hearing to accept public com- (ii) Whether the capacity of the county to meat regarding the suggested amendments on the provide adequate services has diminished or preliminary docket. Following the hearing, the increased; planning commission shall prepare a report and rec- (iii) Whether sufficient urban land is ommendation identifying those suggested amend- designated and zoned to meet projected demand meats that it is recommending for consideration by and need; the board of county commissioners during the . (iv) Whether any of the assumptions annual amendment process.The planning commis- upon which the plan is based are no longer found sion's recommendation shall be based upon the per- . to be valid; ceived need, urgency and appropriateness of each • (v) Whether changes in county-wide atti- suggested amendment The planning commission's tudes necessitate amendments to the goals of the report and recommendation shall also include those plan and the basic. values, embodied within the proposed amendments resulting from the periodic Comprehensive Plan Vision Statement; assessment set forth in JCC18.45.050(4),as appli- (vi) Whether changes in circumstances cable.Notice of the planning commission hearing dictate a need for amendments; shall be given by publication in the county's official (vii) Whether inconsistencies exist be- newspaper at least one 10 days prior to the date tween the Comprehensive Plan and the GMA or the of the meeting and by posting a copy of thehearing Comprehensive Plan and the County-wide Plan- notice at the county courthouse,which shall include ning Policy for Jefferson County. [Ord.2-06§ 1] a statement of the purpose of the hearing. 18.4 .060 Review of preliminary — (4) Board of Commissioners Decision—Adop-. p Wninary docket tion of Final Docket. Adoption of final docket. (a) Review and Decision Process. By.the (1) DCD Review of Preliminary Docket. After second regular board of county commissioners compiling the preliminary docket, the administra- meeting in May of each year, the board of county tor shall review the suggested amendments and pre- commissioners shall review and consider the plan- pare a report concerning which suggested amend- ning commission s" re_ it and recommended final ments the administrator believes should be placed d is et at ar y schedu a commissioners . on the final docket for consideration during the an- mm g.The board of county commissioners may nual amendment process.In addition to addressing adopt the planning commission s reco the need,urgency and appropriateness of each sug- final docket without a public hearing;however,in gested amendment, the staff report shall include, th(event that a majority of the board of county but not be limited to,a consideration of the follow- commissioners eci es o a or subtract sug- ing gestkiamendments it shall fusthold apublic hear- (a) The availability of sufficient DCD staff in ,.noticed as set forth in subsetio of this to substantively review the suggested amendments section, w_c shall be held by the first boar-.of and manage the public review process with avail- county commissioners meeting in July. able staff;and final ocket — on . The final (b) Anticipated DCD costs and budget for docket as adopted by the board of county commis- processing the suggested amendments. •sioners shall include the following: (2) Optional Board of County Commissioners/ (i) All applications for formal site-spe- Planning Commission Workshop. The board of cific amendments timely submitted under ICC county commissioners and planning commission 18.45.050(3); • may, but are not required to, hold a noticed joint (ii) Any proposals for suggested amend- workshop meeting to gather information regarding meats which the board of county commissioners the items on the preliminary docket and the admin- elects to consider during the annual amendment istrator's report and recommendation. If held, process;and 18-261 (Revised 21)6) 18.45.070 (iii) When applicable, any amendments (i) The purpose(s) of amending and/or recommended by the planning commission during updating the Comprehensive Plan; its periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan (ii) The deadline for submitting com- 1 that the board of county commissioners elects to ments on the amendments;and consider during the amendment process. (iii) A tentative hearing schedule;contin- (c) Effect of Final Adopted.Docket. The ued hearings may be held by the planning commis- decision of the board of county commissioners to t no additional notices need be published. . adopt the final docket does not constitute a decision ) Required Findings — Generally. For all or recommendation that the substance of any for- proposed amendments, the planning commission mat site-specific, suggested, or planning commis- shall develop findings and conclusions and a rec- sion recommended amendment should be adopted. ommendation which consider the growth manage- No additional amendment proposals shall be con- ment indicators set forth in JCC 18.45.050(4)(bxi) sidered by the county after adoption of the final through(4)(b)(vii),as well as the following: docket for that year; except for exceptions and (i) Whether circumstances related to the emergencies as set forth in JCC 18.45.030, and proposed amendment and/or the area in which it is county-sponsored proposals to amend the capital located have substantially changed since the adop- facilities element of the Comprehensive Plan as set tion of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; forth in JCC 18.45.040(2)(a). [Ord.2-06§ 1]. (ii) Whether the assumptions upon which the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan is based 18.45.070 Final docket—DCD review and are no longer valid,or whether new information is recommendation—SEPA review. available which was not considered during the The final docket as adopted by the board of adoption process or any annual amendments of the county commissioners shall first be reviewed and Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan;and assessed by DCD,and the administrator shall pre- ('iii) Whether the proposed amendment U pare it staff report and recommendation on each reflects current widely held values of the residents PI proposed amendment.DCD shall also be responsi- of Jefferson County. ble for conducting SEPA review of all items on the (c) Additional Required Findings—Formal final docket(see Article X of Chapter 18.40 JCC). Site-Specific Amendments. In addition to the As appropriate,the administrator shall solicit com required findings set forth in subsection(1)(b) of ments regarding the proposed amendments from this section, in order to recommend approval of a the public and/or government agencies. The formal site-specific proposal to amend the Com- administrator shall also provide notice and oppor- prehensive Plan, the planning commission must tunity for public comment as deemed appropriate also make the following findings: given the nature of the proposed amendments and (i) The proposed site-specific amend- consistent with RCW 36.70A.140 and SEPA ment meets concurrency requirements for trans- (Chapter 43.21C RCW and Chapter 197-11 WAC). portation and does not adversely affect adopted • - § 1] level of service standards for other public facilities . and services(e.g.,sheriff,fire and emergency med- 18.45.080 '` I + docket Planning commission ical services,parks,fire flow,and general govern- .nd board of county commissioners mental services); review. (ii) The proposed site-specific amend- Planning Commission Review. All pro- ment is consistent with the goals, policies and posed amendments on the final docket shall be re- implementation strategies of the various elements viewed and assessed by the planning commission, of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; which shall make a recommendation to the board of (iii) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners after holding at least one ment will not result in probable significant adverse open record public hearing. impacts to the county's transportation network, (a) Notice.The hearing before the planning capital facilities,utilities,parks,and environmental commission shall be noticed by one publication in features that cannot be mitigated,and will not place the official newspaper of the county at least 10 days uncompensated burdens upon bxisting or planned prior to the date of the hearing and by posting a service capabilities; copy of the notice of hearing in the Jefferson (iv) In the case of a site-specific amend- County Courthouse. This notice shall include the ment to the land use map, that the subject parcels following: are physically suitable for the requested land use (Revised 2/06) 18-262 Jefferson County Code 18.45.090 ' designation and the anticipated land use develop- Comprehensive Plan amendments may be com- ment,including,but not limited to,the following: biped with any notice or public hearing for pro- ' s. (A) Access; posed amendments to the county's Comprehensive (B) Provision of utilities;and Plan implementing regulations(e.g., this code),or . (C) Compatibility with existing and for other actions of the board of county commis- planned surrounding land uses; - sioners. • (v) The proposed site-specific amend- (c) Criteria for.Evaluation of Proposed Plan ment will not create a pressure to change the land Amendments.The board of county commissioners use designation of other properties, unless the shall apply the same criteria as the planning com- change of land use designation for other properties mission as setforth in subsections(1)(b)and(1)(c) is in the long-term best interests of the county as a of this section,as applicable. whole; (d) Adoption by Ordinance. The board of (vi) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners shall adopt any amend- ment does not materially affect the land use and ments to the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan population growth projections that are the bases of by ordinance.This final action on the docket must the Comprehensive Plan; be taken by the second regular board meeting in •(vii) If within an unincorporated urban Dumber of each year. . .growth area (UGA), the proposed site-specific (e) Transco M to State. The administrator amendment does not materially affect the ade- shall transmit a.copy of any proposed amendment quacy or availability of urban facilities and ser- of the Comprehensive Plan to the Washington vices to the immediate area and the overall UGA; State Office of Community Development(OCD)at (viii) The proposed amendment is con- least 60 days prior to the expected date of final sistent with the Growth Management Act(Chapter action by the board of county commissioners, as 36.70A RCW), the County-Wide Planning.Policy consistent with Chapter 36.70A RCW.The admin- . for Jefferson County, any other.applicable inter- istrator shall transmit a copy of any adopted Com- jurisdictional policies or agreements,and any other prehensive Plan amendment to OCD within 10 local,state or federal laws. days after adoption by the board. (d) Recommendation. The planning coin- (1) Appeals. All appeals to the adoption of mission's findings and conclusions shall include a . an amendment to the.Jefferson County Compre- recommendation to the board of county commis- hensive Plan shall be filed with and processed by . sioners that the proposed amendment(s)be denied, the Western Washington Growth Management approved, or approved with conditions or modifi- Hearings Board in accordance with the provisions cations. of Chapter 36.70A RCW.[Ord.2-06§1] (2) Board of County Commissioners Review— Appeals. 18.45.090 Amendments to GMA implementing (a) Board of County Commissioners Work- regulations. shop.The board of county commissioners may first (1) Initiation. The text of the county's adopted review the recommendation of the planning coin- Comprehensive Plan implementing regulations mission in a workshop meeting(s). (also referred to within this code as"development (b) Board of County Commissioners regulations") may be amended at any time, pro- Review.The board of county commissioners shall vided the amendment is consistent with the Jeffer- consider the proposed amendments to the Compre- son County Comprehensive Plan and land use map. hensive Plan at a regularly scheduled meeting. If When inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan after considering the matter at the regularly ached- and land use map, the amendment shall be pro- uled public meeting the board of county commis- cessed concurrent with any necessary plan amend- sioners deems a change in the recommendation of ments using the process and timelines for plan the planning commission to be necessary, the amendments set forth in this chapter. "Implement- change shall not be incorporated until the board ing regulations" means the controls placed on conducts its own public hearing using the proce= development or land use activities by the county, dunes set forth under ICC 18.40.310.The hearing including,but not limited to,this Unified Develop- shall be noticed by one publication in the official ment Code,the Jefferson County Shoreline Master newspaper of the county at least 10 days prior to the Program,or any other official controls required to • date of the hearing, and by posting copies of the implement the plan (see RCW 36.70A.030). Pro- ' notice of hearing in the Jefferson County Court- posed amendments,changes,or modifications may house.The notice and public hearing for proposed • be initiated as follows: 18-263 (Revised 26) 18.45.090 (a) When consistent with the plan, at any (b) If after applying the criteria set forth in time at the direction of the board of county com- JCC 18.45.080(1)(b)and(1)(c), as applicable,the missioners or by the planning commission pursu- board of county commissioners concludes that a ant to RCW 36.70.550; change in the recommendation of the planning (b) When inconsistent with the plan,under commission is necessary, the change shall not be the process and time lines for Comprehensive Plan incorporated until the board conducts its own pub- amendments by any interested person consistent lic hearing using the procedures set forth under with this chapter;or JCC 18.40.310. The hearing shall be noticed by (c) Immediately following or concurrent one publication in the official newspaper of the with an amendment or amendments to the letter- county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- son County Comprehensive Plan, the implement- ing,and by posting copies of the notice of hearing ing regulations shall be amended to be consistent in the Jefferson County Courthouse. The notice with the plan and land use map. and public hearing for proposed amendments to (2) Notice. 0 implementing regulations'may be combined with (a) Proposed amendments to the implement- any notice or public hearing for proposed amend- ing regulations pursuant to subsection (1) of this meats to the Comprehensive Plan or for other section which must be processed concurrently with actions of the board of county commissioners. an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan and land (5) Transmittal to State.The administrator shall use map shall be processed and noticed in the same transmit a copy of any proposed amendment(s)to manner as plan amendments consistent with this the implementing regulations at least 60 days prior chapter. to the expected date of final action by the board of (b) Notice of any hearing on amendments to county commissioners,as consistent with Chapter the implementing regulations generated by DCD 36.70A RCW. The administrator shall transmit a staff, the board.of county commissioners or the copy of any adopted amendment(s),to the imple-• planning commission outside of the annual Com menting regulations to OCD within•10 days after prehensive Plan amendment process shall be given adoption by the board. - by one publication in the official newspaper of the (6) Appeals.All appeals to the adoption of any county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- amendment(s) to the implementing regulations big and by posting a copy of the notice of hearing shall be filed with and processed by the Western in the Jefferson County Courthouse. Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (c). Any additional notice required by state, in accordance with the provisions-of Chapter or local law(e.g.,statutory notice requirements for 36.70A RCW.[Ord 2-06§ 1] amendments to the Shoreline Master Program), or deemed appropriate by the administrator, shall be paid for by the applicant. (3) Planning Commission Review. The plan- ning commission shall hold a public hearing on any amendment(s)to the implementing regulations and shall make a recommendation to the board of county commissioners using the site-specific crite- ria set forth in JCC 1.8.45.080(1)(b) and(1)(c), as applicable. (4) Board of County Commissioners Review. The board of county commissioners shall consider the proposed amendments at a regularly scheduled meeting. (a) If after applying the criteria set forth in JCC 18.45.080(1)(b)and(l)(c), as applicable, the board of county commissioners concludes that no change in the recommendation of the planning commission is necessary, the board may make a final determination on the proposed amendment(s) and adopt the amendments as recommended by the planning commission, (Revised 2/06) 18-264 1 18.30.150 Signs. No sign shall hereafter be erected or used for any purpose or in any manner except as permitted by the regulations of this section or as specified elsewhere in this code.All signs subject to this section shall be subject to approval and issuance of a sign permit by the administrator according to a Type 1 permit approval process as specified in Chapter 18.40 JCC.The administrator may waive certain requirements of this section or require additional conditions for any sign permit,if deemed necessary to maintain consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. (1) Prohibited Signs.The following signs are prohibited: (a) Abandoned signs; (b) Billboards; (c) Flashing,revolving or moving signs,excepting clocks; (d) Off-site signs which advertise a business; (e) Signs or sign structures,which by coloring,shape,working,or location resemble or conflict with traffic-control signs or devices; (f) Signs which create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic;and (g) Signs attached to utility poles or traffic signs. (2) Exemptions.The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section: (a) Traffic and standardized public signs installed by a government entity; (b) Window and merchandise displays,point of purchase advertising displays such as product dispensers and barber poles; (c) National flags,flags of a political subdivision,and symbolic flags of an institution or business; (d) Legal notices required by law; (e) Historic site plaques and markers and gravestones; (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing";, =-{Deleted: or (g) , olitical messages- --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- -- {Deleted:p t(h) Structures intended for separate use,such as recycling containers and phone Deleted:= not to exceed eight square booths; N feet (i) Real estate signs;and {Deleted: (j) Lettering painted on or magnetically flush-mounted onto a motor vehicle operating in the normal course of business. (3) Design Standards.All signs must meet the following standards: (a) The following standards apply to the illumination and illustration of signs: (i) The illumination of signs shall be shaded,shielded,or directed so the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect-surrounding-properties-or public and private rights-of-way or create a hazard or nuisance to the traveling public,or to surrounding properties. (ii) No sign or part thereof shall consist of rotating,revolving,or moving parts; consist of banners,streamers,or spinners;or involve flashing,blinking,or alternating lights.An exception to this standard is temporary signs associated with local festivals, fairs,parades,or special events pursuant to subsection(4)(a)of this section. (b) Sign size shall be regulated as follows: (i) The total square footage of signs shall not exceed 64 square feet for any business within any commercial or industrial land use district.Multitenant developments may have one freestanding sign for each access point,commonly identifying the businesses within multitenant developments provided such signs total no more than 64 square feet in aggregate.The maximum aggregate size for projection signs placed on a building is limited to one percent of the floor areas of the building,except that each occupant is allowed a sign of at least two square feet.In no case may an individual occupant's sign be larger than 15 square feet. (ii) The square footage of signs shall be calculated by the outside dimensions necessary to frame the information displayed.No sign mounted on a building shall extend above or beyond the eave,rake,or parapet of the wall on which it is mounted.Any sign projecting beyond six inches from a perpendicular wall shall be at least seven feet above grade. (iii) Directional,identification or advertising signs for any use located in any rural residential district shall not exceed 32 square feet,with the exception of institutional use signs,which shall not exceed 64 square feet. (c) Uses located in any rural commercial or industrial land use districts shall have no more than two on-premises signs except as allowed in this section for multitenant developments. (d) Signs attached to or painted against the structure to which it relates shall be computed as a part of the overall total square footage,or number of signs allowed. (e) All signs shall be continuously maintained. Signs that present a public hazard as determined by the Jefferson County building official or department of public works shall be subject to abatement. (f) The design of freestanding signs shall include measures to restrict vehicles from passing beneath them,unless otherwise permitted by the Jefferson County department of public works.All free standing pole signs or projecting signs shall provide pedestrian clearance to a minimum of eight feet,where applicable. (g) Signs should be incorporated into the landscaping of the site when landscaping is provided. (h) No signs,other than those related to water dependent uses,such as a marina,are permitted to face seaward,excepting signs relating to safety concerns,such as cable- crossing,construction-dredging,fuel area,etc. (i) No sign shall be placed in the public right-of-way or in the vision clearance triangle of intersections and curb cuts,unless otherwise approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (4) Specialty Signs.Specialty signs may be established when consistent with the standards set forth below: (a) Signs and banners promoting public festivals,community or special events,and grand openings may be displayed up to 30 days prior to the event,and shall be removed no later than seven days after the event.The sponsoring entity is responsible for sign removal.Event signs may be located"off-site." (b) Signs which identify a recognized community or unincorporated place are permitted at each entrance to the community.Said signs are limited to one per entrance, and may not exceed 64 square feet or eight feet in height.Signs relating to clubs, societies,orders,fraternities and the like shall be permitted as part of the community sign. (c) Businesses may erect temporary on-site sandwich board signs subject to the following criteria: (i) No more than two sandwich board signs may be erected per business; (ii) Sandwich board signs shall not exceed four feet in height or three feet in width; (iii) Sandwich board signs shall be displayed during business hours only; (iv) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed on sidewalks;and (v) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed in public road rights-of-way unless approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (d) Off-site signs may only be allowed when they meet all of the following standards: (i) Are directional in nature; (ii) Located on private property along a major or minor arterial; (iii) Located no more than 600 feet from an intersection;and (iv) No larger than 12 square feet. (5) Nonconforming Signs.Legally established signs in place prior to the adoption of these standards and not in conformance with these standards shall be considered legal, nonconforming signs,and may remain as provided below: (a) Nonconforming off-premises signs shall be removed within five years of adoption of this code.Until then,such signs must be continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered.Nonconforming off-premises signs may be replaced by off-site directional signs as allowed in this section. (b) Nonconforming on-premises signs may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered. (c) Billboards which are in place prior to the adoption of the ordinance codified in this code may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered. [Ord. 11-00 §6.15] va4 X4/1 District No. 1 Commissioner:Phil Johnson #44.Q,4'SON 006 District No.2 Commissioner:David W.Sullivan 4rf 141.01:4 District No.3 Commissioner:John Austin County Administrator:John F.Fischbach $ Clerk of the Board:Loma Delaney ijr T3G•S0 MINUTES Week of'Ytery 20,2007 Commissioner Phil Johnson called the meeting to order in the presence of Commissioner g P David W. Sullivan and Commissioner John Austin. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD: The following comments were made by citizens. Several people stated that they support the reappointment of Jim Hagan and Dennis Schultz to the Planning Commission;the people on the Critical Areas Ordinance(CAO)Committee are volunteers and should be commended for their hard work;the County needs to consider the landowners who will be adversely affected by the regulations they adopt;the Washington Environmental Counsel declined to participate on the CAO Committee when they were invited;property rights are civil rights according to recent case law;if the Board accepts the minority report of the CAO,they won't get re-elected;Commissioner Austin's campaign flyer said that he would listen to his constituents;the County needs to stop stonewalling businesses that want to expand; the Commissioners took an oath to uphold the State and the U.S. Constitution;the developers of the Planned Rural Residential Development at the Discovery Bay Golf Course want to change the plan and eliminate the golf course;the Board's meetings should be video taped and put on PTTV;the legislation on the Puget Sound Partnership is being revised,but the end result of usurping local authority is the same;and the majority of the CAO Committee members do not represent the pro-environmental views of the citizens of the County. APPROVAL AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSENT AGENDA:Commissioner Austin moved to approve the Consent Agenda. Commissioner Sullivan seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. 1. RESOLUTION NO. 17-07 re:Adopting a Disbursement Policy 2. RESOLUTION NO. 18-07 re:Authorization for Auditor to Sign Payroll 3. RESOLUTION.NO. 19-07 re: Establishing Standard for the Annual Inventory of the Capitalized Fixed Assets 4. NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING re: East Jefferson County Off-Highway Vehicle(OHV) Feasibility Study Report; Scheduled for Monday,February 26,2007 at 1:30 p.m. at the Quilcene Community Center 5. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re: Educational and Therapeutic Services for Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years and Their Families;Jefferson County Public Health;Holly Ridge Center • Page 1 • Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 6. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Developmental Disability Educational and Therapeutic Services for South Jefferson County Families and their Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years; Jefferson County Public Health;Concerned Citizens 7. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Voter Registration and Election System;Jefferson County Auditor,DFM Associates 8. AGREEMENT re:Guardrail Installation;Paradise Bay Road Project No. CR1148-4;Jefferson County Public Works;Petersen Brothers,Inc. 9. Payment of Jefferson County Vouchers/Warrants Dated February 13,2007 Totaling$4,531.32 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with vouchers approved and signed by the Board of Jefferson County Commissioners are retained by the Jefferson County Auditor and Public Works Department.) 10. Payment of Jefferson County A/P Warrants Done by Payroll Dated February 6,2007 Totaling $128,766.31 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with A/P Warrants approved by the Payroll Services Manager are retained in the Jefferson County Auditor's Office.) 11. Letter of Appreciation for Donation of Hand Carved Monkey Tree Wooden Bowl from Courthouse Neighbors 12. Letter Regarding Support of House Bill 1167,Preserving the Viability of Agricultural Lands; Representative Geoff Simpson,Chair,House Local Government Committee APPROVAL OF MINUTES:Commissioner Sullivan moved to approve the minutes of February 5,2007. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. Ferry Advisory Committee Interviews and Possible Appointment: The Board interviewed Peter Bonyun,Tom Thiersch,Tim Snider,Peter Hanke,Dr.Albert Abrams and Fred Beck. Dr Abrams and Fred Beck currently serve on the advisory committee and their terms are expiring. There are also two vacant positions. There are five members on the committee. After the interviews,the Board asked the County Administrator to see if more than five member can serve on the Ferry Advisory Committee. The appointments will be scheduled on next week's agenda. Discussion re:Revisions to Jefferson County Code 18.3 0.1 S0 regarding Political Signs: Director of Community Development Al Scalf reported that the Board has stated that they think it is in the public interest to amend the Jefferson County Code regarding political sign regulations. Staff has recommended that political signs be exempt unless they exceed the threshold for a building permit. If the Board agrees with the proposed language,it will be forwarded to the Planning Commission for a public hearing and final recommendation. Commissioner Sullivan asked about the sign size limits. Building Official Fred Slota replied that he only deals with the structure of a sign. A 32 square foot sign is engineered and built to withstand the wind. He thinks a sign exceedingl6 square feet would need a permit,but it would not have to be engineered. Page 2 y Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 The Board noted their concerns about political signs that could create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic. Al Scalf explained that signs that create a safety hazard are prohibited,even if they are listed under Exemptions in the Code. The Board asked that this language be clarified. Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining(2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as `yard sale"or `no trespassing";(g)political signs;and(i)real estate signs in one clause. There was a discussion about the maximum size for all exempt signs. The Building Official stated that the International Building Code(IBC)does not recommend a size. Al Scalf explained that the current County policy requires engineered plans for signs in excess of 32 square feet or six feet above grade. A building permit is required for any freestanding sign with posts if the top of the sign exceeds six feet above grade and the sign exceeds 16 square feet in size. Commissioner Sullivan suggested that all exempt signs not exceed 16 square feet. Commissioner Sullivan moved to forward the Sign Ordinance(JCC 18.30.150)to the Planking Commission and combine(2)(f)(g)and(i)in one clause,including language that clarifies when a building permit is required and when it is exempt, and that(2)Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The Board met in Executive Session from 11:30 a.m.to Noon with the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,Outside Legal Counsel,the County Administrator and the Director of Community Development regarding actual litigation • NOTICE OF ADJOURNMENT:Commissioner Sullivan moved to adjourn the meeting at 12:17 p.m. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The next meeting is schdfor Monday,February 26,2007 at 9 a.m. MEETING JOURNEr =;4y �; JEFFERSON COUNTY • { < ; BOARD 0. CO) I ISSIONERS SEAM ' i;` r • 1 . 4 dit,� iv • . sly..,� Phi o • .,Chair ATTEST. y, . a4# _ r DaVI 11 em er ulie Matthes, CMC _ Deputy Clerk of the Board Jo Austin, ember • Page 3 MEETING AGENDA Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:30 P.M. WSU Community Learning Center,Port Hadlock 6:30 Call to Order(Roll Call,Quorum,Approve Minutes of February 21,March 7 and March 21) Bud Schindler, Chair Staff Updates Committee Reports General Public Comments A. Public Hearing—2007 Comp Plan Amendments Preliminary Docket(Suggested) Open Public Hearing Staff Report Public Testimony Close Public Hearing Planning Commission Discussion and Recommendation to BOCC for Final Docket B. Proposed Planning Commission By-Law Amendment C. Review Process for CAO Committee Reports to Planning Commission D. introduction to Sign Ordinance Revisions General Public Comments Summary of tonight's meeting and forward look at agenda issues for the next meeting 9:30 Adjournment NOTE: The Planning Commission may add and take action on other items not listed on this agenda. Guidelines for Public Comment: 1)Be concise. Summarize your questions/concerns. If you have substantial background information to support your comments,please submit in writing. 2)Be civil. Focus on issues not individuals. Personal attacks,derogatory language and threatening remarks will not be tolerated. 3)Speak clearly. Speak loudly&slowly enough so you are heard. Explain any jargon and acronyms you use. Excerpt from Planning Commission Minutes for April 18,2007 Karen Barrows provided an introduction to the sign ordinance revisions. She referred to • the BOCC minutes for the week of February 20, 2007,on the issue of JCC 18.30.150 regarding signs. The BOCC thought it was in the public interest to amend the JCC regarding political sign regulations. Al Scalf explained that the BOCC had utilized a provision of the Planning Enabling Act called"A Board Initiated Control". Earlier, staff had done a review of how other jurisdictions regulate political(campaign) signs. As a result, staff provided a recommendation to the BOCC that political messages be allowed as an outright exemption. Staff took this Board initiated control to the BOCC on February 20. The BOCC expressed some concerns, some related to airplane banners or building code issues or real estate signs. He suggested that it may be appropriate for the Building Official to come and meet with the Planning Commission. He suggested that the Planning Commission schedule the issue at a later meeting for deliberations and to make a recommendation to the BOCC. Mr. Scalf referred to a pertinent court case— Collier vs. the City of Tacoma- a suggested the Planning Commission may want to consider it. The commissioners agreed to allow input from a real estate professional who was present. Karen Best said that real estate signs are treated differently than political signs. She urged the Planning Commission to keep realtors involved in the process regarding the sign revisions. This particular proposal does not affect real estate signs. Henry asked if there are issues with real estate signs or if it is only political signs that are at issue. If it is just political signs, he suggested the Planning Commission deal with that and move on. Al Scalf responded that the staff draft proposal only addressed political signs. However, the commission may want to also consider the concerns expressed by the BOCC as reflected in their February 20 minutes. The commission could prepare its own code draft and hold a public hearing. He reported that the BOCC had suggested the Planning Commission examine the code as written for consistency, whether it was fair across the board. He also recommended that the commissioners also read Collier vs. City of Tacoma to see the legal issues surrounding signs, including the Constitutional right of free speech. The commissioners invited Mike Belenski to address the sign issue. Mike Belinski explained that he had contested the recommendation that political signs be reduced to a limit of eight square feet while real estate signs could be larger. He had even gone to court for an injunction. His opinion was that they wanted to limit political signs to 16 square feet and he did not think they could not do that. He thought the First Amendment free speech rights were unlimited. In order to restrict that, you had to show a compelling government interest. He spoke about the amount of money some political candidates may spend on advertising in the media while some other candidate may only be able to afford signs. He said that whatever the county adopted, it should be internally consistent across the board. He also referred to the Collier vs. City of Tacoma case as something the county needed to comply with. He did not think there was any harm with a person putting a political sign in his yard and he did not think someone should have to pay for a permit for the privilege. Motion by Edel Sokol, seconded by Mike Whittaker,to accept staff's recommendation to exempt political signs and to remove the size limitation. The motion carried unanimously (8-0-0). Al S calf stated that he would review the sizes of 16 square feet versus 32 square feet with the Building Official. He explained that JCC 18.30.150 was the Zoning section of the code. The Building Code was JCC Title 15 and addressed structural issues. planning agency. Note well that the PC did NOT hold a noticed public hearing on this issue. My review of both RCW 36.70.580 and JCC 18.45.090(3)indicates that the PC"shall hold a public hearing" before making any recommendation to the BoCC. So there has to be a public hearing before the PC prior to the"planning agency"forwarding its recommendation to the BoCC. After that hearing,the recommendation of the planning agency,referred to as a report in the Planning Enabling Act,will be brought to the BoCC via an Agenda Request Item from DCD. The BoCC is required to deliberate on the substance of the report at the.first public meeting per RCW 36.70.620. If the BoCC wants to adopt precisely the text that was recommended to them, then they can adopt the "official control" at a second public meeting WITHOUT holding a public hearing. If the BoCC wants to adopt any different text,then it must hold a public hearing before adopting its preferred text at a second public meeting. See RCW 36.70.620 and RCW 36.70.630. That public hearing would need the normal not less than 10 days' notice in order to comply with the notice requirements found in RCW 36.70.590 and JCC 18.45.090(4). Following this process would also represent compliance with the"public participation"requirements of Ch. 36.70A RCW(GMA)which also apply but don't go into detail about the precise steps that equate with sufficient public participation. Text changes to fix typographical errors or to,for example,reorder the exemptions would not require a public hearing. David Alvarez. 2 Juelanne Dalzell ' --i;;;%..- j JEFFERSON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY i T '` =� Courthouse—P.O.Box 1220 . ,ter- Q. -y -' t•f;X• •A. Port Townsend,Washington 98368 '';'t° '.- ' .'It`` - -'' Telephone(360)385-9180 FAX(360)385-0073 . a1`, .0. u . .I, ' P ( ) ( ) APt � k C� � _ David W.Alvarez,Deputy Prosecutor 1- 1 r� •'- Katherine Gulmert,Deputy Prosecutor "` `j, " J '— '� Edward B.DeBray,Deputy Prosecutor JEFF00ON COUNTY SEAT.-PORT TOWN800.WASHINGTON Rafael E.Urquia,Deputy Prosecutor Thomas A.Brotherton,Deputy Prosecutor Lianne Perron-Kossow,Victim Witness Advocate April 4, 2008 NOT CONFIDENTIAL To: County Commission Frank Gifford, T.I. County Admin. Karen Barrows, DCD Stacie Hoskins, DCD Al Scalf, DCD From: David Alvarez, Chief Civil DPA Re: Sign Ordinance The need for an amendment to the JCC at§18.30.150(2), an amendment that would remove the 8 square feet size limitation on political signs,a limitation only impacting political signs, was prompted by Mr.Belenski's lawsuit in Clallam County(Cause#06-2-00894-7)and the injunction against enforcing that rule entered against the County under that cause number in October 2006. Note,however that the BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act of 1963 at RCW 36.70.640 to send an"official control"or,in this case,an amendment to an"official control" to the"planning agency" (DCD and the PC combined) for a report. Pursuant to that authority,the BoCC discussed the need for changes to this section of the JCC with planning and building/inspection staff from DCD on February 20,2007 and subsequent to that discussion passed a motion forwarding their proposed text changes for JCC §18.30.150(2) [known as the "Sign Ordinance"] to the Planning Commission or"PC." The PC deliberated on the proposal on April 18, 2007 and voted 8-0 to accept staff's --recommendation that simply removed the size cap on political signs and gave political signs their own subsection under JCC §18.20.150(2). In sum,DCD proposed and the PC approved and recommended something different than what the BoCC had originally sent to the 171 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 1 of 12 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA July 1993 [No. 59442-2. En Banc. July 1, 1993.] COLLIER v. TACOMA MICHAEL COLLIER, ET AL, Respondents, v.THE CITY OF TACOMA,Appellant [1] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Federal Constitution ❑ Application to State. Freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment applies to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [2] Constitutional Law 0 Construction ❑ Priority of Consid-eration. When feasible, a court will decide constitutional issues under the state constitution before considering the federal constitution. [3]Constitutional Law 0 Construction ❑ State and Federal Provisions 0 Independent State Interpretation ❑ Federal Precedent El Effect.When reviewing a state constitutional provision that is interpreted differently from its federal counterpart,a court may cite federal cases for the purpose of guidance;federal cases do not,however,compel a result under the state constitution. [4] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Degree of Protection. Political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Const.art. 1,§5.and the First Amendment. [5] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Right To Restrict.The government has only a very limited right to restrict political speech in a traditional public forum, i.e., a place that by tradition or government fiat has been devoted to assembly and debate. [6]Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 What Constitutes 0 Parking Strips.The area between public streets and public sidewalks constitutes a traditional public forum for purposes of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. [7]Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Test. Under Const.art. 1,§5,time, place,and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum are valid only if they(1)are content neutral,(2)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,and(3)leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [8] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression, a restriction is not content neutral if it defines and regulates (1) a particular viewpoint or(2)a particular subject matter or class of expression.The intent of the enacting body is not determinative of the issue of content neutrality. [9]Constitutional Law❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time,Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality 0 Secondary Effects. A time, place, and manner restriction on political speech in a traditional public forum is not content neutral merely because it is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. [10] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Content Neutrality 0 Subject-Matter Based 0 Test. Under Const. art. 1, §5 and the First Amendment,time,place,and manner restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral, but subject-matter based,are valid only if they(1)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and (2) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. The State has the burden of proving the validity of such restrictions. [11] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression, legislation serves a compelling state interest if its purpose is a fundamental one and it bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the purpose. [12] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Balancing Test.When determining the validity of time,place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,a court will balance the public interest advanced by the legislation against the extent of its restriction on free speech rights. [13] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Aesthetics ❑ In General. A government's interest in aesthetics, such as maintaining a clean and litter-free community,is not sufficiently compelling to justify a time, place, and manner restriction,that is content based,on political speech in a traditional public forum. [14] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Aesthetics ❑ Traffic Safety 0 Favoring Commercial Speech Over Political Speech.A governments interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not compelling and does not justify a greater restriction on political speech than on commercial speech. (State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52 is overruled insofar as it is inconsistent.) [15] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Aesthetics 0 Traffic Safety.A government's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not sufficiently compelling to ustify time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum absent a showing that the government has seriously and comprehensively addressed such aesthetic and traffic safety concerns other than through the restrictions in question. [16]Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Alternative Channels of Communication ❑ Burden of Proof. For purposes of determining the validity of time,place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,the government has the burden )f establishing that the restrictions leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [17] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Alternative Channels of Communication 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining whether a time place,and manner restriction on freedom of expression leaves open ample alternative channels of communication,the alternatives must be practically available. [18]Statutes 0 Validity 0 Invalidity 0 Partial Invalidity 0 Effect.As a general rule,a court will invalidate only that portion of an enactment that is unconstitutional;the remaining valid portions of the enactment survive and are enforceable. [19] Civil Rights 0 Deprivation 0 Attorney Fees 0 In General.A prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is entitled to an attorney 'ee award under 42 U.S.C.§ 1988 unless special circumstances would render an attorney fee award unjust. [20] Civil Rights 0 Deprivation 0 Attorney Fees 0 Special Circumstances for Denial 0 Outside Funding for Attorney.The fact that a prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C.§1983 is represented by an association funded by someone other than the party does not constitute a special 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 2 of 12 circumstance for not awarding the party attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.§1988. [21] Civil Rights ❑ Deprivation ❑ Attorney Fees ❑ Special Circumstances for Denial ❑ Publicity. Publicity gained from an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not grounds for denying the prevailing party an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 absent a finding that the party used the judicial system to gain publicity for personal benefit. DURHAM, J.,ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur in the result by separate opinion; MADSEN, J.,did not participate in the disposition of this case. Nature of Action: A candidate for Congress claimed that city ordinances prohibiting the posting of political signs more than 60 days before the election violated his right of free speech. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 90-2-06091-3, Frederick B. Hayes, J., on February 15, 1991, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff but refused to award attorney fees. Supreme Court: Holding that the ordinances restrict the right to political expression in violation of the federal and state constitutions, that only those portions of the ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech are invalid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court affirms the judgment in part, reverses it in part, and remands the case for an award of attorney fees. William J. Barker, City Attorney, and John C. Kouklis, Patricia Bosmans, and Heidi Ann Horst, Assistants, for appellant. Adam Kline, for respondents. Richard L. Andrews, on behalf of the City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, amici curiae. GUY, J. 0 Michael Collier, a candidate for Congress, posted his political campaign signs in residential areas within the city of Tacoma more than 60 days prior to the 1990 primary election. City workers removed Collier's signs from residential yards and parking strips in accordance with two Tacoma ordinances that restrict the preelection posting of political signs in such areas to a 60-day campaign window. Collier sued Tacoma claiming the ordinances violated his free speech rights. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Collier, holding the ordinances unconstitutional. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTS Michael Collier was a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for Congress in the Sixth Congressional District of Washington in 1990. Collier had not previously held or run for any elective office. He was not considered a public figure or well known in political circles. Collier's opponent in the primary election was Representative Norm Dicks, a 14-year incumbent. The primary election was scheduled for September 18, 1990. Collier began to plan his campaign in December 1989. and began fundraising in February 1990. Collier identified that the greatest obstacles to his campaign were lack of name familiarity and funding. During the course of the primary campaign, Collier raised and spent a total of$29,000. Representative Dicks spent$329,000 in his primary campaign. Given his resources, Collier determined that yard signs were the most cost-effective means of communicating his political message. At the beginning of May 1990, the Collier campaign assembled some 700 2-sided yard signs. The first of these was posted outdoors between May 20 and 30. Collier supporters placed "Mike Collier for Congress"signs in their front yards and parking strips. Tacoma Municipal Code (TMC) 2.05.275 defines and regulates political signs. The ordinance defines political signs as "[a]ll signs which are displayed out-of-doors on real property relating to the nomination or election of any individual for a public political office or advocating any measure to be voted on at any special or general election". The ordinance limits the posting of such political signs to a period of not more than 60 days prior to and 7 days after the date of the election for which the signs are intended. TMC 2.05.275(1). «1» a1»The full text of TMC 2.05.275(1)provides: httn://srch.mrsc.org:8 0 8 0/wacourts/D ocV iew/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d073 7.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 3 of 12 "(1) Such political signs shall not be displayed more than sixty days prior to and seven days after the date of the election for which intended. In cases where a general election follows within 55 days of a primary election,those signs for candidates whose names will appear on the ballot in the general election may be displayed during the interim period and up to seven days after the general election. In all instances herein in which political signs are required to be removed within seven days after the election for which the political sign was displayed, if said signs are not removed, they will be subject to removal by the City of Tacoma Public Works Department. Provided, however, that this provision shall not prohibit political signs in areas where other provisions of the Official Code of the City of Tacoma allows the same as legally licensed outdoor advertising displays." Tacoma Municipal Code 6.03.070 prohibits any person, firm, or corporation from posting any signs on any public street or highway or upon any curbstone, lamp post, street sign,pole,hydrant,bridge,tree,or other thing situated upon any public street or highway or any publicly owned property within the City of Tacoma,except as may be authorized by ordinances of the City of Tacoma. . . PROVIDED,HOWEVER,the prohibition contained herein shall not apply to political signs placed on parking strips preceding a primary or general election where such political signs are installed pursuant to the permission of the owner of the property abutting said parking strip and installed in such a manner as not to constitute a traffic hazard. . .. Real estate signs advertising the sale or rent of the property upon which they stand or to which they are attached, and other signs attached to any building or sidewalk advertising the business carried on in the building, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. TMC 6.03.080. Pursuant to these ordinances, Tacoma Public Works Department employees removed signs displaying "Mike Collier for Congress"from residential yards and parking strips within the city of Tacoma that were posted more than 60 days prior to the primary election. Mr. Benjamin Thompson, City Engineer for Tacoma, testified that he directed personnel from his department to pick up all signs in the public right of way c 2» «2N Mr.Thompson defined public"right-of-way"as"that area within a development that is set aside for and dedicated for use of a public street, sidewalks,and public utilities."Report of Proceedings,at 11.Mr.Thompson testified that the public right of way extends 15 feet from the curb:5 feet for the parking strip,5 feet for the sidewalk,and an additional 5 feet into the homeowner's front yard. throughout the city. Mr. Thompson testified that his department also removes commercial signs from residential areas since commercial signs are not permitted in those areas. Mr. Thompson understood that the ordinance allows an exception for on-site commercial signs pertaining to the sale or rent of private property. He testified that in order to enforce the ordinances, he differentiates between commercial and political signs by reading them. Collier filed this action in July 1990 seeking a temporary restraining order, an injunction against the ordinances' enforcement, a declaratory judgment that the ordinances are unconstitutional, and attorney fees. The complaint was subsequently amended to include plaintiff«3» x3, Hereafter,both plaintiffs are identified collectively as"Collier". Joel Beritich, a Collier supporter who had political signs removed from his yard and parking strip. The amended complaint also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an additional source of protection for the rights involved and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the statutory basis for the claim of attorney fees. On February 15, 1991, the trial court entered judgment in `avor of Collier, holding that the ordinances were unconstitutional, but denied Col-tier's claim for attorney fees. Tacoma appealed the trial court's judgment as to the ordinances, and Collier cross-appealed the trial court's denial of attorney ees. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and now affirm in part and reverse in part. SSUES This case presents three issues for review. First, do the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutionally restrict Collier's free speech rights? We hold that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs a nconstitutionally restricts Collier's right to political expression. 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 4 of 12 I 1 Second, did the trial court err in declaring the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety? We answer in the affirmative and hold unconstitutional only those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech. Third, did the trial court err when it denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988? We reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees and remand for a determination of an award of fees consistent with this opinion. ANALYSIS [1] The Tacoma ordinances are challenged under both the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech". U.S. Const. amend. 1. The freedom of speech which is secured by the First Amendment is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State." Burson v. Freeman, _U.S. , 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 12, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (quoting Thornhill v.Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940)). Article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides that"[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." [2, 3]As we stated in O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)), "[t]his court has a duty, where feasible, to resolve constitutional questions first under the provisions of our own state constitution before turning to federal law."We do so because in addition to our responsibility to interpret Washington's constitution, we must furnish a rational basis "for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law." State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). See Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). We recognize that the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions are different in wording and effect, but that the result reached by previous Washington cases in general adopted much of the federal methodology for application to state constitutional cases. The federal cases cited here and in our prior decisions are used for the purpose of guidance and do not themselves compel the result the court reaches under our state constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 775 (1988). With these statements in mind, we turn to our analysis of the Tacoma ordinances. I [4] The Tacoma ordinances implicate several concerns in our free speech jurisprudence: regulation of political speech, regulation of political speech in a public forum, and regulation based on the content of the speech. The speech restricted by Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 is political speech. The code defines"political signs" and restricts the time and place in which such signs may be posted. Wherever the extreme perimeters of protected speech may lie, it is clear the First Amendment protects political speech, see Carey v. Brown,447 U.S. 455, 467, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263, 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980), giving it greater protection over other forms of speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). The constitutional protection afforded political speech has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35, 91 S. Ct. 621 (1971). [5, 6]The second important feature of the Tacoma ordinances is that they restrict political speech in a traditional public forum. The traditional public forum includes those places "which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"' such as parks, streets and sidewalks. Burson v. Freeman, supra at 13 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983)); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). See also Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. III. L. Rev. 949, 951. The parking strips «4» «4»Collier also raises an issue concerning the restriction of political speech on private property.This issue was not adequately addressed in the briefing,is not necessary to our decision in this case,and thus will not be discussed further. httn.//srch.mrsc.org_8080/wacourts/DocView/suoremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 5 of 12 in which Collier and his supporters placed his political signs lie between the "streets and sidewalks" and thus are part of the "traditional public forum". Because these places occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection, the government's ability to restrict expressive activity is very limited. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). [7] Since the Tacoma ordinances do not ban political signs altogether, we analyze the ordinances as time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We diverge from the Supreme Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, "as we believe restrictions on speech can be imposed consistent with Const. art. 1, § 5 only upon showing a compelling state interest." «5» «5H Our prior holdings have required counsel to discuss at least the factors enunciated in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) when they assert the applicability of our state constitution. Counsel's failure in this case to discuss these factors would normally preclude our consideration of the state constitutional issues. State v.Wethered, 110 Wn2d 466,472,755 P.2d 797(1988).Citation of Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212,721 P.2d 918(1986),cert.dismissed,479 U.S. 1050(1987)is not enough. Because Bering is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwall analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to reach the state constitutional issue. For future cases,we stress that this court must have the benefit of a state constitutional argument that is of assistance to the court to determine the meaning of the language used as it relates to the state constitutional claim and whether there are factors other than language that should determine the scope of our constitutional provisions. See Utter,The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism:Washington's Experience,65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1160-63(1992). Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The broad language of Const. art. 1, § 5 as compared with the federal constitution compels this result. Tacoma and amici curiae City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys argue that the Tacoma ordinances are constitutionally permissible restrictions on the time, place, and manner of political speech. We disagree. Applying the 3-part test for time, place, and manner regulations outlined above, we conclude that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs is unconstitutional. Our analysis of the Tacoma ordinances under each element of the time, place, and manner test follows. Content Neutrality [8] The trial court held that Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 are "not content-neutral, in that they expressly define and regulate 'political' signs." Tacoma and amici argue that the ordinances are content-neutral because the City does not regulate the message conveyed ❑ only the method by which it is conveyed. Collier claims the ordinances are content based because they define and regulate political speech as a class of expression. Constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restrictions may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980). Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and are thus subject to strict scrutiny. Renton, at 46-47; Burson v. Freeman, 119 t. Ed. 2d at 13-14. Under that intense level of review, government must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The Tacoma ordinances do not fit neatly into either the content-based or the content-neutral category. Our review of the case law and commentary on this subject indicates that the distinction is not always transparent. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983-1984). In determining whether a restriction is content neutral or content based, the Supreme Court has held that"[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791. While the Tacoma ordinances do not regulate political signs in terms of viewpoint, they describe and regulate permissible sign posting in terms of subject matter. Subject-matter restrictions are not directed at"particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information,but at entire subjects of expression."Stone, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 239. In this case, political signs are subject to a 60-day restriction "out-of-doors on real 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046,COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 6 of 12 • property", whereas on-site commercial signs identifying a property for sale or for rent are not. TMC 2.05.275; TMC 6.03.070, .080. How long a sign may be maintained depends upon the kind of message the sign seeks to convey. The trial court found that Tacoma Public Works Department personnel have to read the signs in order to determine whether they are prohibited at a particular time. The United States Supreme Court has held that an ordinance is content based if it distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to content. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984). As one commentator noted, the United States Supreme Court's prohibition of content- based regulations is based "both on equal protection grounds and on a first amendment grant of equal access to an open forum." (Footnotes omitted.) Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property to Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 208-09 (1984-1985). The question is "not whether all those within the classes defined by the state are treated equally but, rather, whether the classification itself is permissible." Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 276. As the Supreme Court stated in Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13 n.3, content-based restrictions raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection concerns because such restrictions differentiate between types of speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 517-21 (billboard ordinance favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech violated First Amendment neutrality); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (ordinance that prohibited picketing near a school building, but that expressly exempted peaceful labor picketing, held unconstitutional); Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1985) (town bylaw that barred the posting of political signs on residential property but permitted the posting of certain commercial signs held facially unconstitutional because bylaw was concerned with content, as opposed to the time, place, or manner of the speech); People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (ordinance which proscribed political signs but allowed other signs in residential areas subjected to strict scrutiny); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (municipal ordinance which imposed a 60-day limitation on political signs but not on commercial signs discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause). The Tacoma ordinances, by regulating sign posting in terms of subject matter, albeit viewpoint neutral, fall within the realm of content-based restrictions. Tacoma and amid argue that in determining content neutrality, the question is not whether the signs must be read, but whether the City of Tacoma prohibited the signs out of disapproval of the message promoted. «6» «6» The stated purpose of Tacoma's sign code is "to provide minimum standards to safeguard life, health, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design,quality of materials,construction,location,electrification,and maintenance of all signs and sign structures." TMC 2.05.020. Citing Ward, Tacoma claims the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in time, place, or manner cases is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech "because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)). Tacoma contends that since the ordinances serve a purpose unrelated to a sign's content, the ordinances are content neutral. See Ward, at 791. Collier argues that this standard is too subjective, and that a showing of "improper legislative intent" would be practically impossible to make. We agree. The Supreme Court has recognized that"even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 592, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983). In some cases, the fact that a regulation is content based and invalid will be apparent from its face. See Simon &Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., U.S. _, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 492, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In other cases, a censorial justification "will not be apparent from the face of a regulation which draws distinctions based on content, and the government will tender a plausible justification unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas." Burson v. Freeman, _ U.S. 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 23, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, they define and regulate a specific subject matter ❑ political speech. This content-based distinction, while viewpoint neutral, is particularly problematic because it inevitably favors certain groups of candidates over others. The incumbent, for example, has already acquired name familiarity and therefore benefits greatly from Tacoma's restriction on political signs. The underfunded challenger, on the other hand, who relies on the inexpensive yard sign to get his message before the public is at a disadvantage. We conclude therefore that while aesthetic interests are legitimate goals, they require careful scrutiny hut-rile-roll mrcr nra•Rf 1R(1/warniirteMnwView/cnnremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 7 of 12 when weighed against free speech interests because their subjective nature creates a high risk of impermissible speech restrictions. "[D]emocracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgments in this area". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 519. [9] Finally, Tacoma cites Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), for the proposition that an apparently content-based statute may be content neutral if the restriction on speech is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. In Renton, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult theaters to one area of town. The ordinance was held constitutional because it did not target the content of the films shown at the theaters. Rather, the ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects that adult theaters have on the surrounding community. Renton, at 46. We do not find Renton dispositive since it did not analyze a content-based restriction on political speech. While a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters may be permissible based on a "secondary effects" analysis, drawing a similar distinction between commercial speech and political speech turns the favored status of political speech on its head. We therefore decline to draw such a distinction where a restriction on political speech in a public forum is at issue. [10] In summary, the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, but are content based in that they classify permissible speech in terms of subject matter. Ordinarily this conclusion would take the ordinances out of the domain of time, place, and manner restrictions, Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516-17, and would instead require a strict scrutiny analysis. Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We conclude, however, that the Tacoma ordinances can be reviewed under a time, place, and manner formulation. We hold that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech that are viewpoint neutral, but subject-matter based, are valid so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. This formulation of the standard of review comports with free speech jurisprudence under both article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), and the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that in time, place, and manner cases, since the regulation's justification is a a"central inquiry", the compelling interest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the sserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law). «7» 07» For cases requiring careful judicial scrutiny of regulations to ensure that no covert content-based restrictions exist,see Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.v. Public Serv.Comm'n,447 U.S.530,65 L.Ed.2d 319, 100 S.Ct.2326(1980);Erznoznik v.Jacksonville,422 U.S.205,45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). See Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns,34 De Paul L.Rev. 197,206(1984-1985). In this manner, we are able to balance the competing interests while recognizing that the burden of justifying a restriction on speech remains on the State. See Burson, at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Compelling State Interest [11, 12] Inasmuch as we have dealt with the first element of the time, place, and manner analysis, content neutrality, we next discuss the state interest element. Applying the standard enunciated above, Tacoma must prove that its ordinances, taken together, are narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. To constitute a compelling interest, the purpose must be a fundamental one and the legislation must bear a reasonable relation to the achievement of the purpose. Adult Entertainment Ctr., Inc. v. Pierce Cy., 57 Wn. App. 435, 439, 788 P.2d 1102, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1006 (1990). See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-25, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480,80 S. Ct. 412 (1960). We determine the reasonableness of a time, place, and manner restriction by balancing the public interest advanced by the regulation against the extent of the restriction on free speech rights. State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 58, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). [13] Tacoma argues that its interest in city aesthetics and traffic safety is a compelling state interest, and that the. ordinances were "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. We disagree. Although aesthetics has been determined to be a significant governmental interest, Members of City Coun. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), it has not been determined to be an interest sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on political speech in a public forum. The record in this case does not justify such a result. While Tacoma and amici cite Vincent and State v. Lotze, supra, for support, neither decision supports their premise that aesthetics 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 8 of 12 and traffic safety are state interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the restrictions imposed on Collier's free speech. In Vincent, the Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of any signs on public property. Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. His political signs were attached to utility poles throughout the city. Pursuant to the ordinance, his signs were removed from the poles. The Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Vincent, at 815. Vincent is distinguishable from this case in two important respects. First, Vincent involved a law that prohibited the posting of all signs, regardless of content. Second, the utility poles upon which Vincent's signs were posted were not considered part of the traditional public forum. Vincent, at 814. See also Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 227 (1984-1985) (analyzes Vincent as misapplying First Amendment precedent and the primacy of political speech). In State v. Lotze, supra, we held that aesthetics and, to a greater extent, traffic safety were interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the incidental restrictions on the appellants' exercise of First Amendment speech. Lotze, at 58- 60. In Lotze, the State sought to remove political billboards adjacent to a highway under the authority of Washington's highway sign law (RCW 47.42), which generally prohibits all signs visible from interstate, primary or scenic systems except as permitted under the act. The listed exceptions under the act include signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they are located. We stated that unlike on-premise business signs and realty for sale signs, political messages such as the signs involved in Lotze are addressed "to the general universality of political ideas"and need not be linked with a specific site in order to derive meaning. Lotze, at 59. We held that the statute met the test for a state restraint on First Amendment rights because appellants'speech was not controlled as to content and because alternative means of communicating such views were available. Lotze, at 60. The Supreme Court in Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18, overruled its prior summary approval of State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979). Finding that San Diego's aesthetic interests were sufficiently significant to justify its ban on off-site commercial advertising, but were insufficient to warrant a ban on noncommercial signs, the Court observed that some decisions, including State v. Lotze, supra, have failed to give adequate weight to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18. Other courts have also criticized the analysis in Lotze. In Van v. Travel Information Coun., 52 Or.App. 399, 628 P.2d 1217 (1981), the Oregon.Court of Appeals held that a 60-day restriction on temporary political signs adjacent to highways was unconstitutional. The Van court relied on a majority of decisions which were contrary to Lotze in order to conclude that aesthetic interests were insufficient to justify the significant restriction on political speech imposed by the 60-day limitation on political campaign signs. Van, at 416. [14] We agree with Collier that Lotze should not be controlling on this issue. We depart from our holding in Lotze to the extent it implies that aesthetics and traffic safety are compelling interests justifying greater restrictions on political speech than on commercial speech. We recognize that Tacoma's ordinances, unlike the statute at issue in Lotze, do not completely prohibit political sign posting. Given the preferred status of political speech, however, Tacoma has failed to show that its interest in maintaining a clean, litter-free community «8» «8» Indeed,Collier argues that the self-interest and good sense of candidates already serves to regulate political yard signs. is sufficiently compelling to justify its disparate treatment of political speech. In Metromedia, San Diego's allowance of some billboards, but not others, was evidence that its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while "substantial", fell short of "compelling". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520. Likewise, Tacoma's disparate treatment of on-site commercial signs over political signs indicates that its interest in aesthetics is significant, but not compelling. Furthermore, Tacoma has not shown that yard signs create a substantial traffic hazard. There was no evidence that any of Collier's signs were hazardous to traffic or blocked pedestrian access. Mr. Thompson knew of no yard signs that had been found blocking sidewalks, utility lines or poles, or streets. Tacoma's claim that it restricts political yard signs to a 60-day period on behalf of a "compelling state interest" in traffic safety lacks evidentiary support. Once political signs are allowed on a temporary basis, "it is difficult to imagine how prohibiting political signs at other times significantly promotes highway safety."Van, 52 Or. App. at 412. A regulation that serves a compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Ward v. Rock httn://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 9 of 12 Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 233- 34, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The trial court found that neither ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Tacoma argues that its restrictions are narrowly drawn since they allow political signs to be posted for the duration of apolitical campaign. We disagree. The Tacoma ordinances restrict political expression by imposing durational limitations on the preelection posting of political campaign signs. Tacoma cites two cases for authority that preelection sign limitations have been upheld. Neither decision provides a satisfactory rationale for upholding such restrictions. In Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 63 Misc. 2d 836, 839, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Dist. Ct. 1970), the court held that a 6-week limitation on political signs was within the scope of the municipality's police powers. The court found that the municipality could use or consider aesthetic considerations in applying such power. Cf. People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 763, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (distinguished Huntington, holding that a similar political sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it made an impermissible distinction between political signs and other signs). In Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955 (D. Hawaii 1972), the court upheld a 60-day restriction, stating only that the ordinance was a "proper balancing of the conflicting interests". We find these decisions unpersuasive since they lack a discussion of the First Amendment and equal protection considerations at issue. Other courts have held that preelection durational limitations on political campaign signs are unconstitutional. In Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982), the court held that the Antioch municipal ordinance, which banned the posting of temporary political signs everywhere in the city for all but a 60-day period before an election, unconstitutionally discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause. The Antioch court viewed the ordinance as a general "ban" on political speech, with a temporary, 60-day suspension, prior to an election. Antioch, at 56. See also Van v. Travel Information Coun., supra at 416 (60-day limitation unnecessarily restrictive in light of the First Amendment interests involved and the State's interests sought to be advanced); Orazio v. North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (ordinance which limited the posting of political wall signs to 6 weeks prior to an election was invalidated on equal protection grounds). See generally Blumoff, After Metromedia: Sign Controls and the First Amendment, 28 St. Louis U.L.J. 171, 194-96 (1984). [15] Tacoma's 60-day restriction, unlike the typical time, place, and manner restriction, does not attempt to determine whether and at what times the exercise of free speech rights is compatible or incompatible with the normal uses of a traditional forum or place. The Tacoma ordinances, like the ordinances in Antioch, Van, and Orazio, unnecessarily restrict the preelection posting of signs promoting the candidacy of certain individuals or advocating a certain viewpoint on an upcoming ballot proposition. Tacoma has-not shown that its restrictive time period of 60 days, even if evenhandedly applied to all temporary signs, reasonably and adequately provides for the exercise of political speech. Before the City may impose durational limits or other restrictions on political speech to advance aesthetic interests, it must show that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 60. Accord, Tauber v. Longmeadow, 695 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Mass. 1988). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-31, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (failure to provide adequate justification for a restriction on protected activity merits invalidation of the restriction). Tacoma has made no showing on the record that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic or traffic safety concerns other than through the ordinances in question. While Tacoma is correct that the ordinances are not invalid simply because there may be some "imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech", Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (quoting United States v.Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985)), the ordinances fail to provide adequately for Collier's free speech rights. Given the preferred status accorded political speech, and the persuasive authority in other jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue, we conclude the Tacoma ordinances are not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. In balancing the competing interests, we hold that Tacoma's regulatory interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, as demonstrated on the record, do not outweigh Collier's right to political speech. We depart from our decision in Lotze to the extent it conflicts with our decision in this case. Alternative Channels of Communication The third and final element of both the federal and state constitutional tests requires that a time, place, and manner restriction leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234. The trial court found that Collier had not"sustained [his] burden of proof that the ordinances do not leave open . . . an alternative means of communication". Collier assigns error to the trial court's placement of the burden of proof on him. We agree with Collier. 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046,COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 10 of 12 [16] Government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech, provided the restrictions meet the standards enunciated above. Because Tacoma seeks to uphold the ordinances as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech, it has the burden of meeting each element of the time, place, and manner test. We conclude the trial court erred in assigning Collier the burden of proving the "availability of alternative channels of communication", the third element of the time, place, and manner test. See Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234;Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. That burden properly rests with Tacoma, and Tacoma has failed to meet it. [17] Both Tacoma and amid argue that politicians have numerous ways of expressing themselves through other media than the posting of signs. Collier does not dispute that he had the right to purchase radio and television time and to engage in direct mail. His argument is that these alternative modes of communication were effectively unavailable to him as an underfunded challenger. Based on our review of the record, we agree with Collier. In Collier's case, the yard sign was the most cost-effective, realistic method of increasing his name familiarity. Because means of political speech are not entirely fungible, the political yard sign offers special advantages to the candidate seeking public office. Political yard signs are relatively cost-effective and can be localized to a high degree. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 59 (citing Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977)). In Col-lier's case, the issue is not whether "ample alternatives" are available, but whether they are practically available. Alternatives are not "alternatives" if they are far from satisfactory. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516. Thus, the "summary seizure of a political sign for even a few days can deprive the sign's owner of an important First Amendment liberty interest." Baldwin, 540 F.2d at 1374. Given the record before us, we conclude that Tacoma's restrictions on political sign posting did not afford Collier adequate alternative channels of communication. In summary, we concur with the trial court that the Tacoma ordinances are invalid time, place, and manner restrictions. Tacoma has failed to prove that its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions imposed on Collier's rights to political expression. Tacoma has also failed to prove that its restrictions left Collier ample alternative channels in which to communicate his message. We conclude, therefore, that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political campaign signs violates the free speech provisions of both the Washington and the United States Constitutions. Ill Tacoma claims the trial court erred in declaring both ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety. We agree. The record indicates that the parties' dispute focused on section (1) of TMC 2.05.275, rather than on the ordinance as a whole. No issue was raised as to section (2) (size limitations), or section (3) (requiring consent of private property owners). Similarly, only those portions of TMC 6.03.070 and .080 that affect political expression are at issue. [18] As a general rule "only the part of an enactment that is constitutionally infirm will be invalidated, leaving the rest intact." National Advertising Co. v. Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988). See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 94 L. Ed. 2d 661, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). We hold unconstitutional only those provisions of the ordinances which impermissibly restrict the scope of political speech through limitations on the time and place for the preelection posting of political signs. Tacoma's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficient to justify reasonable, content-neutral regulation of the noncommunicative aspects of political signs, such as size, spacing, and consent of the private property owner. We are sensitive to the need for judicial restraint in intruding on the exercise of the police power by local governments to regulate land uses in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Consequently, our holding does not compel a change to postevent removal requirements as long as such requirements are reasonable and apply to all temporary events, such as political campaigns, home sales and residential renting. While preelection political speech interests may outweigh a municipality's regulatory interests in a given case, those same interests are not present postevent and may be outweighed by a municipality's demonstrated interests in aesthetics or traffic safety. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra(10-day postelection removal requirement upheld). IV Collier assigns error to the trial court's holding that the "special circumstances" of trial publicity and representation by the ACLU preclude an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Collier also requests additional fees for the purposes of this appeal. [19] A party prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 httn://srch.mrsc.ore:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046,COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 11 of 12 U.S.C. § 1988. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 675, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). A prevailing plaintiff"'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."' Jacobsen, at 675-76 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263, 88 S. Ct. 964 (1968)). [20, 21] In the instant case, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Collier and Beritich. They are"prevailing parties"for the purposes of the statute. The trial court, however, identified publicity gained by the suit and ACLU representation as "special circumstances" which warranted denial of an award of attorney fees. We disagree. In Runyon v. Fasi, 762 F. Supp. 280 (D. Hawaii 1991), the plaintiff requested attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a factually similar action challenging the constitutionality of a city'ordinance which prohibited outdoor political signs. The Runyon court addressed the identical issue of public service representation as a "special circumstance". We agree with the Runyon court's conclusion that the fact that the prevailing party was represented by a public service firm or association funded by public funds is irrelevant. See Runyon, 762 F. Supp. at 286 (citing Watkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 632 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980)). As to the issue of trial publicity, Tacoma urges this court to accept the trial court's denial of attorney fees as a proper use of discretion. The trial court, however, made no finding that Collier used the judicial system to gain publicity for political purposes. Tacoma argues that should this court reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees, the court should limit the amount of attorney fees to reflect work performed from the point after which the complaint was amended. Tacoma reasons that until respondents filed the amended complaint which cited 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as statutory authority for attorney fees, Tacoma had no notice of any claim for attorney fees. We disagree. Tacoma had notice of respondents' claim for attorney fees with the filing of Collier's original complaint. Collier's amendment of his complaint to add an additional source of authority for obtaining attorney fees does not alter the fact that Tacoma had sufficient notice to prepare an adequate response to Collier's request for attorney fees. The final issue to resolve is whether the requested fees were reasonable. The trial court found that the plaintiffs' attorney had spent 99.3 hours in the prosecution of this action, and "said hours have been expended reasonably and necessarily in view of the result obtained." The trial court also found that the plaintiffs' attorney's hourly rate of $150 was reasonable compensation for the work performed. These findings were uncontroverted. We will not disturb these findings on appeal. CONCLUSION The Tacoma ordinances impermissibly restrict Collier's right to political expression in violation of article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, and the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold unconstitutional those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impose durational limitations on the preelection posting of political signs. We remand for a determination of a reasonable attorney fee, to include a determination of attorney fees on appeal. UTTER, DOLLIVER, SMITH, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. DURHAM, J. (concurring) ❑ For 15 years, this court has wrestled with the difficult concept of independent state constitutional analysis. The circumstances under which it should be applied has been the subject of many divided opinions and considerable acrimony. Finally, in 1986, this court unanimously agreed on a list of six nonexclusive criteria to aid in determining when state constitutional analysis is appropriate. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). Shortly thereafter, in State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), we unequivocally stated the necessity of employing the Gunwall criteria: Wethered urges this court to follow our holding in State v. Lavaris, 99 Wn.2d 851, 664 P.2d 1234 (1983) under Const. art. 1, § 9 and cites State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) as general authority that the Washington Constitution can be and has been interpreted as more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution. He fails to use the Gunwall interpretive principles to assist this court . . .. By failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in Gunwall, he requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority the "adequate and independent state grounds" to support his assertions. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). We decline to do so consistent with our policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued by the parties. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606,, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). (Italics mine.) Since Gunwall and Wethered, over 70 Washington appellate decisions have acknowledged our rule barring 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 12 of 12 consideration of state constitutional issues absent briefing of the Gunwall factors. E.g., State v. Greenwood, 120 Wn.2d 585, 614, 845 P.2d 971 (1993); Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 77, 838 P.2d 111, 845 P.2d 1325 (1992); State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414 n.1, 828 P.2d 636, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1019 (1992). In fact, one noteworthy commentator has explained that: Assistance from counsel in interpreting state constitutional provisions is vitally important. Wethered directs counsel to bring the constitutional issues into as sharp a focus as they possibly can by requiring them to fashion a state constitutional argument that addresses textual language, constitutional and common law history, structural differences, and local concerns. Our decision in Wethered reaffirmed that the criteria are a necessary starting point for a discussion between bench and bar about the meaning of a state constitutional provision. (Italics mine.) Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism:Washing- ton's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1162 (1992). This same commentator has recognized that "Gunwall functions as a procedural threshold for considering state constitutional claims". (Italics mine.)Utter, at 1165. Today, however, 8 years of painfully crafted jurisprudence is cast aside in a footnote: "[b]ecause Bering [v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)] is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwall analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to reach the state constitutional issue." Majority, at 747-48 n.5. This reasoning completely ignores the Wethered rule, which was adopted 2 years after Bering. Moreover, putting aside the majority's attempt to limit its own case to the facts, there is no principled way to keep this exception from swallowing the rule. Bering was not unique. There were several cases between Gunwall and blethered that engaged in a state constitutional exegesis without the benefit of the Gunwall factors. See, e.g., Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775(1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7); O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 5); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7). As such,the majority's analysis only serves to cast doubt on a wide body of law under Const. art. 1, §§ 5 and 7 requiring briefing of the Gunwall factors. If, indeed, it is the intention of a majority of this court to cast aside the Gunwall/Wethered principles, it should be done forthrightly and with reasoned analysis. «9» «9» It is so that"[t]his court has a duty, where feasible,"to consider state constitutional analysis. (Italics mine.) Majority, at 745. However,the case cited in the lead opinion for this proposition, O'Day, 109 Wn.2d at 801-02 (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)),was decided prior to the blethered rule. In fact,Wethered specifically recognized that this language from O'Day and Coe was limited by, and subject to,briefing of the Gunwall factors.See 110 Wn.2d at 471-72. Ironically, the majority's result in negating the Tacoma sign ordinance could be reached under federal law analysis. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, U.S.U.S. —, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (both plurality and dissent would require strict scrutiny for content-based, but viewpoint-neutral speech); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (law banning posting of political signs except for 60 days prior to election violated equal protection clause). It is only because of the applicability of federal law that I concur in the result. ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur with DUR-HAM, J. http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 (T) (C) . •C Ai 0 ) C : 0 D 3, Co ccj''. ' i ciAdscc `04\i-\\ ! "-�'.`r`� i i .�'L...�Vc- C Y rN`• 91..1 1 F U °""_ 5015- QC- 8110g August 18, 2008 Dear Commissioners, It has come to our attention that at a recent Commissioners meeting one of our Jefferson County Association members made comments regarding the sign ordinance currently in effect as it applies to real estate signage. It was made clear at the time that her comments were personal and not reflective of the opinions of the majority of the 137 members. The Association has researched the ordinance and collectively feels very strongly that the current ordinance should remain intact as written, keeping real estate signs exempt. There are compelling reasons that the Association feels this way. For instance, there are few complaints and the Association members do an excellent job of self regulating. Further, there are regulations in place in Port Townsend and Port Ludlow as well as CC&R's for specific communities such as Kala Point. Sincerely, Terry Smith President Jefferson County Association of Realtors • 18.30.150 Signs. No sign shall hereafter be erected or used for any purpose or in any manner except as permitted by the regulations of this section or as specified elsewhere in this code.All signs subject to this section shall be subject to approval and issuance of a sign permit by the administrator according to a Type 1 permit approval process as specified in Chapter 18.40 JCC.The administrator may waive certain requirements of this section or require additional conditions for any sign permit,if deemed necessary to maintain consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. (1) Prohibited Signs.The following signs are prohibited: (a) Abandoned signs; (b) Billboards; (c) Flashing,revolving or moving signs,excepting clocks; (d) Off-site signs which advertise a business; (e) Signs or sign structures,which by coloring,shape,working,or location resemble or conflict with traffic-control signs or devices; (f) Signs which create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic;and (g) Signs attached to utility poles or traffic signs. (2) Exemptions.The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section: (a) Traffic and standardized public signs installed by a government entity; (b) Window and merchandise displays,point of purchase advertising displays such as product dispensers and barber poles; (c) National flags,flags of a political subdivision,and symbolic flags of an institution or business; (d) Legal notices required by law; (e) Historic site plaques and markers and gravestones; (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing"{ --{Deleted: or (g) ,olitical messages; {Deleted:p jh) Structures intended for separate use,such as recycling containers and phone • Deleted: not to exceed eight square booths; feet (i) Real estate signs;and '''{Deleted: (j) Lettering painted on or magnetically flush-mounted onto a motor vehicle operating in the normal course of business. (3) Design Standards.All signs must meet the following standards: (a) The following standards apply to the illumination and illustration of signs: (i) The illumination of signs shall be shaded,shielded,or directed so the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect surrounding properties or public and private rights-of-way or create a hazard or nuisance to the traveling public,or to surrounding properties. (ii) No sign or part thereof shall consist of rotating,revolving,or moving parts; consist of banners,streamers,or spinners;or involve flashing,blinking,or alternating lights.An exception to this standard is temporary signs associated with local festivals, fairs,parades,or special events pursuant to subsection(4)(a)of this section. (b) Sign size shall be regulated as follows: (i) The total square footage of signs shall not exceed 64 square feet for any business within any commercial or industrial land use district.Multitenant developments may have 18.30.150 Signs. No sign shall hereafter be erected or used for any purpose or in any manner except as permitted by the regulations of this section or as specified elsewhere in this code.All signs subject to this section shall be subject to approval and issuance of a sign permit by the administrator according to a Type 1 permit approval process as specified in Chapter 18.40 JCC.The administrator may waive certain requirements of this section or require additional conditions for any sign permit,if deemed necessary to maintain consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. (1) Prohibited Signs.The following signs are prohibited: (a) Abandoned signs; (b) Billboards; (c) Flashing,revolving or moving signs,excepting clocks; (d) Off-site signs which advertise a business; (e) Signs or sign structures,which by coloring,shape,working,or location resemble or conflict with traffic-control signs or devices; (f) Signs which create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic;and (g) Signs attached to utility poles or traffic signs. (2) Exemptions.The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section: (a) Traffic and standardized public signs installed by a government entity; (b) Window and merchandise displays,point of purchase advertising displays such as product dispensers and barber poles; (c) National flags,flags of a political subdivision,and symbolic flags of an institution or business; (d) Legal notices required by law; (e) Historic site plaques and markers and gravestones; (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing";! Deleted: or (g) political messaged — Deleted:p Jh) Structures intended for separate use,such as recycling containers and phone - — - — booths; Deleted: not to exceed eight square feet (i) Real estate signs;and • Deleted: (j) Lettering painted on or magnetically flush-mounted onto a motor vehicle operating in the normal course of business. _ (3) Design Standards.All signs must meet the following standards: (a) The following standards apply to the illumination and illustration of signs: (i) The illumination of signs shall be shaded,shielded,or directed so the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect surrounding properties or public and private rights-of-way or create a hazard or nuisance to the traveling public,or to surrounding properties. (ii) No sign or part thereof shall consist of rotating,revolving,or moving parts; consist of banners,streamers,or spinners;or involve flashing,blinking,or alternating lights.An exception to this standard is temporary signs associated with local festivals, fairs,parades,or special events pursuant to subsection(4)(a)of this section. (b) Sign size shall be regulated as follows: (i) The total square footage of signs shall not exceed 64 square feet for any business within any commercial or industrial land use district.Multitenant developments may have ` S I CO '1 4, 45ON C'� District No. 1 Commissioner.Phil Johnson „V. L District No.2 Commissioner:David W.Sullivan Q. 444 I District No.3 Commissioner:John Austin County Administrator:John F. Fischbach Clerk of the Board: Lorna Delaney ~94S*1"I NG•t0 MINUTES Week of February 20,2007 Commissioner Phil Johnson called the meeting to order in the presence of Commissioner David W. Sullivan and Commissioner John Austin. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD: The following comments were made by citizens. Several people stated that they support the reappointment of Jim Hagan and Dennis Schultz to the Planning Commission;the people on the Critical Areas Ordinance(CAO)Committee are volunteers and should be commended for their hard work;the County needs to consider the landowners who will be adversely affected by the regulations they adopt;the Washington Environmental Counsel declined to participate on the CAO Committee when they were invited;property rights are civil rights according to recent case law;if the Board accepts the minority report of the CAO,they won't get re-elected;Commissioner Austin's campaign flyer said that he would listen to his constituents; the County needs to stop stonewalling businesses that want to expand; the Commissioners took an oath to uphold the State and the U.S. Constitution; the developers of the Planned Rural Residential Development at the Discovery Bay Golf Course want to change the plan and eliminate the golf course;the Board's meetings should be video taped and put on PTTV;the legislation on the Puget Sound Partnership is being revised,but the end result of usurping local authority is the same;and the majority of the CAO Committee members do not represent the pro-environmental views of the citizens of the County. APPROVAL AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSENT AGENDA:Commissioner Austin moved to approve the Consent Agenda. Commissioner Sullivan seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. 1. RESOLUTION NO. 17-07 re:Adopting a Disbursement Policy 2. RESOLUTION NO. 18-07 re:Authorization for Auditor to Sign Payroll 3. RESOLUTION NO. 19-07 re: Establishing Standard for the Annual Inventory of the Capitalized Fixed Assets 4. NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING re: East Jefferson County Off-Highway Vehicle(01W) Feasibility Study Report; Scheduled for Monday,February 26,2007 at 1:30 p.m. at the Quilcene Community Center 5. AGREEMENT Amendment No.1 re: Educational and Therapeutic Services for Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years and Their Families;Jefferson County Public Health; Holly Ridge Center • Page 1 Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 (I) 6. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Developmental Disability Educational and Therapeutic Services for South Jefferson County Families and their Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years; Jefferson County Public Health;Concerned Citizens 7. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Voter Registration and Election System;Jefferson County Auditor;DFM Associates 8. AGREEMENT re: Guardrail Installation;Paradise Bay Road Project No.CR1148-4;Jefferson County Public Works;Petersen Brothers,Inc. 9. Payment of Jefferson County Vouchers/Warrants Dated February 13,2007 Totaling$4,531.32 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with vouchers approved and signed by the Board of Jefferson County Commissioners are retained by the Jefferson County Auditor and Public Works Department.) 10. Payment of Jefferson County A/P Warrants Done by Payroll Dated February 6,2007 Totaling $128,766.31 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with A/P Warrants approved by the Payroll Services Manager are retained in the Jefferson County Auditor's Office.) 11. Letter of Appreciation for Donation of Hand Carved Monkey Tree Wooden Bowl from Courthouse Neighbors 12. Letter Regarding Support of House Bill 1167,Preserving the Viability of Agricultural Lands; Representative Geoff Simpson,Chair,House Local Government Committee APPROVAL OF MINUTES:Commissioner Sullivan moved to approve the minutes of February 5,2007. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. Ferry Advisory Committee Interviews and Possible Appointment The Board interviewed Peter Bonyun,Tom Thiersch,Tim Snider,Peter Hanke,Dr.Albert Abrams and Fred Beck. Dr Abrams and Fred Beck currently serve on the advisory committee and their terms are expiring. There are also two vacant positions. There are five members on the committee. After the interviews,the Board asked the County Administrator to see if more than five member can serve on the Ferry Advisory Committee. The appointments will be scheduled on next week's agenda. Discussion re:Revisions to Jefferson County Code 18.30.150 regarding Political Signs: Director of Community Development Al Scalf reported that the Board has stated that they think it is in the public interest to amend the Jefferson County Code regarding political sign regulations. Staff has recommended that political signs be exempt unless they exceed the threshold for a building permit. If the Board agrees with the proposed language,it will be forwarded to the Planning Commission for a public hearing and final recommendation. Commissioner Sullivan asked about the sign size limits. Building Official Fred Slota replied that he only deals with the structure of a sign. A 32 square foot sign is engineered and built to withstand the wind. He thinks a sign exceedingl6 square feet would need a permit,but it would not have to be engineered. Page 2 eir% W C 7 MEETING AGENDA Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:30 P.M. WSU Community Learning Center,Port Hadlock 6:30 Call to Order(Roll Call,Quorum,Approve Minutes of February 21, March 7 and March 21) Bud Schindler, Chair Staff Updates Committee Reports General Public Comments A. Public Hearing—2007 Comp Plan Amendments Preliminary Docket(Suggested) Open Public Hearing Staff Report Public Testimony Close Public Hearing Planning Commission Discussion and Recommendation to BOCC for Final Docket B. Proposed Planning Commission By-Law Amendment C. Review Process for CAO Committee Reports to Planning Commission D. Introduction to Sign Ordinance Revisions General Public Comments Summary of tonight's meeting and forward look at agenda issues for the next meeting 9:30 Adjournment NOTE: The Planning Commission may add and take action on other items not listed on this agenda. Guidelines for Public Comment: 1)Be concise. Summarize your questions/concerns. If you have substantial background information to support your comments,please submit in writing. 2)Be civil. Focus on issues not individuals. Personal attacks,derogatory language and threatening remarks will not be tolerated. 3)Speak clearly. Speak loudly&slowly enough so you are heard. Explain any jargon and acronyms you use. Excerpt from Planning Commission Minutes for April 18,2007 Karen Barrows provided an introduction to the sign ordinance revisions. She referred to the BOCC-minutes for the week of February 20, 2007, on the issue of JCC 18.30.150 regarding signs. The BOCC thought it was in the public interest to amend the JCC regarding political sign regulations. Al Scalf explained that the BOCC had utilized a provision of the Planning Enabling Act called"A Board Initiated Control". Earlier, staff had done a review of how other jurisdictions regulate political (campaign) signs. As a result, staff provided a recommendation to the BOCC that political messages be allowed as an outright exemption. Staff took this Board initiated control to the BOCC on February 20. The BOCC expressed some concerns, some related to airplane banners or building code issues or real estate signs. He suggested that it may be appropriate for the Building Official to come and meet with the Planning Commission. He suggested that the Planning Commission schedule the issue at a later meeting for deliberations and to make a recommendation to the BOCC. Mr. Scalf referred to a pertinent court case— Collier vs. the City of Tacoma—a suggested the Planning Commission may want to consider it. The commissioners agreed to allow input from a real estate professional who was present. Karen Best said that real estate signs are treated differently than political signs. She urged the Planning Commission to keep realtors involved in the process regarding the sign revisions. This particular proposal does not affect real estate signs. Henry asked if there are issues with real estate signs or if it is only political signs that are at issue. If it is just political signs, he suggested the Planning Commission deal with that and move on. Al Scalf responded that the staff draft proposal only addressed political signs. However, the commission may want to also consider the concerns expressed by the BOCC as reflected in their February 20 minutes. The commission could prepare its own code draft and hold a public hearing. He reported that the BOCC had suggested the Planning Commission examine the code as written for consistency, whether it was fair across the board. He also recommended that the commissioners also read Collier vs. City of Tacoma to see the legal issues surrounding signs, including the Constitutional right of free speech. The commissioners invited Mike Belenski to address the sign issue. Mike Belinski explained that he had contested the recommendation that political signs be reduced to a limit of eight square feet while real estate signs could be larger. He had even gone to court for an injunction. His opinion was that they wanted to limit political signs to 16 square feet and he did not think they could not do that. He thought the First Amendment free speech rights were unlimited. In order to restrict that, you had to show a compelling government interest. He spoke about the amount of money some political candidates may spend on advertising in the media while some other candidate may only be able to afford signs. He said that whatever the county adopted, it should be internally consistent across the board. He also referred to the Collier vs. City of Tacoma case as something the county needed to comply with. He did not think there was any harm with a person putting a political sign in his yard and he did not think someone should have to pay for a permit for the privilege. Motion by Edel Sokol, seconded by Mike Whittaker, to accept staffs recommendation to exempt political signs and to remove the size limitation. The motion carried unanimously (8-0-0). Al Scalf stated that he would review the sizes of 16 square feet versus 32 square feet with the Building Official. He explained that JCC 18.30.150 was the Zoning section of the code. The Building Code was JCC Title 15 and addressed structural issues. 42 36.70.690 36.70.630 Official controls—Board to conduct hear- shall be sent to the*department of community development ing,adopt findings prior to incorporating changes in rec- by September 30, 1990. ommended control. If after considering the matter at a pub- On or before June 30,1991,each municipality that plans lic meeting as provided in RCW 36.70.620 the board deems a and zones under this chapter shall have adopted an ordinance change in the recommendations of the planning agency to be or ordinances that are necessary to implement the findings of necessary,the change shall not be incorporated in the recom- this review,if the findings indicate that such changes are nec- mended control until the board shall conduct its own public essary,or shall notify the*department of community devel- hearing, giving notice thereof as provided in RCW opment as to why such implementing ordinances were not 36.70.590, and it shall adopt its own findings of fact and adopted. [1989 c 335§6.] statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing and its own analysis of findings considered by it to be con- *Reviser's note: Powers,duties,and functions of the department of community development and the department of trade and economic ic d develop- trolling. [1963 c 4§36.70.630.Prior: 1961 c 232 §5; 1959 ment were transferred to the department of community,trade,and economic c 201 §63.] development by 1993 c 280,effective July 1,1994. Findings—Purpose--Severability-1989 c 335: See notes following 36.70.640 Official controls—Board may initiate. RCW 35.63.170. When it deems it to be for the public interest,the board may Definitions for RCW 36.70.675: See RCW 35.63.170. initiate consideration of an ordinance establishing an official control,or amendments to an existing official control,includ- 36.70.677 Accessory apartments. Any local govern- IA ing those specified in RCW 36.70.560.The board shall first ment,as defined in RCW 43.63A.215,that is planning under fr Arefer the proposed official control or amendment to the plan- this chapter shall comply with RCW 43.63A.215(3). [1993 c ning agency for report which shall,thereafter,be considered 478§ 10.] and processed in the same manner as that set forth in RCW 36.70.630 regarding a change in the recommendation of the planning agency. [1963 c 4§36.70.640.Prior: 1959 c 201 § 36.70.678 Conditional and special use permit appli- 64.1 cations by parties licensed or certified by the department of social and health services or the department of correc- tions—Mediation prior to appeal required. A final deci- 36.70.650 Board final authority. The report and rec- sion by a hearing examiner involving a conditional or special. ommendation by the planning agency,whether on a proposed use permit application under this chapter that is requested by control initiated by it,whether on a matter referred back to it a party that is licensed or certified by the department of social by the board for further report,or whether on a matter initi and health services orthe department of corrections is subject ated by the board,shall be advisory only and the final deter- to mediation under RCW 35.63.260 before an appeal may be mination shall rest with the board. [1963 c 4 §36.70.650. filed. [1998 c 119§3.] Prior: 1959 c 201 §65.] 36.70.680 Subdividing and platting. The planning 36.70.660 Procedures for adoption of controls lim- agency shall review all proposed land plats and subdivisions ited to planning matters. The provisions of this chapter and make recommendations to the board thereon with refer- with references to the procedures to be followed in the adop- ence to approving,or recommending any modifications nec- tion of official controls shall apply only to establishing offi- essary to assure conformance to the general purposes of the cial controls pertaining to subjects set forth in RCW comprehensive plan and to standards and specifications 36.70.560. [1963 c 4§36.70.660.Prior: 1959 c 201 §66.] established by state law or local controls. [1963 c 4 § 36.70.680.Prior: 1959 c 201 §68.] 36.70.670 Enforcement—Official controls. The board may determine and establish administrative rules and proce- 36.70.690 County improvements. No county shall dures for the application and enforcement of official controls, improve any street or lay or authorize the laying of sewers or and may assign or delegate such administrative functions, connections or other improvements to be laid in any street powers and duties to such department or official as may be within any territory for which the board has adopted an offi- appropriate. [I963 c 4§36.70.670.Prior: 1959 c 201 §67.] cial control in the form of precise street map or maps,until the matter has been referred to the planning agency by the 36.70.675 Child care facilities—Review of need and department or official having jurisdiction for a report thereon demand—Adoption of ordinances. Each county that does and a copy of the report has been filed with the department or not provide for the siting of family day care homes in zones official making the reference unless one of the following con- that are designated for single family or other residential uses, ditions apply: and for the siting of mini-day care centers and day care cen- (1)The street has been accepted, opened, or has other- ters in zones that are designated for any residential or corn- wise received legal status of a public street; mercial uses,shall conduct a review of the need and demand (2)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on for child care facilities,including the cost of any conditional the official controls applicable to the subject; or special use permit that may be required.The review shall (3)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on be completed by August 30, 1990. A copy of the findings, a subdivision(land plat)approved by the board. [1963 c 4§ conclusions,and recommendations resulting from the review 36.70.690.Prior: 1959 c 201 §69.] 2007 21 36.70.547 36.70.547 General aviation airports—Siting of light for solar energy systems. [1979 ex.s.c 170§11; 1963 c incompatible uses. Every county,city, and town in which 4 §36.70.560.Prior: 1959 c 201 §56.] there is located a general aviation airport that is operated for Seversbility-1979 ex.s.c 170: See note following RCW 64.04.340. the benefit of the general public,whether publicly owned or privately owned public use,shall,through its comprehensive "Solar er ystem°defused: RCW36.70.025. plan and development regulations, discourage the siting of incompatible uses adjacent to such general aviation airport. 36.70.570. Official controls—Adoption. Official con- Such plans and regulations may only be adopted or amended trols shall be adopted by ordinance and shall further the pur- after formal consultation with: Airport owners and manag- pose and objectives of a comprehensive plan and parts ers,private airport operators,general aviation pilots,ports, thereof. [1963 c 4§36.70.570.Prior. 1959 c 201 §57.] and the aviation division of the department of transportation. All proposed and adopted plans and regulations shall be filed with the aviation division of the department of transportation 36.70.580 Official controls—Public hearing by com- within a reasonable time after release for public consideration mission. Before recommending an official control or amend- and comment.Each county,city,and town may obtain tech- ment to the board for adoption,the commission shall hold at nical assistance from the aviation division of the department least one public hearing. [1963 c 4§36.70.580.Prior. 1959 of transportation to develop plans and regulations consistent c 201 §58.] with this section. Any additions or amendments to comprehensive plans or 36.70.590 Official controls—Notice of hearing. development regulations required by this section may be Notice of the time,place and purpose of the hearing shall be adopted during the normal course of land-use proceedings. given by one publication in a newspaper of general circula This section applies to every county, city, and town, lion in the county and in the official gazette,if any, of the whether operating under chapter 35.63,35A.63,36.70, [or] county at least ten days before the hearing. The board may 36.70A RCW,or under a charter. [1996 c 239§2.] prescribe additional methods for providing notice. [1963 c 4 §36.70.590.Prior. 1959 c 201 §59.] 36.70.550 Official controls. From time to time, the planning agency may,or if so requested by the board shall, 36.70.600 Official controls—Recommendation to cause to be prepared official controls which,when adopted board—Required vote. The recommendation to the board by ordinance by the board,will further the objectives and of any official control or amendments thereto by the planning goals of the comprehensive plan. The planning agency may agency shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than a also draft such regulations,programs and legislation as may, majority of the total members of the commission. Such in its judgment,be required to preserve the integrity of the approval shall be by a recorded motion which shall incorpo- comprehensive plan and assure its systematic execution,and rate the findings of fact of the commission and the reasons for _the planning agency may recommend such plans,regulations, its action and the motion shall refer expressly to the maps, programs and legislation to the board for adoption. [1963 c 4 descriptive and other matters intended by the commission to §36.70.550.Prior: 1959 c.201 §55.] constitute the plan, or amendment, addition or extension thereto.The indication of approval by the commission shall 36.70.560 Official controls—Forms of controls. Offi- be recorded on the map and descriptive matter by the signs- cial controls may include: tures of the chairman and the secretary of the commission and (1)Maps showing the exact boundaries of zones within of such others as the commission in its rules may designate. each of which separate controls over the type and degree of [1963 c 4 §36.70.600.Prior: 1961 c 232 § 3; 1959 c 201 § 60.] permissible land uses are defined; (2)Maps for streets showing the exact alignment,gradi- ents,dimensions and other pertinent features,and including 36.70.610 Official controls—Reference to board. A specific controls with reference to protecting such accurately copy of any official control or amendment recommended defined future rights-of-way against encroachment by build- pursuant to RCW 36.70.550, 36.70.560, 36.70.570 and ings,other physical structures or facilities; 36.70.580 shall be submitted to the board not later than four- (3)Maps for other public facilities,such as parks,play- teen days following the action by the commission and shall grounds, civic centers, etc., showing exact location, size, be accompanied by the motion of the planning agency boundaries and other related features,including appropriate approving the same,together with a statement setting forth regulations protecting such future sites against encroachment the factors considered at the hearing,and analysis of findings by buildings and other physical structures or facilities; considered by the commission to be controlling. [1963 c 4§ (4) Specific regulations and controls pertaining to other 36.70.610.Prior: 1961 c 232§4; 1959 c 201 §61.] subjects incorporated in the comprehensive plan or establish- • ing standards and procedures to be employed in land devel- 36.70.620 Official controls—Action by board. Upon opment including,but not limited to,subdividing of land and receipt of any recommended official control or amendment the approval of land plats and the preservation of streets and thereto,the board shall at its next regular public meeting set lands for other public purposes requiring future dedication or the date for a public meeting where it may,by ordinance, acquisition and general design of physical improvements, adopt or reject the official control or amendment. [1963 c 4 and the encouragement and protection of access to direct sun- §36.70.620.Prior. 1959 c 201 §62.] 20 2007 rlSON 44 OG yG gsh9" JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 Al Scalf, Director February 13, 2008 To: DCD Staff From: Al Scalf, Directo -&s Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager SUBJECT: Sign Exemption 2 (f) Clallam County Order 06-2-00894-7 dated October 13, 2006 enjoins Jefferson County from enforcing Section 18.30.150(2)(f) of the JCC. Said section states: (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as "yard sale"or "no trespassing"or political messages not to exceed eight square ft; As such, DCD will not enforce the eight square foot limit for signs in JCC 18.30.150(2)(f). CC: BoCC County Administrator Deputy Prosecuting Attorney Auditor Building Permits/Inspections Development Review Division Long Range Planning (360) 379-4450 ascalftc' co.iefferson.wa.us FAX: (360) 379-4451 t 4' ' Juelanne Dalzell j 5- JEFFERSON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY �' % ~-N' ` `. `r` Courthouse—P.O.Box 1220 ' "'`"i. Port Townsend Washington 98368 f ,?- a a 1� .nom ' �' ',c, �, ,`'''!' • r• � - '"' - • t! Telephone(360)385-9180 FAX(360)385-0073 01 rt R} : ' ' ' '.. David W.Alvarez,Deputy Prosecutor 1 q.r. ;_' ' . , =' Katherine Gulmert,Deputy Prosecutor "�-.---- Edward B.DeBray,Deputy Prosecutor JEFFERSON COUNTY SEAT-PORT TOWNSE D,WASHINGTON Rafael E.Urquia,Deputy Prosecutor Thomas A.Brotherton,Deputy Prosecutor Lianne Perron-Kossow,Victim Witness Advocate April 4, 2008 NOT CONFIDENTIAL To: County Commission Frank Gifford, T.I. County Admin. Karen Barrows, DCD Stacie Hoskins, DCD Al Scalf, DCD From: David Alvarez, Chief Civil DPA Re: Sign Ordinance The need for an amendment to the JCC at §18.30.150(2), an amendment that would remove the 8 square feet size limitation on political signs,a limitation only impacting political signs, was prompted by Mr. Belenski's lawsuit in Clallam County(Cause#06-2-00894-7)and the injunction against enforcing that rule entered against the County under that cause number in October 2006. Note,however that the BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act of 1963 at RCW 36.70.640 to send an"official control"or, in this case, an amendment to an"official control" to the "planning agency" (DCD and the PC combined) for a report. Pursuant to that authority,the BoCC discussed the need for changes to this section of the JCC with planning and building/inspection staff from DCD on February 20,2007 and subsequent to that discussion passed a motion forwarding their proposed text changes for JCC §18.30.150(2) [known as the "Sign Ordinance"] to the Planning Commission or"PC." The PC deliberated on the proposal on April 18, 2007 and voted 8-0 to accept staff's ->recommendation that simply removed the size cap on political signs and gave political signs their own subsection under JCC §18.20.150(2). In sum,DCD proposed and the PC approved and recommended something different than what the BoCC had originally sent to the planning agency. Note well that the PC did NOT hold a noticed public hearing on this issue. My review of both RCW 36.70.5 80 and JCC 18.45.090(3)indicates that the PC"shall hold a public hearing" before making any recommendation to the BoCC. So there has to be a public hearing before the PC prior to the"planning agency"forwarding its recommendation to the BoCC. After that hearing,the recommendation of the planning agency,referred to as a report in the Planning Enabling Act,will be brought to the BoCC via an Agenda Request Item from DCD. The BoCC is required to deliberate on the substance of the report at the.first public meeting per RCW 36.70.620. If the BoCC wants to adopt precisely the text that was recommended to them, then they can adopt the "official control" at a second public meeting WITHOUT holding a public hearing. If the BoCC wants to adopt any different text,then it must hold a public hearing before adopting its preferred text at a second public meeting. See RCW 36.70.620 and RCW 36.70.630. That public hearing would need the normal not less than 10 days' notice in order to comply with the notice requirements found in RCW 36.70.590 and JCC 18.45.090(4). Following this process would also represent compliance with the"public participation"requirements of Ch. 36.70A RCW(GMA)which also apply but don't go into detail about the precise steps that equate with sufficient public participation. Text changes to fix typographical errors or to,for example,reorder the exemptions would not require a public hearing. David Alvarez. 2 Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 (-) The Board noted their concerns about political signs that could create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic. Al Scalf explained that signs that create a safety hazard are prohibited, even if they are listed under Exemptions in the Code. The Board asked that this language be clarified. Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining(2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as `yard sale"or "no trespassing"; (g)political signs;and(i)real estate signs in one clause. There was a discussion about the maximum size for all exempt signs. The Building Official stated that the International Building Code(IBC)does not recommend a size. Al Scalf explained that the current County policy requires engineered plans for signs in excess of 32 square feet or six feet above grade. A building permit is required for any freestanding sign with posts if the top of the sign exceeds six feet above grade and the sign exceeds 16 square feet in size. Commissioner Sullivan suggested that all exempt signs not exceed 16 square feet. Commissioner Sullivan moved to forward the Sign Ordinance(ICC 18.30.150)to the Planning Commission and combine(2)(f)(g)and(i)in one clause,including language that clarifies when a building permit is required and when it is exempt,and that(2)Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The Board met in Executive Session from 11:30 a.m.to Noon with the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,Outside Legal Counsel,the County Administrator and the Director of Community Development regarding actual litigation NOTICE OF ADJOURNMENT:Commissioner Sullivan moved to adjourn the meeting at 12:17 p.m. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The next meeting is schd'for Monday,February 26,2007 at 9 a.m. MEE O JOURNEU ::z \ JEFFERSON COUNTY • w . • • ! A BOARD 0 CO ISSIONERS SEALi \ ti /: J " Phi o n,Chair ATTEST: ` ` ," --,:.',"1:/' 9AbOlaiii �� din C Davi li em er aulie Matthes, CMC aja,,, ■ Deputy Clerk of the Board Jo Austin,Member Page 3 1 ` County sign-ordinance is up for discussion Wednesday in Had lock Page 1 of 2 i'S'''''r*M"—.all '....:—.-..„:" .- ' .. '. ,,, 1 iik , ,4T-,,, 1,,,,,,,:= . ......„,1 Iv, . home classifieds photos subscribe top jobs contact us contests ferry & tides Search Sponsored Search HELP WANTED There== — are 336 d.�� l�� a ' k�ea�o ^ WANTED � ��— golf &��U' Advanced Search regulation ��^~~~ ~~��~~ '1 om e.dally news.flash.dad,/news flasl May O7.2008 °- 5/6/200 9:47:00 AM Email thin article•Print this article County i ordinance is Hadlock 53 A public hearing 6:30 7 before��"�,�Jefferson pv��g�c�Planning m�""t.� comm�amnu�mmoounn�mev�vmnomn8�mVn*e��CommunuvLvummo �� !".,* U — The open public hearing,vm«mpo�and pum|c�oompnvp�voo*mmocommivnm�umoommonuauonmmo — �— Jefferson County commissioners. NEW!=�m��` — ^Tmvpumioxunnno|a any ~ ~= = ~� news sua/tui�cm,o,mooepomnento/oummun/�oovomnmont(oco). t~^~ � ond Daily News F lash "We are encouraging citizens to tell us their views on signage-from suggested size,location and type(neon, Real Estate pamex.nvo�ncwnt.em)mwxatmxoum»ononn|moV.onmm�iva|uannemonupmioca|signs mmum|nvn Top Stories uuumnq� Younu�en.unui,xm|a�vmmqno.ww'�||xemxoa,mopumio'oopmmn/' Arts& Entertainment Gallery Walk The public hearing was initiated based upon direction given b Jefferson County commissioners a year ago to �uu�oso�onUoommoJnma�vncoun�Couo�CC)mnaminns|nnuno.oCovt�eu� Opinion Forum Our Place The code also is being reviewed in the wake of an injunction Mike Belenski of Mats Mats sought and won against Columns the county in 2006 limiting the size of political signs. Sports gac��VN i ^mmvoninwn the limit signs mV feet was nommnmomthan ammpt Marketplace the outcome of elections b making it harder for candidates that are not as well heeled as their opponents to get Law&Justice NEW! name rec Vnmononume|,muomagvcmn,oyoummo,oters.^aelonomnamlast year. Local Water Issues Citizen Journalist One of the issues under consideration now is to delete language stating that signs should not exceed 8 square feet. community oCo��nmonmmonusmmon�po|�oa��nvvxuumonmmm�onm size xmnaoonoand m�ovpo�u| Community Billboard ovu,��|nnmmn�ocuoouum»voum,pounxa/m*o»000» OX-4§/�7-�0-'-rrii11 Community Calendar Online Calendar After the hearing tonight,the planning commission will delibera te and forward a recommendation to county Activities Guide commissioners,who would take any final action un the issue. Government Meetings For more information on Jefferson County Planning Commission meetings and the upcoming public hearing,n. Links Directory contact Karen Barrows,assistant planner,at 379-4450 or kbarrows@co.jefferson.wa.us,or visit 2008 Support Groups www.co.jefferson.wa.us. media ii Photo Gallery Looe| K8ua|o Local Video Reader Comments Kl..:2;;;;-:...i,,I.itii,.l*I visitors Visitor Information 07,2008 Visitors Guide Article comment by: Elizabeth Sneed :OICE''' ' ' advertising The mo�nmnannuomme,ua| mouone�ummnwpnmucxnnn�hway s be a Display Ad Rates cautionary tale.With all the beautiful natural scenery to enj e would have to peer between billboards to get a ' Classifieds glimpse of it.It makes for a depressing and dreary impression of the city As citizens, targets m marketing xmewomm.Canxwoiu� the vi�w*im om�someone else Online Advertising wannnot��e|l`s something?Let the vision of Lady Bird Johnson be our guide as to the beautification of Americ 's Legal Notices roads and hig All the ingrediants wao|mauvxo�.Let's minimize the visual clutter.The needs of the people weekly specials should take precedence over that of business. 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The Leaner OiLrne©2008 Port Townsend&Jefferson County Leader 226 Adams St,Port Townsend,Washington 98368,USA Phone (360)385-2900 Fax:(360)385-3422 Contact info Inter act with Staff Web Administrator:Fred Obee Software©1998-2008 1 up!Software,All Rights Reserved • http://www.ptleader.com/main.asp?SectionlD=4&SubSectionlD=4&ArticlelD=20773&TM=67003.14 5/7/2008 • Affidavit of Publication STATE OF WASHINGTON) SS COUNTY OF JEFFERSON) I, Allegra A. Clarkson, Legal Publications Coordinator of the Port Townsend & Jefferson County Leader, a weekly newspaper which has been established, published in the English language and circulated continuously as a weekly newspaper in the town of Port Townsend in said County and State, and for general circulation in said county for noTictOP leffitiCA#1040 more than six (6) months prior to the date of first publication of the AteliessoocatiniXARDOFOOURTY Notice hereto attached and that the said Port Townsend & Jefferson gancrilIS.tEREAT OP that; - to fern Board of Sot*�� County Leader was on the 27 day of June 1941 approved as a legal 0340)4 newspaper by the Superior Court of said Jefferson County and hold a public hawing on maalIma*midget 2008 at its AM ctititiii at int Jefferson annexed is a true copy of the Cow) Jeffereal*reef.Red Townsend WA • r The purpose of the public hearing is to hear NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING totimonY rectagfingovosektanottoe JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY development standards,found at Jefferson County Code 18.30,150,pertaining toregulations COMMISSIONERS NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the that govern signs.The B0CC may choose to hold Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners will deliberations and make a decision following the public hearing. , hold a public hearing on Monday, June 16, 2008 at 10:45 Agenda topics could also be noticed AM • the Government Meetings section,of the Pal Townsend&Jefferson County Leader and in the Nee on Jefferson n section of the Peninsula Drely As it appeared in the regular and entire issue of said paper itself not in News.Tt�r�y.aofft�ftne�+untty pP g p p News section of the F Forum. Agendas are a supplement thereof for a period of 1 week, beginning on the 4th day also ' ` 2008, ending on the 4th day of June, 2008, that said Range�cr�i+ trma�rrpls Long- of June, Planning, WA newspaper was regularly distributed to their subscribers during all of ment-62f Sheridan row 98388,Oeo)37tt4asaarhharaaofakiatwah. this period. That the full amount of$28.00 has been paid in full, at the rate of$ 7.00 nerlcolumn inch for each insertion. Subscct4` eiigt o'' fore me this 25"7= of au 014.. 2008. i�01AR y y / 41101 a i ixo n111812012 = ►' • p B 1 t G o °llegra A. son Notar P'i .in and lot't State of Washington Residing at Port Townsend. //�c/OF•\ppS\A • h Agenda Request Lef r". . 11:00 a.m. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AGENDA REQUEST TO: Board of County Commissioners Dennis Richards, County Administrator FROM: Al Scalf, Director, Department of Community Development(DC' Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager(DCD) Karen Barrows,Assistant Planner, Long-Range Planning (LRP) 7 DATE: June 16, 2008 SUBJECT: Public Hearing on proposed amendments to JCC 18.30.150, development standards for signs STATEMENT OF ISSUE: As staff advised the Board of County Commissioners(BoCC)on May 27, 2008, during a presentation of Planning Agency recommendations, the staff recommendation and the Planning Commission recommendation differ with respect to this proposal,whereby the BoCC directed staff to schedule a public hearing on this matter. Attachments: 1) DCD staff agenda request dated May 27, 2008 2) Planning Commission recommendations (including a minority report)from May 15, 2008 3) DCD staff report and recommendation from April 23, 2008 4) Planning Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 5) Staff proposed line-in/line-out code revision 6) Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) 7) Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 8) Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 9) Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 10) Collier v. City of Tacoma ANALYSIS/STRATEGIC GOALS : The BoCC directed staff to schedule the public hearing since the Planning Agency recommendations differ with respect to this proposal. The BoCC should conduct a public hearing, deliberate on the record, and formulate a decision following the public hearing. FISCAL IMPACT: No fiscal impact is expected as a result of amending JCC 18.30.150. RECOMMENDATION: DCD staff recommends that the BoCC deliberate and make a decision on the proposal concerning JCC 18.30.150, development standards for Signs, as recommended by DCD staff on April 23, 2008. REVIEWED BY: Dennis Richards, County Administrator Date Agenda Request 10:30 a.m. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AGENDA REQUEST TO: Board of County Commissioners Dennis Richards, County Administrator I FROM: Al Scalf, Director, Department of Community Development(DCD ; - Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager(DCD) Karen Barrows,Assistant Planner, Long-Range Planning (LRP)407 DATE: May 27, 2008 SUBJECT: Request for regular agenda item for DCD staff report and Planning Commission recommendation on JCC 18.30.150, development standards for signs STATEMENT OF ISSUE: The Department of Community Development Long-Range Planning Division is requesting that the Board of County Commissioners(BoCC) review the staff report and Planning Commission recommendations on a UDC amendment proposal for JCC 18.30.150,which regulates signs. Please note that the staff recommendation and the Planning Commission recommendation differ. The staff response to the Planning Commission recommendation is consolidated into this request. Attachments: 1) Planning Commission recommendations (including a minority report)from May 15, 2008 2) DCD staff report and recommendation from April 23, 2008 3) Planning Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 4) Staff proposed line-in/line-out code revision 5) Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) 6) Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 7) Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 8) Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 9) Collier v. City of Tacoma ANALYSIS/STRATEGIC GOALS : The following findings of fact inform this issue: 1) Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code regulates signs. Paragraph (2)of this Section designates signs that are exempt from the provisions of this Section. Subsection (f)states, "Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing"or political messages not to exceed eight square feet;" 2) On October 13, 2006, Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing Section 18.30.150(2)(f)of the Jefferson County Code. 3) On February 20,2007, the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners discussed the issue, and, using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a"Board Initiated Control"found in RCW 36.70.640(please see attached), decided that it was in the public interest to amend the code regulating signs contained in JCC 18.30.150. The Board then voted unanimously to forward the issue to the Planning Commission for review. 4) On April 18, 2007, staff presented the suggested revisions to the Planning Commission, and explained the chronology of the process. 5) On April 18, 2007,the Planning Commission discussed the issue, heard public comment, and voted to accept staffs recommendation to exempt political signs from size limitations. 6) Following legal review it was determined that the Planning Commission must hold a public hearing. Agenda Request 10:30 a.m. 7) On April 23, 2008, in anticipation of the Planning Commission public hearing, staff published its report and recommendation. The staff recommendation is that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection JCC 18.30.150(2)(g) should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows: "18.30.150(2)(g) Political messages"(please see attached). 8) The Planning Commission held a public hearing on the development standards for signs on May 7,2008, during which it heard public testimony. After the public hearing was closed, the Planning Commission deliberated and formulated recommendations(please see attached). The Planning Commission recommendation differs from the staff recommendation dated April 23, 2008. Staff has the following concerns with the Planning Commission recommendation: 1) Real estate signs are not exempt under the Planning Commission recommended code language. Real estate signs are a commercial sign. Without an exemption, the amended code does not have any applicable criteria for review of real estate signs. 2) Potential legal problems exist: for example, in the Washington Supreme Court case Collier v. City of Tacoma (used as a basis for legal authority and precedent in the Clallam County Superior Court case enjoining Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f)), it was determined that signs could not be regulated based on content. While the Planning Commission articulated during deliberations a desire to render its proposed revisions"content-neutral,"the phrase"event-based signs" in its proposed subsection (2)(g)would require a person to read the sign in order to determine whether or not it is exempt. This would appear to contradict the conclusions in both the Collier and Clallam County cases. 3) Public Works does not allow signs in the right of way(ROW). The exemption allowed by the Planning Commission for the"6 square feet in the ROW"conflicts with Public Works requirements. 4) Standards for administration are unclear with respect to non-commercial signs exceeding 32 square feet. When non-commercial signs exceed 32 square feet,the existing Unified Development Code(UDC), JCC Title 18, and Planning Commission proposed language lack any standards for review. The Building Official has determined a building permit is required for free-standing signs exceeding 32 square feet, or six feet(6')in height to insure consistency with the International Building Code, as adopted in JCC Title 15. No reference or permit requirement is necessary in the UDC to confirm the safety of a structure with regard to the building code. In other words, planners do not need to oversee that a building permit is regt.ft ed or approved under the authority of the Building Official. Staff maintains the recommendation detailed in the DCD staff report and recommendation dated April 23, 2008. FISCAL IMPACT: No fiscal impact is expected as a result of amending JCC 18.30.150. RECOMMENDATION: DCD staff recommends that the BoCC direct staff to schedule'a public hearing on JCC 18.30.150, development standards for Signs. REVIEWED BY: Dennis Richards, County Administrator Date g0N co ew ("t L gsx) JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 (360) 379-4450 MEMORANDUM To: Board of County Commissioners (BoCC); County Administrator From: Peter Downey, Barbara Nightingale, Henry Werch, Jefferson County Planning Commission Date: May 15, 2008 Re: Planning Commission Minority Report for proposed UDC Amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards:18.30.150: Signs At the May 8, 2008 Planning Commission meeting, a public hearing was held to consider proposed changes to JCC 18.30.150, the Jefferson County sign ordinance. Following that hearing, Commission member Tom Brotherton introduced two additional proposed revisions to sections (2)(f) and (2)(g) of the ordinance. His revisions were accompanied by two "Conclusions of Law" and one "Findings of Fact". A motion was introduced and amended to accept the proposed ordinance revisions submitted by the DCD along with the additional revisions submitted by Commissioner Brotherton, and including the submitted "Conclusions of Law" and "Findings of Fact", and an additional request to strike (2)(i), which was recommended by Commissioner Henry Werch. The vote was 6 to 3 to approve. We wish to introduce the following "Minority Report" in support of the concerns prompting we three members of the Commission to vote "no" on the measure. The intent of the revised ordinance as submitted by DCD was to exclude "political messages" from the sign ordinance, in order to keep the ordinance in compliance with court cases relating to First Amendment rights. Commissioner Brotherton's changes were submitted to keep JCC 18.30.150 in compliance with recent court cases but also to recognize that "unlimited growth" of certain signs "negatively impacts residents' quality of life," and that court cases such as "Collier v. City of Tacoma" allow for the reasonable regulation of signs so long as the regulation is "content-neutral". Despite our vote, we do generally endorse the goals reflected in the majority vote* and the submitted "Conclusions of Law" and "Findings of Fact" introduced by Commissioner Brotherton. Our separate concerns can be expressed as follows: (1) While the ordinance, as proposed, is, in fact, content-neutral, and it does exclude signs on private property measuring less than or equaling 32 square feet, it would appear to only address free-standing signs and not satisfactorily to address certain other types of"signs" on private property, i.e. signs painted on the side of a building, or banners hung on the side of a building or suspended between trees. (2) We note that although the proposed revised ordinance regulates the size of signs on private property, it does not deal with the number of signs, so we wonder whether it satisfactorily accomplishes its objective. (3) We did not feel that we were presented with sufficient time or documentation prior to the meeting of May 8 to consider, whether, in fact, the regulation of"content-neutral" signs can be adopted into JCC 18.30.150 without reconsidering other sections of the code, and thus meet the objective of properly protecting First Amendment rights. (4) We share concerns, as expressed by DCD Planning Manager Stacie Hoskins, that the new ordinance, as written, seems to create an administrative problem by introducing the need for simultaneous zoning and permitting review processes for signs in excess of 32 square feet. So, while each of us in the minority may not share all of the concerns expressed above, we all would have preferred that the May 8 vote would have been limited to the approval of the revision of JCC 18.30.150 as submitted by DCD. Then, in consideration of the valuable suggestions submitted by Commissioner Brotherton, we would have endorsed a re-evaluation of the sign ordinance in its entirety to make sure that it best supports quality-of-life and commercial growth objectives along with the protection of First Amendment rights. Respectfully, 'l Peter Downey, it Barbara Nightingale /� ya,6 Henry Werch rviaAl 0-4-41-0/1 1/1/4..e.t.dvt —{ 1/4frkilija71--tti 'WI' 4 14'11ING' JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 (360) 379-4450 MEMORANDUM To: Board of County Commissioners (BoCC); County Administrator From: Jefferson County Planning Commission Date: May 15, 2008 Re: Planning Commission Recommendation for proposed UDC Amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards: 18.30.150: Signs Proposal: Pursuant to RCW 36.70.580 and Chapter 18.45 of the Unified Development Code (UDC), Title 18 of the Jefferson County Code (JCC), the Planning Commission is required to hold a public hearing and transmit a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners (BoCC) with respect to the proposed UDC amendment to JCC 18.30.150, which regulates signs. In formulating its recommendation, the Planning Commission shall identify findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with and in consideration of the required Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.050(4)(b)(i), JCC 18.45.080(1)(b), and JCC 18.45.090(3). Background: The BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act at RCW 36.70.640 to send an "official control," or an amendment to an "official control"to the Planning Agency (the Department of Community Development (DCD) and the Planning Commission)for a report, which the Planning Commission received in April 2007. On October 13, 2006, Jefferson County was enjoined from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2) as a result of Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7. The DCD staff recommendation is that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection 18.30.150(2) should be created for political signs. The Planning Commission held a duly-noticed public hearing on May 7, 2008, and heard public testimony on the proposed UDC amendment concerning JCC 18.30.150. Commissioner Brotherton offered an amendment to the language proposed by staff. This intent of this amendment is to keep JCC 18.30.150 in compliance with recent court cases but also to recognize that "unlimited growth" of certain signs "negatively impacts 1 residents' quality of life," and that court cases such as "Collier v. City of Tacoma" allow for the reasonable regulation of signs so long as the regulation is "content-neutral". The Planning Commission voted 6-3 to accept this amendment and forward this recommendation on to the BoCC. Recommendation: The Planning Commission also conducted deliberations on May 7, 2008, and formulated the following recommendation: Specified subsections of JCC 18.30.150 should be amended to read as follows: (2)(f) Non-commercial signs on private property measuring less than or equal to 32 square feet. (2)(g) Event-based signs in a public right of way measuring less than or equal to 6 square feet, provided that such signs must be removed no more than 7 days following the event. Delete entirely the following subsection: (2)(i) real estate signs Findings: With regard to findings of fact, the Planning Commission found that the Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.080 are not applicable to this ordinance. Further, the Planning Commission found that unlimited growth of temporary signs negatively impacts residents' quality of life and detracts from commercial growth potential. With regard to conclusions of law, the Planning Commission agreed that freedom of political speech is a highly protected constitutional right, and all residents of Jefferson County are encouraged to exercise that right; and further, that Jefferson County has a reasonable governmental interest in aesthetics and traffic safety and a duty to develop reasonable content-neutral regulations on the size, height, and spacing of temporary signs, and for the post-election removal of signs whose issue has been settled by an election. After conducting a duly-noticed public hearing, and with respect to the timeliness of the issue, the Planning Commission forwards this recommendation to the Board. Peter Downey, Ch. anie Orr, Secretary 2 _____ er .1 tk, ql roc---,-N4t JEFFERSON COUNTY DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT .,� 621 Sheridan Street• Port Townsend •Washington 98368 ( 360/379-4450 • 360/379-4451 Fax www.cojefferson.wa.us/commdevelopnnent Staff Report and Recommendation on UDC Amendment, JCC 18.30.150, Signs To: Jefferson County Planning Commission, and Interested Parties Fr: Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager Date: April 23, 2008 Re: DCD report and recommendation on proposed UDC amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards, specifically 18.30.150: Signs. Background Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code(JCC) regulates signs. On February 20, 2007 the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners(BoCC)discussed with planning and building staff the need for changes to this section of the JCC. Staff findings: 1) Using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a"Board-Initiated Control,"found at RCW 36.70.640 (please see attached), the BoCC decided that it was in the public interest to amend the Sign Ordinance contained in JCC 18.30.150. During discussions, Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining Section (2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as "yard sale"or"no trespassing'; (g)political signs;and (i) real estate signs in one clause. It was moved and voted upon unanimously to forward the Sign Ordinance to the Planning Commission for review, combining (2)(f)(g)and (i) in one clause, to include language that clarifies when zoning review is required and when it is exempt, and further, that(2) Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited;" 2) On April 18, 2007, staff recommended to the Planning Commission that political signs be exempt from size limitations per the zoning code, and that political signs receive a separate subsection: JCC 18.30.150(2)(g). The Planning Commission heard public comment, deliberated, and voted 8-0-0 to accept staffs recommendation; 3) The Planning Commission is required to hold a public hearing and consider public comments on this issue before making a recommendation to the BoCC, in accordance with RCW 36.70.850 and JCC 18.45.090(3); 4) On October 13, 2006, Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f), which limits the size of political signs to eight square feet, based on the conclusion of law that the code "violates plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it limits or interferes with constitutionally protected speech"; and 5) An argument used as legal authority and precedent for the Clallam County decision is Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wn.2d 737, 746, 854 P.2d. 1046 (1993), in which it was determined that "Free speech is protected under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Page 1 Washington State Constitution. And political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Article I, Section 5 of the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 6) The Growth Management Act(GMA) contains guidance for controls placed on development or land use activities by counties. The use of the"Board-Initiated Control"with respect to JCC 18.30.150 (Signs) is consistent with GMA at RCW 36.70A.030(7). The Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan ensures consistency with GMA with respect to JCC 18.30.150 at LNP 1.2, wherein the rights of private property owners are protected, and at LNP 1:8, wherein it is ensured "that land permitting processes are predictable and timely." 7) Notice of the public hearing was provided via a legal notice published on April 23, 2008, in the official newspaper of record, the Jefferson County-Port Townsend Leader, in accordance with JCC 18.45.090(2Xb). Department of Community Development Recommendation DCD staff recommends that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection 18.30.150(2)(g)should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows: 18.30.150(2Xg) Political messages Staff recommends further that the Planning Commission hold a public hearing on Signs on May 7, 2008, its first regular meeting in May, and that,following the public hearing, the Planning Commission deliberate and formulate a recommendation to the BoCC. During deliberation the Planning Commission will enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with and in consideration of the required Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.050(4XbXi), JCC 18.45.080(1)(b),and JCC 18.45.090(3). The Planning Commission will then develop and present to the BoCC a recommendation, which, in concert with the DCD staff recommendation,comprises the-official recommendation recommendation from the Planning Agency. Attachments: • Planning and Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 • Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) • Proposed line-in/line-out code revision • Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 • Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 • Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 • Collier v. City of Tacoma Page 2 36.70.547 36.70.547 General aviation airports—Siting of light for solar energy systems. [1979 ex.s.c 170§11;1963 c incompatible uses. Every county,city, and town in which 4§36.70.560.Prior. 1959 c 201 §56.] there is located a general aviation airport that is operated for the benefit of the general public,whether publicly owned or 'erab3aty—t9�ex.s.c 170: See note following RCW 64.04.140. privately owned public use,shall,through its comprehensive "Solo,energysystem"defined: RCW36.70.025. plan and development regulations, discourage the siting of incompatible uses adjacent to such general aviation airport. 36.70.570 Official controls—Adoption. Official con- Such plans and regulations may only be adopted or amended trols shall be adopted by ordinance and shall further the pur- after formal consultation with: Airport owners and manag- pose and objectives of a comprehensive plan and parts • ers,private airport operators,general aviation pilots,ports, thereof. [1963 c 4§36.70.570.Prior. 1959 c 201 §57.] and the aviation division of the department of transportation. All proposed and adopted plans and regulations shall be filed with the aviation division of the department of transportation 36.70.580 Official controls—Public hearing by coin within a reasonable time after release for public consideration mission. Before recommending an official control or amend and comment.Each county,city,and town may obtain tech- went to the board for adoption,the commission shall hold at nical assistance from the aviation division of the department least one public hearing. [I963 c 4§36.70.580.Prior: 1959 of transportation to develop plans and regulations consistent c 201 §58.] with this section. Any additions or amendments to comprehensive plans or 36.70.590 Official controls—Notice of hearing. development regulations required by this section may be • Notice of the time,place and purpose of the hearing shall be ' adopted during the normal course of land-use proceedings. given by one publication in a newspaper of general circula- This section applies to every county, city, and town, tion in the county and in the official gazette,if any,of the whether operating under chapter 35.63,35A.63,36.70, [or] county at least ten days before the hearing.The board may 36.70A RCW,or under a charter. [1996 c 239§2.] prescribe additional methods for providing notice. [1963 c 4 §36.70.590.Prior: 1959 c 201 §59.] • 36.70.550 Official controls. From time to time, the • • planning agency may,or if so requested by the board shall, .. 36.70.600 Official controls—Recommendation to cause.to-be prepared official controls which,when adopted board—Required vote. The recommendation to the board by ordinance by the board,will further the objectives and . of any official control or amendments.thereto by the planning goals of the comprehensive plan.The planning agency may agency shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than a also draft such regulations,programs and legislation as may, majority of the total members of the commission. Such in its judgment,be required to preserve the integrity of the approval shall be by a recorded motion which shall incorpo- comprehensive plan and assure its systematic execution,and rate the findings of fact of the commission and the reasons for the planning agency may recommend such plans,regulations, : its action and the motion shall refer expressly to the maps, programs and legislation to the board for adoption. [1963 c 4 descriptive and other matters intended by the commission to §36.70.550.Prior. 1959 c201 §55.] constitute the plan, or amendment, addition or extension thereto.The indication of approval by the commission shall be recorded On the map and descriptive matter by the sign- 36.70.560 Official controls—Forms of controls. Offi- cial controls may include: tures of the chairman and the secretary of the commission and (1)Maps showing the exact boundaries of zones within of such others as the commission in its rules may designate. • each of which separate controls over the type and degree of 60 j 3 c 4 §36.70.600.Prior. 1961 c 232 §3; 1959 c 201 § permissible land uses are defined; (2)Maps for streets showing the exact alignment,gradi- ents,dimensions and other pertinent features,and including 36.70.610 Official controls—Reference to board. A specific controls with reference to protecting such accurately copy of any official control or amendment recommended defined future rights-of-way against encroachment by build- pursuant to RCW 36.70.550, 36.70.560, 36.70.570 and ings,other physical structures or facilities; 36.70.580 shall be submitted to the board not later than four- (3)Maps for other public facilities,such as parks,play- teen days following the action by the commission and shall grounds, civic centers, etc., showing exact location, size, be accompanied by the motion of the planning agency boundaries and other related features,including appropriate approving the same,together with a statement setting forth regulations protecting such future sites against encroachment the factors considered at the hearing,and analysis of findings by buildings and other physical structures or facilities; considered by the commission to be controlling. [1963 c 4§ (4)Specific regulations and controls pertaining to other 36.70.610.Prior: 1961 c 232§4; 1959 c 201 §61.] subjects incorporated in the comprehensive plan or establish- ing standards and procedures to be employed in land devel- 36.70.620 Official controls—Action by board. Upon opment including,but not limited to,subdividing of land and receipt of any recommended official control or amendment the approval of land plats and the preservation of streets and thereto,the board shall at its next regular public meeting set lands for other public purposes requiring future dedication or the date for a public meeting where it may,by ordinance, acquisition and general design of physical improvements, adopt or reject the official control or.amendment. [1963 c 4 and the encouragement and protection of access to direct sun- §36.70.620.Prior:. 1959 c 201 §62.] 20 2007 42 36.70.690 36.70.630; Official.eontr is Board to conduct hear.; shall be sent to the*department of community development ing,adopt findings prior to incorporating changes in rec- by September 30,1990. ommended control. If after considering the matter at a pub- On or before June 30,1991,each municipality that plans • lic meeting as provided in RCW 36.70.620 the board deems a and zones under this chapter shall have adopted an ordinance change in the recommendations of the planning agency to be or ordinances that are necessary to implement the findings of necessary,the change shall not be incorporated in the recom- this review,if the findings indicate that such changes are nec- mended control until the board shall conduct its own public essary,or shall notify the*department of community devel- hearing, giving notice thereof as provided in RCW opment as to why such implementing ordinances were not 36.70.590,and it shall adopt its own findings of fact and adopted. [1989 c 335§6.] statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing *Reviser's note: Powers,duties,and functions of the department of and its own analysis of findings considered by it to be con- community development and the department of trade and economic develop- trolling. [1963 c 4§36.70.630.Prior: 1961 c 232 §5;1959 ment were transferred to the department of community,trade,and economic c 201§63.] development by 1993 c 280,effective July 1,1994. Findings—Purpose--Severability-1989 c 335: See notes following RCW 35.63.170. 36.70.640 Official controls—Board may initiate: When it deems it to be for the public interest,the board may Definitions for RCW 36.70.675: See RCW 35.63.170. initiate consideration of an ordinance establishing an official control,or amendments to an existing official control,includ- 36.70.677 Accessory apartments. Any local govern ing those specified in RCW 36.70.560.The board shall first ment,as.defined in RCW 43.63A215,that is planning under refer the proposed official control or amendment to the plan- this chapter shall comply with RCW 43.63A.215(3). [1993 c frieWing agency for report which shall,thereafter,be considered 478.§ 10.] and processed in the same manner as that set forth in RCW 3630.630 regarding a change in the recommendation of the 36.70.678 Conditional and special use permit appli planning agency. [1963 c 4§36.70.640.Prior. 1959 c 201 § cations by parties licensed or certified by the.department 64•1 of social and health services or the department of correc . tions—Mediation prior to appeal required. A-final deci- 36.70.650 Board final authority. The report and rec- sion by a hearing examiner involving a conditional or special ommendation by the planning agency,whether on a proposed use permit application under this chapter that is requested by control initiated by it,whether on a matter referred back to it a party that is licensed or certified by the department of social by the board for further report,or whether on a matter initi-. ' and health services orthe department of corrections is subject ated by the board,shall be advisory only and the final deter- to mediation under RCW 35.63.260 before an appeal may be mination shall rest with the board. [1963 c 4§36.70.650. • filed. [1998 c 119§3.] Prior. 1959 c 201 §65.] 36.70.680 Subdividing and platting. The planning 36.70.660 Procedures for adoption of controls lira- agency shall review all proposed land plats and subdivisions ited to planning matters.._The provisions of this chapter and make recommendations to the board thereon with.refer- . . with references to the procedures to be followed in the adop- ence to approving,or recommending any modifications nec- lion of official controls shall apply only to establishing offi- . essary to assure conformance to the general purposes of the cial controls pertaining to subjects set forth in RCW comprehensive plan and to standards and specifications 36.70.560. [1963 c 4§36.70.660.Prior. 1959 c 201 §66.] established by state law or local controls. [1963 c 4 § 36.70.680.-.Prior 1959 c 201 §68.] 36.70.670 Enforcement—Official controls. The board. may determine and establish administrative rules and proce- 36.70.690 County improvements. No county shall dures for the application and enforcement of official controls, improve any street or lay or authorize the laying of sewers or and may assign or delegate such administrative functions, connections or other improvements to be laid in any street powers and duties to such department or official as may be within any territory for which the board has adopted an offi- appropriate. [1963 c 4§36.70.670.Prior: 1959 c 201 §67.]. cial control in the form of precise street map or maps,until the matter has been referred to the planning agency by the 36.70.675 Child care facilities—Review of need and department or official having jurisdiction for a report.thereon demand—Adoption of ordinances. Each county that does and a copy of the report has been filed with the department or not provide for the siting of family day care homes in zones official making the reference unless one of the following con- that are designated for single family or other residential uses, damns apply: and for the siting of mini-day care centers and day care cen- (1)The street has been accepted, opened, or has other- ters in zones that are designated for any residential or corn- wise received legal status of a public street; mercial uses,shall conduct a review of the need and demand (2)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on for child care facilities,including the cost of any conditional the official controls applicable to the subject; , or special use permit that may be required.The review shall (3)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on be completed by August 30, 1990. A copy of the findings, a subdivision(land plat)approved by the board. [1963 c 4§ conclusions,and recommendations resulting from the review _ 36.70.690.Prior.- 1959 c 201 §69.] 2007 21 , 18 45050 application fee shall be required for applications received by the deadline set forth in subsection for suggested amendments. (2)(a)of this section,shall not be processed. [Ord. (2) Application Deadline—Form. 2-06§ 1] (a) Deadline. All applications for formal site-specific and suggested amendments shall be 18.45.050 Compilation of preliminary docket. submitted to DCD by March 1st of the current cal- (1) Preliminary Docket-Contents.The prelim- endar year'in order to be considered during that inary docket described more fully in subsections year's amendment process; except that county- (2) through(4) of this section shall consist of the sponsored proposals to amend the capital facilities following: element of the Comprehensive Plan may be (a) All proposals for formal site-specific accepted later than other proposed amendments amendments; because of their relationship to the county's annual (b) All proposals for suggested amend- budget process. ments;and (b) Application Form.All proposed amend- (c) When applicable, all amendments rec- ments(i.e.,both formal site-specific and suggested) ommended by the planning commission during its shall be submitted to DCD on forms provided by periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan. the department and shall include the following- (2) List of Suggested Amendments.Each year, information,as determined by the administrator to the administrator shall maintain for public review be necessary to evaluate a particular proposal: the annual list of suggested amendments made by (ii) Name and address of applicant; citizens, the board of county commissioners or (ii) A description of the proposed Com- members of the board of county commissioners, - prehensive Plan amendment and any associated de- county staff,county departments or other agencies. velopment proposals, if applicable.. Formal site- By the end of the second full business week of specific or project-related amendments shall in- March of each year, this list of suggested amend- dude plans, information and/or studies that accu- ments shall be compiled into a preliminary docket. rately-depict existing and proposed use(s) and JCC 18.45.060 sets forth the process for selecting improvements. Proposed site-specific or project- which suggested amendments will be placed on the related Comprehensive Plan'amendments that do final docket to be formally reviewed during the not specify proposed use(s) and potential impacts annual review process. will be assumed to have maximum impact to the en- (3) Formal Site-Specific Amendments. The vironment and public facilities and services; preliminary docket shall also include all formal (iii) Proposed - amendatory language, site-specific applications for Comprehensive Plan preferably shown in a"bill"format(i.e.,new Ian- amendments.Formal site-specific applications for guage underlined; language proposed for deletion amendments that are properly and timely filed in strikeouts); under JCC 18:45.040(2Xa) shall be placed on the (iv) An explanation of the rationale for final docket for consideration during the current the proposed amendment; annual amendment process. (v) An explanation of how the proposed (4) Planning Commission Periodic Assessment amendment and. associated development pro- —Recommendations. posal(s),if any,conform to,conflict with,or relate (a) Periodic Assessment — Timelines. The to the criteria set forth in JCC 18.45.080(1)(c)and• planning commission shall review, and if neces- (1)(d),as applicable; sary, recommend revisions to the Comprehensive (vi)-If color copies,maps or other visuals Plan during the periodic assessment:in accordance are desired the applicant shall submit 20 color cop- with RCW 36.70A.130.The planning commission ies; shall complete its assessment of the Comprehen- (vii) A completed SEPA checklist sive Plan by November 1st of the year prior to the including the supplement sheet for nonproject assessment. Any amendments recommended by a actions if the application is for a formal site-spe- majority vote of the planning commission shall be - cific amendment;and forwarded to the administrator by March 1st of the (viii) Any additional information reason- year in which the periodic assessment is con- ably deemed necessary by the administrator to ducted. The administrator shall place all such rec- evaluate the proposed amendment. ommended amendments on the preliminary docket (3) Failure to Comply — Effect. Applications to be considered during the final docket selection that do not include the information required under process set forth in JCC 18.45.060. subsection (2)(b) of this section, or which are not (Revised 2/06) 18-260 • Jefferson County Code 18.45.060 (b) Criteria Governing Planning Commis- notice of the joint workshop meeting shall be given sion Assessment.The planning commission's pen- by publication in the county's official newspaper at odic assessment and recommendation shall be least one time 10 days prior to the date of the meet- - based upon,but shall not be limited to, an inquiry ing and by posting a copy of the meeting notice at into the following growth management indicators: the county courthouse,which shall include a state- (i) Whether growth and development as ment of the purpose of the joint workshop. envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan is occurring (3) Planning Commission Hearing—Report and faster or slower than anticipated, or is failing to Recommendation.The planning commission shall materialize; hold a noticed public hearing to accept public com- (ii) Whether the capacity of the county to ment regarding the suggested amendments on the provide adequate services has diminished " or preliminary docket. Following the hearing, the increased; planning commission shall prepare a report and rec- (iii) Whether sufficient urban land is ommendation identifying those suggested amend- designated and zoned to meet projected demand ments that it is recommending for consideration by and need; the board of county commissioners during the (iv) Whether any of the assumptions annual amendment process.The planning commis- upon which the plan is based are no longer found sion's recommendation shall be based upon the per- to be valid; ceived need, urgency and appropriateness of each (v) Whether changes in county-wide atti- suggested amendment.The planning commission's tides necessitate amendments to the goals of the report and recommendation shall also include those plan and the basic values embodied within the proposed amendments resulting from the periodic Comprehensive Plan Vision Statement; assessment set forth in ICC18.45.050(4),as appli- (vi) Whether changes in circumstances ` cable.Notice of the planning commission hearing dictate a need for amendments; shallbe given by publication in the county's official (vii) Whether inconsistencies exist be- newspaper at least one time 10 days prior to the date tween the Comprehensive Plan and the GMA or the of the meeting and by posting a copy of the-hearing Comprehensive Plan and the County-wide Plan- notice at the county courthouse,which shall include ning Policy for Jefferson County. [Ord.2-06§ 1) a statement of the purpose of the hearing. 18.45.060 Review of preliminary (4) Board of Commissioners Decision—Adop-. P liminary docket— tion of Final Docket. Adoption of final docket. (a) Review and Decision Process. By the (1) DCD Review of Preliminary Docket.After second regular board of county commissioners - - compiling the preliminary docket, the administra- meeting in May of each year, the board of county tor shall review the suggested amendments and pre- commissioners shall review and consider the Ian- pare a report concerning which suggested amend- ning commissions re port and recommended final ments the administrator believes should be placed oc et at a re gularly scheduled commissioners . on the final docket for consideration during the an- m g The board of county commissioners may nual amendment process.In addition to addressing adopt the planning commission's recommel the need,urgency and appropriateness of each sug- final docket without a public hearing;however,in gested amendment, the staff report shall include, th(event that a majority of the board of county but not be limited to,a consideration of the follow- commissioners ecn es or subtract sug- ing: gested amendments,it shall first hold a public hear- (a) The availability of sufficient DCD staff in noticed as set forth in subs motion (31 of s to substantively review the suggested amendments y gg seconn, w nc shall be held b the first boar f and manage the public review process with avail- county commissioners meeting in July. able staff and fin al ocket — n . The final (b) Anticipated DCD costs and budget for docket as adopted by the board of county commis- processing the suggested amendments. sioners shall include the following: (2) Optional Board of County Commissioners/ (i) All applipations for formal site-spe- Planning Commission Workshop. The board of cific amendments timely submitted under JCC county commissioners and planning commission 18.45.050(3); . may, but are not required to, hold a noticed joint (ii) Any proposals for suggested amend- workshop meeting to gather information regarding ments which the board of county commissioners the items on the preliminary docket and the admin- elects to consider during the annual amendment istrator's report and recommendation. If held, process;and 18-261 (Revised 2/06)= 18.45.070 ' (iii) When applicable, any amendments (i) The purpose(s) of amending and/or recommended by the planning commission during updating the Comprehensive Plan; its periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan (ii) The deadline for submitting com- _. that the board of county commissioners elects to ments on the amendments;and consider during the amendment process. (iii) A tentative hearing schedule;contin (c) Effect of Final Adopted.Docket. The ued hearings may be held by the planning commis- decision of the board of county commissioners to t no additional notices need be published. . adopt the final docket does not constitute a decision (b) Required Findings — Generally. For all or recommendation that the substance of any for- proposed amendments, the planning commission mal site-specific, suggested, or planning commis- shall develop findings and conclusions and a rec- lion recommended amendment should be adopted. ommendation which consider the growth manage- No additional amendment proposals shall be con- ment indicators set forth in JCC 18.45.050(4)(bxi) • sidered by the county after adoption of the final through(4)(b)(vii),as well as the following: docket for that year; except for exceptions and (i) Whether circumstances related to the emergencies as set forth in JCC 18.45.030, and proposed amendment and/or the area in which it is county-sponsored proposals to amend the capital located have substantially changed since the adop- facilities element of the Comprehensive Plan as set tion of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; forth in JCC 18.45.040(2)(a). [Ord.2-06§ 1]. (ii) Whether the assumptions upon which the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan is based 18.45.070 Final docket—DCD review and are no longer valid,or whether new information is recommendation—SEPA review._ available which was not considered during the The final docket as adopted by the board of adoption process or any annual amendments of the county commissioners shall first be reviewed and Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan;and assessed by DCD,and the administrator shall pre- . (iii) Whether the proposed amendment f/ pare a staff report and recommendation on each reflects current widely held values of the residents P proposed amendment.DCD shall also be responsi- of Jefferson County. ble for conducting SEPA review of all items on the (c) Additional Required Findings—Formal final docket(see Article X of Chapter 18:40 JCC). Site-Specific Amendments. In addition to the As appropriate,the administrator shall solicit com- required findings set forth in subsection (1)(b) of ments regarding the proposed amendments from this section, in order to recommend approval of a the public and/or government agencies, The formal site-specific proposal to amend the Com- artministrator shall also provide notice and oppor- prehensive Plan, the planning commission must tunity for public comment as deemed appropriate also make the following findings: given the nature of the proposed amendments and (i) The proposed site-specific amend- consistent with RCW 36.70A.140 and SEPA went meets concurrency requirements for trans- (Chapter 43.21C RCW and Chapter 197-11 WAC). portation and does not adversely affect adopted • - i; § 1] level of service standards for other public facilities and services(e.g.,sheriff,fire and emergency med- . 18A5.080 'r I • docket—Planning commission ical services,parks,fire flow,and general govern- , i d board of county commissioners mental services); review. (u) The proposed site-specific amend- Planning Commission Review. All pro- ment is consistent with the goals, policies and posed amendments on the final docket shall be re- implementation strategies of the various elements viewed and assessed by the planning commission, .. of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; which shall make a recommendation to the board of (iii) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners after holding at least one meat will not result in probable significant adverse open record public hearing. impacts to the county's transportation network, (a) Notice.The hearing before the planning capital facilities,utilities,parks,and environmental commission shall be noticed by one publication in features that cannot be mitigated,and will not place the official newspaper of the county at least 10 days uncompensated burdens upon existing or planned prior to the date of the hearing and by posting a service capabilities; copy of the notice of hearing in the Jefferson (iv) In the case of a site-specific amend County Courthouse. This notice shall include the ment to the land use map, that the subject parcels following: are physically suitable for the requested land use (Revised 2/06) 18-262 Jefferson County Code • 18.45.090 designation and the anticipated land use develop- Comprehensive Plan amendments may be com- ment,including,but not limited to,the following: bined with any notice or public hearing for pro- (A) Access; posed amendments to the county's Comprehensive (B) Provision of utilities;and Plan implementing regulations(e.g., this code),or (C) Compatibility with existing and for other actions of the board of county commis- planned surrounding land uses; sioners. (v) The proposed site-specific amend- (c) Criteria for Evaluation of Proposed Plan ment will not create a pressure to change the land Amendments.The board of county commissioners use designation of other properties, unless the shall apply the same criteria as the planning com- change of land use designation for other properties mission as set forth in subsections(1)(b)and(1)(c) is in the long-term best interests of the county as a of this section,as applicable. whole; (d) Adoption by Ordinance. The board of (vi) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners shall adopt any amend- ment does not materially affect the land use and ments to the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan population growth projections that are the bases of by ordinance.This final action on the docket must the Comprehensive Plan; be taken by the second regular board meeting_in (vii) If within an unincorporated urban Dember of each year. . growth area (UGA), the proposed site-specific (e) Trans ttr tl to State. The administrator amendment does not materially affect the ade- shall transmit a copy of any proposed amendment quacy or availability of urban facilities and ser- of the Comprehensive Plan to the Washington vices to the immediate area and the overall UGA; State Office of Community Development(OCD)at (viii) The proposed amendment is con- least 60 days prior to the expected date of final sistent with the Growth Management Act(Chapter action by the board of county commissioners, as 36.70A RCW),the County Wide Planning.Policy consistent with Chapter 36.70A RCW.The admin- for Jefferson County, any other.applicable inter- istrator shall transmit a copy of any adopted Com- jurisdictional policies or agreements,and any other prehensive Plan amendment to OCD within 10 local,state or federal laws. days after adoption by the board. (d) Recommendation. The planning coin- (1) Appeals. All appeals to the adoption of mission's findings and conclusions shall include a . an amendment to the Jefferson County Compre- recommendation to the board of county commis- hensive Plan shall be filed with and processed by sioners that the proposed amendment(s)be denied, the Western Washington Growth Management approved, or approved with conditions or modify- Hearings Board in accordance with the provisions cations. of Chapter 36.70A RCW.[Ord.2-06§ 1] (2) Board of County Commissioners Review— .-.....------------ Appeals. 18.45.090 Amendments to GMA implementing (a) Board of County Commissioners Work- regulations. . shop.The board of county commissioners may first (1) Initiation. The text of the county's adopted review the recommendation of the planning coin- Comprehensive Plan implementing regulations mission in a workshop meeting(s). (also referred to within this code as"development (b) Board of County Commissioners regulations") may be amended at any time, pro- Review.The board of county commissioners shall vided the amendment is consistent with the Jeffer- consider the proposed amendments to the Compre- son County Comprehensive Plan and land use map. hensive Plan at a regularly scheduled meeting. If When inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan after considering the matter at the regularly sched- and land use map, the amendment shall be pro- uled public meeting the board of county commis- cessed concurrent with any necessary plan amend- sioners deems a change in the recommendation of ments using the process and timelines for plan the planning commission to be necessary, the amendments set forth in this chapter. "Implement- change shall not be incorporated until the board ing regulations" means the controls placed on conducts its own public hearing using the proce= development or land use activities by the county, dures set forth under JCC 18.40.310. The hearing including,but not limited to,this Unified Develop- shall be noticed by one publication in the official ment Code,the Jefferson County Shoreline Master newspaper of the county at least 10 days prior to the Program, or any other official controls required to • date of the hearing, and by posting copies of the implement the plan (see RCW 36.70A.030). Pro- notice of hearing in the Jefferson County Court- posed amendments,changes,or modifications may house.The notice and public hearing for proposed be initiated as follows: 18-263 (Revised 2)6) 18.45.090 (a) When consistent with the plan, at any (b) If after applying the criteria set forth in time at the direction of the board of county corn- JCC 18.45.080(1)(b)and(1Xc), as applicable,the missioners or by the planning commission pursu- board of county commissioners concludes that a I. ant to RCW 36.70.550; change in the recommendation of the planning (b) When inconsistent with the plan, under commission is necessary, the change shall not be the process and time lines for Comprehensive Plan incorporated until the board conducts its own pub- amendments by any interested person consistent lic hearing using the procedures set forth under with this chapter,or JCC 18.40310. The hearing shall be noticed by (c) Immediately following or concurrent one publication in the official newspaper of the with an amendment or amendments to the Jeffer- county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- son County Comprehensive Plan, the implement- ing,and by posting copies of the notice of hearing ing regulations shall be amended to be consistent in the Jefferson County Courthouse. The notice with the plan and land use map. and public hearing for proposed amendments to (2) Notice. implementing regulations*may be combined with (a) Proposed amendments to the implement- any notice or public hearing for proposed amend- ing regulations pursuant to subsection (1) of this ments to the Comprehensive Plan or for other section which must be processed concurrently with actions of the board of county commissioners. an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan and land (5) Transmittal to State.The administrator shall use map shall be processed and noticed in the same transmit a copy of any proposed amendments)to manner as plan amendments consistent with this the implementing regulations at least 60 days prior chapter. to the expected date of final action by the board of (b) Notice of any hearing on amendments to county commissioners,as consistent with Chapter the-implementing regulations generated by DCD— --36.7 RCr-Th ini . staff, the board. of county commissioners or the copy of any adopted amendment(s) to the imple- planning commission outside of the annual Com- meeting regulations to OCD within 10 days after prehensive Plan amendment process shall be given adoption by the board. by one publication in the official newspaper of the - . (6) Appeals.All appeals to the adoption of any county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- amendment(s) to the implementing regulations ing and by posting a copy of the notice of hearing shall be filed with and processed by the Western in the Jefferson County Courthouse. Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (c) Any additional notice required by state, in accordance with the provisions of Chapter or local law(e.g.,statutory notice requirements for 36.70A RCW.[Ord.2-06§ 1] amendments to the Shoreline Master Program),or deemed appropriate by the administrator, shall be paid for by the applicant. . (3) Planning Commission Review. The plan- ning commission shall hold a public hearing on any amendment(s)to the implementing regulations and shall make a recommendation to the board of county commissioners using the site-specific trite- ria set forth in JCC 1.8.45.080(1)(b) and(1)(c), as applicable. (4) Board of County Commissioners Review. The board of county commissioners shall consider the proposed amendments at a regularly scheduled meeting. (a) ,I�f.;pfter applying the criteria set forth in • JCC 18.45.080(1)(b)and(1Kc), as applicable,the board of cpunty commissioners concludes that no change in the recomn}dation of the planning commission is necessary, the board may make a final determination on the proposed amendment(s) and adopt the amendments as recommended by the planning commission. (Revised 2/06) 18-264 18.30.150 Signs. No sign shall hereafter be erected or used for any purpose or in any manner except as permitted by the regulations of this section or as specified elsewhere in this code.All signs subject to this section shall be subject to approval and issuance of a sign permit by the administrator according to a Type 1 permit approval process as specified in Chapter 18.40 JCC.The administrator may waive certain requirements of this section or require additional conditions for any sign permit,if deemed necessary to maintain consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. (1) Prohibited Signs.The following signs are prohibited: (a) Abandoned signs; (b) Billboards; (c) Flashing,revolving or moving signs,excepting clocks; (d) Off-site signs which advertise a business; (e) Signs or sign structures,which by coloring,shape,working,or location resemble or conflict with traffic-control signs or devices; (f) Signs which create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic;and (g) Signs attached to utility poles or traffic signs. (2) Exemptions.The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section: (a) Traffic and standardized public signs installed by a government entity; (b) Window and merchandise displays,point of purchase advertising displays such as product dispensers and barber poles; (c) National flags,flags of a political subdivision,and symbolic flags of an institution or business; (d) Legal notices required by law; (e) Historic site plaques and markers and gravestones; (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing" {Deleted: or (g) Xolitical messa a •_______ - Deleted:p 4h) Structures intended for separate use,such as recycling containers and phone 1.•••••1 not to exceed eight square booths; feet (i) Real estate signs;and Deleted: W Lettering painted on or magnetically flush-mounted onto a motor vehicle operating in the normal course of business. (3) Design Standards.All signs must meet the following standards: (a) The following standards apply to the illumination and illustration of signs: (i) The illumination of signs shall be shaded,shielded,or directed so the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect surrounding properties or public and private rights-of-way or create a hazard or nuisance to the traveling public,or to surrounding properties. (ii) No sign or part thereof shall consist of rotating,revolving,or moving parts; consist of banners,streamers,or spinners;or involve flashing,blinking,or alternating lights.An exception to this standard is temporary signs associated with local festivals, fairs,parades,or special events pursuant to subsection(4)(a)of this section. (b) Sign size shall be regulated as follows: (i) The total square footage of signs shall not exceed 64 square feet for any business within any commercial or industrial land use district.Multitenant developments may have one freestanding sign for each access point,commonly identifying the businesses within multitenant developments provided such signs total no more than 64 square feet in aggregate.The maximum aggregate size for projection signs placed on a building is limited to one percent of the floor areas of the building,except that each occupant is allowed a sign of at least two square feet.In no case may an individual occupant's sign be larger than 15 square feet. (ii) The square footage of signs shall be calculated by the outside dimensions necessary to frame the information displayed.No sign mounted on a building shall extend above or beyond the eave,rake,or parapet of the wall on which it is mounted.Any sign projecting beyond six inches from a perpendicular wall shall be at least seven feet above grade. (iii) Directional,identification or advertising signs for any use located in any rural residential district shall not exceed 32 square feet,with the exception of institutional use signs,which shall not exceed 64 square feet. (c) Uses located in any rural commercial or industrial land use districts shall have no more than two on-premises signs except as allowed in this section for multitenant developments. (d) Signs attached to or painted against the structure to which it relates shall be computed as a part of the overall total square footage,or number of signs allowed. (e) All signs shall be continuously maintained.Signs that present a public hazard as determined by the Jefferson County building official or department of public works shall be subject to abatement. (f) The design of freestanding signs shall include measures to restrict vehicles from passing beneath them,unless otherwise permitted by the Jefferson County department of public works.All free standing pole signs or projecting signs shall provide pedestrian clearance to a minimum of eight feet,where applicable. (g) Signs should be incorporated into the landscaping of the site when landscaping is provided. (h) No signs,other than those related to water dependent uses,such as a marina,are permitted to face seaward;excepting signs relating to safety concerns,such as cable- crossing,construction-dredging,fuel area,etc. (i) No sign shall be placed in the public right-of-way or in the vision clearance triangle of intersections and curb cuts,unless otherwise approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (4) Specialty Si gns.Specialty signs may be established when consistent with Y the standards set forth below: (a) Signs and banners promoting public festivals,community or special events,and grand openings may be displayed up to 30 days prior to the event,and shall be removed no later than seven days after the event.The sponsoring entity is responsible for sign removal.Event signs "off-site." s ma be located off site. may Signs which identify a recognized community or unincorporated place are permitted at each entrance to the community.Said signs are limited to one per entrance, and may not exceed 64 square feet or eight feet in Y q height. Si relating to . g1i gh Signs g clubs, societies,orders,fraternities and the like shall be permitted part of the communi p p ty sign. (c) Businesses may erect temporary on-site sandwich board signs subject to the following criteria: (i) No more than two sandwich board signs may be erected per business; (ii) Sandwich board signs shall not exceed four feet in height or three feet in width; (iii) Sandwich board signs shall be displayed during business hours only; (iv) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed on sidewalks;and (v) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed in public road rights-of-way unless approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (d) Off-site signs may only be allowed when they meet all of the following standards: (i) Are directional in nature; (ii) Located on private property along a major or minor arterial; (iii) Located no more than 600 feet from an intersection;and (iv) No larger than 12 square feet. (5) Nonconforming Signs.Legally established signs in place prior to the adoption of these standards and not in conformance with these standards shall be considered legal, nonconforming signs,and may remain as provided below: (a) Nonconforming off-premises signs shall be removed within five years of adoption of this code.Until then,such signs must be continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered.Nonconforming off-premises signs may be replaced by off-site directional signs as allowed in this section. (b) Nonconforming on-premises signs may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered. (c) Billboards which are in place prior to the adoption of the ordinance codified in this code may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered.[Ord. 11-00§6.15] • • /4/$, District No. 1 Commissioner:Phil Johnson 4$ N COL District No.2 Commissioner:David W.Sullivan rDistrict No.3 Commissioner:John Austin County Administrator.John F.Fischbach Clerk of the Board:Loma Delaney 4skl NG�° MINUTES Week of February 20,2007 Commissioner Phil Johnson called the meeting to order in the presence of Commissioner David W.Sullivan and Commissioner John Austin. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD: The following comments were made by citizens. Several people stated that they support the reappointment of Jim Hagan and Dennis Schultz to the Planning Commission;the people on the Critical Areas Ordinance(CAO)Committee are volunteers and should be commended for their hard work;the County needs to consider the landowners who will be adversely affected by the regulations they adopt;the Washington Environmental Counsel declined to participate on the CAO Committee when they were invited;property rights are civil rights according to recent case law;if the Board accepts the minority report of the CAO,they won't get re-elected;Commissioner Austin's campaign flyer said that he would listen to his constituents;the County needs to stop stonewalling businesses that want to expand;the Commissioners took an oath to uphold the State and the U.S.Constitution;the developers of the Planned Rural Residential Development at the Discovery Bay Golf Course want to change the plan and eliminate the golf course;:the Board's meetings should be video taped and put on PTTV;the legislation on the Puget Sound Partnership is being revised,but the end result of usurping local authority is the same;and the majority of the CAO Committee members do not represent the pro-environmental views of the citizens of the County. APPROVAL AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSENT AGENDA:Commissioner Austin moved to approve the Consent Agenda. Commissioner Sullivan seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. 1. RESOLUTION NO. 17-07 re:Adopting a Disbursement Policy 2. RESOLUTION NO. 18-07 re:Authorization for Auditor to Sign Payroll 3. RESOLUTION NO. 19-07 re:Establishing Standard for the Annual Inventory of the Capitalized Fixed Assets 4. NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING re: East Jefferson County Off-Highway Vehicle(OHV) Feasibility Study Report; Scheduled for Monday,February 26,2007 at 1:30 p.m. at the Quilcene Community Center 5. AGREEMENT Amendment No.1 re: Educational and Therapeutic Services for Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years and Their Families;Jefferson County Public Health;Holly Ridge Center • • Page 1 Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 6. AGREEMENT Amendment No.1 re:Developmental Disability Educational and Therapeutic Services for South Jefferson County Families and their Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years; Jefferson County Public Health; Concerned Citizens 7. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Voter Registration and Election System;Jefferson County Auditor;DFM Associates 8. AGREEMENT re: Guardrail Installation;Paradise Bay Road Project No.CR1148-4;Jefferson County Public Works;Petersen Brothers,Inc. 9. Payment of Jefferson County Vouchers/Warrants Dated February 13,2007 Totaling$4,531.32 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with vouchers approved and signed by the Board of Jefferson County Commissioners are retained by the Jefferson County Auditor and Public Works Department.) 10. Payment of Jefferson County A/P Warrants Done by Payroll Dated February 6,2007 Totaling $128,766.31 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with A/P Warrants approved by the Payroll Services Manager are retained in the Jefferson County Auditor's Office.) 11. Letter of Appreciation for Donation of Hand Carved Monkey Tree Wooden Bowl from Courthouse Neighbors 12. Letter Regarding Support of House Bill 1167,Preserving the Viability of Agricultural Lands; Representative Geoff Simpson,Chair,House Local Government Committee APPROVAL OF MINUTES:Commissioner Sullivan moved to approve the minutes of February 5,2007. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. Ferry Advisory Committee Interviews and Possible Appointment: The Board interviewed Peter Bonyun,Tom Thiersch,Tim Snider,Peter Hanke,Dr.Albert Abrams and Fred Beck. Dr Abrams and Fred Beck currently serve on the advisory committee and their terms are expiring. There are also two vacant positions. There are five members on the committee. After the interviews,the Board asked the County Administrator to see if more than five member can serve on the Ferry Advisory Committee. The appointments will be scheduled on next week's agenda. Discussion re:Revisions to Jefferson County Code 18.3 0.150 regarding Political Signs:.. Director of Community Development Al Scalf reported that the Board has stated that they think it is in the public interest to amend the Jefferson County Code regarding political sign regulations. Staff has recommended that political signs be exempt unless they exceed the threshold for a building permit. If the Board agrees with the proposed language,it will be forwarded to the Planning Commission for a public hearing and final recommendation. Commissioner Sullivan asked about the sign size limits. Building Official Fred Slota replied that he only deals with the structure of a sign. A 32 square foot sign is engineered and built to withstand the wind. He thinks a sign exceedingl6 square feet would need a permit,but it would not have to be engineered. Page 2 Commissioners Meeting Minutes: Week of February 20,2007 t,„.1 ) The Board noted their concerns about political signs that could create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic. Al Scalf explained that signs that create a safety hazard are prohibited, even if they are listed under Exemptions in the Code. The Board asked that this language be clarified. Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining(2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as `yard sale"or "no trespassing";(g)political signs;and(i)real estate signs in one clause. There was a discussion about the maximum size for all exempt signs. The Building Official stated that the International Building Code(IBC)does not recommend a size. Al Scalf explained that the current County policy requires engineered plans for signs in excess of 32 square feet or six feet above grade. A building permit is required for any freestanding sign with posts if the top of the sign exceeds six feet above grade and the sign exceeds 16 square feet in size. Commissioner Sullivan suggested that all exempt signs not exceed 16 square feet. Commissioner Sullivan moved to forward the Sign Ordinance(JCC 18.30.150)to the Planking Commission and combine(2)(f)(g)and(i)in one clause,including language that clarifies when a building permit is required and when it is exempt, and that(2)Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The Board met in Executive Session from 11:30 a.m. to Noon with the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney,Outside Legal Counsel,the County Administrator and the Director of Community Development regarding actual litigation NOTICE OF ADJOURNMENT:Commissioner Sullivan moved to adjourn the meeting at 12:17 p.m. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The next meeting is sch c d•forMonday,February 26,2007 at 9 a.m. / .K 9 N;c. :` MEETING JOURNEY .f I-; ti JEFFERSON COUNTY ,. .A BO• ' 1 0, CO/I SIONERS SEALk : _ \iv • * I. ..-4 : ettA•ar . _,,.. 4., ,...,.. .,; Phi Jo . i,Chair ATTEST: `' , y J ....BMW,. ...7" Davi li* er em Que,:c ulie Matthes, CMC Deputy Clerk of the Board Jo Austin,Member • Page 3 • MEETING AGENDA Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:30 P.M. WSU Community Learning Center,Port Hadlock 6:30 Call to Order(Roll Call,Quorum,Approve Minutes of February 21,March 7 and March 21) Bud Schindler, Chair Staff Updates Committee Reports General Public Comments A. Public Hearing—2007 Comp Plan Amendments Preliminary Docket(Suggested) Open Public Hearing Staff Report Public Testimony Close Public Hearing Planning Commission Discussion and Recommendation to BOCC for Final Docket B. Proposed Planning Commission By-Law Amendment C. Review Process for CAO Committee Reports to Planning Commission D. Introduction to Sign Ordinance Revisions General Public Comments Summary of tonight's meeting and forward look at agenda issues for the next meeting 9:30 Adjournment NOTE: The Planning Commission may add and take action on other items not listed on this agenda. Guidelines for Public Comment: 1)Be concise. Summarize your questions/concems. If you have substantial background information to support your comments,please submit in writing. 2)Be civil. Focus on issues not individuals. Personal attacks,derogatory language and threatening remarks will not be tolerated. 3)Speak clearly. Speak loudly&slowly enough so you are heard. Explain any jargon and acronyms you use. Excerpt from Planning Commission Minutes for April 18,2007 Karen Barrows provided an introduction to the sign ordinance revisions. She referred to the BOCC minutes for the week of February 20,2007,on the issue of JCC 18.30.150 regarding signs. The BOCC thought it was in the public interest to amend the JCC regarding political sign regulations. Al Scalf explained that the BOCC had utilized a provision of the Planning Enabling Act called"A Board Initiated Control". Earlier, staff had done a review of how other jurisdictions regulate political (campaign) signs. As a result, staff provided a recommendation to the BOCC that political messages be allowed as an outright exemption. Staff took this Board initiated control to the BOCC on February 20. The BOCC expressed some concerns, some related to airplane banners or building code issues or real estate signs. He suggested that it may be appropriate for the Building Official to come and meet with the Planning Commission. He suggested that the Planning Commission schedule the issue at a later meeting for deliberations and to make a recommendation to the BOCC. Mr. Scalf referred to a pertinent court case— Collier vs. the City of Tacoma—a suggested the Planning Commission may want to consider it. The commissioners agreed to allow input from a real estate professional who was present. Karen Best said that real estate signs are treated differently than political signs. She urged the Planning Commission to keep realtors involved in the process regarding the sign revisions. This particular proposal does not affect real estate signs. Henry asked if there are issues with real estate signs or if it is only political signs that are at issue. If it is just political signs, he suggested the Planning Commission deal with that and move on. Al Scalf responded that the staff draft proposal only addressed political signs. However,the commission may want to also consider the concerns expressed by the BOCC as reflected in their February 20 minutes. The commission could prepare its own code draft and hold a public hearing. He reported that the BOCC had suggested the Planning Commission examine the code as written for consistency,whether it was fair across the board. He also recommended that the commissioners also read Collier vs. City of Tacoma to see the legal issues surrounding signs, including the Constitutional right of free speech. The commissioners invited Mike Belenski to address the sign issue. Mike Belinski explained that he had contested the recommendation that political signs be reduced to a limit of eight square feet while real estate signs could be larger. He had even gone to court for an injunction. His opinion was that they wanted to limit political signs to 16 square feet and he did not think they could not do that. He thought the First Amendment free speech rights were unlimited. In order to restrict that,you had to show a compelling government interest. He spoke about the amount of money some political candidates may spend on advertising in the media while some other candidate may only be able to afford signs. He said that whatever the county adopted,it should be internally consistent across the board. He also referred to the Collier vs. City of Tacoma case as something the county needed to comply with. He did not think there was any harm with a person putting a political sign in his yard and he did not think someone should have to pay for a permit for the privilege. Motion by Edel Sokol, seconded by Mike Whittaker,to accept staffs recommendation to exempt political signs and to remove the size limitation. The motion carried unanimously (8-0-0). Al Scaif stated that he would review the sizes of 16 square feet versus 32 square feet with the Building Official. He explained that JCC 18.30.150 was the Zoning section of the code. The Building Code was JCC Title 15 and addressed structural issues. Juelanne Dalzell (--' , � '. JEFFERSON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY °~ Courthouse—P.O.Box 1220•( t - . x. • Port 4.•_. ,h. : ' Townsend,Washington 98368 i-; .r. �, . ) Telephone(360)385-9180 FAX(360)385-0073 !p s .', i- David W.Alvarez,Deputy Prosecutor ,A1„..- •-'+ - ^ Katherine Gulmert,Deputy Prosecutor JEF COUNTY FERDON Edward B.DeBray,Deputy Prosecutor Rafael E.Urquia,Deputy Prosecutor Thomas A.Brotherton,Deputy Prosecutor Lianne Perron-Kossow,Victim Witness Advocate April 4, 2008 NOT CONFIDENTIAL To: County Commission Frank Gifford, T.I. County Admin. Karen Barrows, DCD Stacie Hoskins, DCD Al Scalf, DCD From: David Alvarez, Chief Civil DPA Re: Sign Ordinance The need for an amendment to the JCC at§18.30.150(2), an amendment that would remove the 8 square feet size limitation on political signs,a limitation only impacting political signs, was prompted by Mr.Belenski's lawsuit in Clallam County(Cause#06-2-00894-7)and the injunction against enforcing that rule entered against the County under that cause number in October 2006. Note,however that the BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act of 1963 at RCW 36.70.640 to send an"official control"or,in this case,an amendment to an"official control" to the "planning agency" (DCD and the PC combined) for a report. Pursuant to that authority,the BoCC discussed the need for changes to this section of the JCC with planning and building/inspection staff from DCD on February 20,2007 and subsequent to that discussion passed a motion forwarding their proposed text changes for JCC §18.30.150(2) [known as the "Sign Ordinance") to the Planning Commission or"PC." The PC deliberated on the proposal on April 18, 2007 and voted 8-0 to accept staff's ---->recommendation that simply removed the size cap on political signs and gave political signs their own subsection under JCC §18.20.150(2). In sum,DCD proposed and the PC approved and recommended something different than what the BoCC had originally sent to the planning agency. Note well that the PC did NOT hold a noticed public hearing on this issue. My review of both RCW 36.70.580 and JCC 18.45.090(3)indicates that the PC"shall hold a public hearing" before making any recommendation to the BoCC. So there has to be a public hearing before the PC prior to the"planning agency"forwarding its recommendation to the BoCC. After that hearing,the recommendation of the planning agency,referred to as a report in the Planning Enabling Act,will be brought to the BoCC via an Agenda Request Item from DCD. The BoCC is required to deliberate on the substance of the report at the.first public meeting per RCW 36.70.620. If the BoCC wants to adopt precisely the text that was recommended to them, then they can adopt the "official control" at a second public meeting WITHOUT holding a public hearing. If the BoCC wants to adopt any different text,then it must hold a public hearing before adopting its preferred text at a second public meeting. See RCW 36.70.620 and RCW 36.70.630. That public hearing would need the normal not less than 10 days' notice in order to comply with the notice requirements found in RCW 36.70.590 and JCC 18.45.090(4). Following this process would also represent compliance with the"public participation"requirements of Ch. 36.70A RCW(GMA)which also apply but don't go into detail about the precise steps that equate with sufficient public participation. Text changes to fix typographical errors or to,for example,reorder the exemptions would not require a public hearing. David Alvarez. 2 1.21 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 1 of 12 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA July 1993 [No. 59442-2. En Banc.July 1, 1993.] COLLIER v. TACOMA MICHAEL COLLIER, ET AL,Respondents, v.THE CITY OF TACOMA,Appellant. [1] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Federal Constitution ❑ Application to State. Freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment applies to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [2] Constitutional Law ❑ Construction ❑ Priority of Consid-eration. When feasible, a court will decide constitutional issues under the state constitution before considering the federal constitution. [3]Constitutional Law❑ Construction 0 State and Federal Provisions 0 Independent State Interpretation 0 Federal Precedent 0 Effect.When reviewing a state constitutional provision that is interpreted differently from its federal counterpart,a court may cite federal cases for the purpose of guidance;federal cases do not,however,compel a result under the state constitution. [4] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech ❑ Degree of Protection. Political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Const.art.1,§5 and the First Amendment. [5] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum 0 Right To Restrict.The government has only a very limited right to restrict political speech in a traditional public forum, i.e., a place that by tradition or government fiat has been devoted to assembly and debate. [6] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 What Constitutes 0 Parking Strips. The area between public streets and public sidewalks constitutes a traditional public forum for purposes of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. [7] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Test. Under Const. art. 1,§5,time,place,and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum are valid only if they(1)are content neutral,(2)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,and(3)leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [8] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression, a restriction is not content neutral if it defines and regulates(1) a particular viewpoint or(2) a particular subject matter or class of expression.The intent of the enacting body is not determinative of the issue of content neutrality. [9]Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time,Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality 0 Secondary Effects. A time, place, and manner restriction on political speech in a traditional public forum is not content neutral merely because it is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. [10] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality 0 Subject-Matter Based ❑ Test. Under Const. art. 1, §5 and the First Amendment,time, place,and manner restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral,but subject-matter based,are valid only if they(1)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and (2)leave open ample alternative channels of communication. The State has the burden of proving the validity of such restrictions. [11] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest ❑ What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,legislation serves a compelling state interest if its purpose is a fundamental one and it bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the purpose. [12] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest ❑ Balancing Test. When determining the validity of time,place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,a court will balance the public interest advanced by the legislation against the extent of its restriction on free speech rights. [13] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Aesthetics 0 In General. A government's interest in aesthetics, such as maintaining a clean and litter-free community, is not sufficiently compelling to justify a time,place, and manner restriction,that is content based,on political speech in a traditional public forum. [14] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest ❑ Aesthetics ❑ Traffic Safety ❑ Favoring Commercial Speech Over Political Speech.A government's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not compelling and does not justify a greater restriction on political speech than on commercial speech. (State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52 is overruled insofar as it is inconsistent.) [15] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest 0 Aesthetics 0 Traffic Safety.A government's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not sufficiently compelling to justify time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum absent a showing that the government has seriously and comprehensively addressed such aesthetic and traffic safety concerns other than through the restrictions in question. [16]Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions 0 Alternative Channels of Communication 0 Burden of Proof. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,the government has the burden of establishing that the restrictions leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [17] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Alternative Channels of Communication 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining whether a time, place,and manner restriction on freedom of expression leaves open ample alternative channels of communication,the alternatives must be practically available. [18]Statutes 0 Validity❑ Invalidity ❑ Partial Invalidity❑ Effect.As a general rule,a court will invalidate only that portion of an enactment that is unconstitutional;the remaining valid portions of the enactment survive and are enforceable. [19]Civil Rights ❑ Deprivation ❑ Attorney Fees 0 In General.A prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 is entitled to an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C.§1988 unless special circumstances would render an attorney fee award unjust. [20]Civil Rights 0 Deprivation 0 Attorney Fees 0 Special Circumstances for Denial ❑ Outside Funding for Attorney.The fact that a prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is represented by an association funded by someone other than the party does not constitute a special httn://srch.mrsc.ore:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:._. 4/18/200R 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page,2 of 12 circumstance for not awarding the party attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.§1988. [211 Civil Rights ❑ Deprivation ❑ Attorney Fees ❑ Special Circumstances for Denial❑ Publicity. Publicity gained from an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not grounds for denying the prevailing party an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 absent a finding that the party used the judicial system to gain publicity for personal benefit. DURHAM, J.,ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur in the result by separate opinion; MADSEN, J., did not participate in the disposition of this case. Nature of Action: A candidate for Congress claimed that city ordinances prohibiting the posting of political signs more than 60 days before the election violated his right of free speech. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 90-2-06091-3, Frederick B. Hayes, J., on February 15, 1991, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff but refused to award attorney fees. Supreme Court: Holding that the ordinances restrict the right to political expression in violation of the federal and state constitutions, that only those portions of the ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech are invalid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court affirms the judgment in part, reverses it in part, and remands the case for an award of attorney fees. William J. Barker, City Attorney, and John C. Kouklis, Patricia Bosmans, and Heidi Ann Horst, Assistants, for appellant. Adam Kline, for respondents. Richard L. Andrews, on behalf of the City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, amici curiae. GUY,J. ❑ Michael Collier, a candidate for Congress, posted his political campaign signs in residential areas within the city of Tacoma more than 60 days prior to the 1990 primary election. City workers removed Collier's signs from residential yards and parking strips in accordance with two Tacoma ordinances that restrict the preelection posting of political signs in such areas to a 60-day campaign window. Collier sued Tacoma claiming the ordinances violated his free speech rights. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Collier, holding the ordinances unconstitutional. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTS Michael Collier was a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for Congress in the Sixth Congressional District of Washington in 1990. Collier had not previously held or run for any elective office. He was not considered a public figure or well known in political circles. Collier's opponent in the primary election was Representative Norm Dicks, a 14-year incumbent. The primary election was scheduled for September 18, 1990. Collier began to plan his campaign in December 1989 and began fundraising in February 1990. Collier identified that the greatest obstacles to his campaign were lack of name familiarity and funding. During the course of the primary campaign, Collier raised and spent a total of$29,000. Representative Dicks spent$329,000 in his primary campaign. Given his resources, Collier determined that yard signs were the most cost-effective means of communicating his political message. At the beginning of May 1990, the Collier campaign assembled some 700 2-sided yard signs. The first of these was posted outdoors between May 20 and 30. Collier supporters placed "Mike Collier for Congress"signs in their front yards and parking strips. Tacoma Municipal Code (TMC) 2.05.275 defines and regulates political signs. The ordinance defines political signs as "[a]II signs which are displayed out-of-doors on real property relating to the nomination or election of any individual for a public political office or advocating any measure to be voted on at any special or general election". The ordinance limits the posting of such political signs to a period of not more than 60 days prior to and 7 days after the date of the election for which the signs are intended. TMC 2.05.275(1). «1» a1»The full text of TMC 2.05.275(1)provides: http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 3 of 12 "(1) Such political signs shall not be displayed more than sixty days prior to and seven days after the date of the election for which intended. In cases where a general election follows within 55 days of a primary election,those signs for candidates whose names will appear on the ballot in the general election may be displayed during the interim period and up to seven days after the general election. In all instances herein in which political signs are required to be removed within seven days after the election for which the political sign was displayed, if said signs are not removed, they will be subject to removal by the City of Tacoma Public Works Department. Provided, however, that this provision shall not prohibit political signs in areas where other provisions of the Official Code of the City of Tacoma allows the same as legally licensed outdoor advertising displays." Tacoma Municipal Code 6.03.070 prohibits any person, firm, or corporation from posting any signs on any public street or highway or upon any curbstone,lamp post, street sign,pole,hydrant,bridge,tree, or other thing situated upon any public street or highway or any publicly owned property within the City of Tacoma,except as may be authorized by ordinances of the City of Tacoma. . . PROVIDED,HOWEVER,the prohibition contained herein shall not apply to political signs placed on parking strips preceding a primary or general election where such political signs are installed pursuant to the permission of the owner of the property abutting said parking strip and installed in such a manner as not to constitute a traffic hazard . . .. Real estate signs advertising the sale or rent of the property upon which they stand or to which they are attached,and other signs attached to any building or sidewalk advertising the business carried on in the building, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. TMC 6.03.080. Pursuant to these ordinances, Tacoma Public Works Department employees removed signs displaying "Mike Collier for Congress"from residential yards and parking strips within the city of Tacoma that were posted more than 60 days prior to the primary election. Mr. Benjamin Thompson, City Engineer for Tacoma, testified that he directed personnel from his department to pick up all signs in the public right of way g2» «2» Mr.Thompson defined public"right-of-way"as"that area within a development that is set aside for and dedicated for use of a public street, sidewalks, and public utilities."Report of Proceedings,at 11. Mr.Thompson testified that the public right of way extends 15 feet from the curb:5 feet for the parking strip,5 feet for the sidewalk,and an additional 5 feet into the homeowner's front yard. throughout the city. Mr. Thompson testified that his department also removes commercial signs from residential areas since commercial signs are not permitted in those areas. Mr. Thompson understood that the ordinance allows an exception for on-site commercial signs pertaining to the sale or rent of private property. He testified that in order to enforce the ordinances, he differentiates between commercial and political signs by reading them. Collier filed this action in July 1990 seeking a temporary restraining order, an injunction against the ordinances' enforcement, a declaratory judgment that the ordinances are unconstitutional, and attorney fees. The complaint was subsequently amended to include plaintiff«3» «3» Hereafter, both plaintiffs are identified collectively as"Collier". Joel Beritich, a Collier supporter who had political signs removed from his yard and parking strip. The amended complaint also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an additional source of protection for the rights involved and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the statutory basis for the claim of attorney fees. On February 15, 1991, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Collier, holding that the ordinances were unconstitutional, but denied Col-lier's claim for attorney fees. Tacoma appealed the trial court's judgment as to the ordinances, and Collier cross-appealed the trial court's denial of attorney fees. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and now affirm in part and reverse in part. ISSUES This case presents three issues for review. First, do the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutionally restrict Collier's free speech rights? We hold that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs unconstitutionally restricts Collier's right to political expression. httn://srch.mrsc.ora:8080/wacourts/DocView/sun remearchive/121wn2d/121wn2d0737.htm?hilite=colliery_.. 4/1 R/9n6R 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046,COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 4 of 12 Second, did the trial court err in declaring the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety? We answer in the affirmative and hold unconstitutional only those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech. Third, did the trial court err when it denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988? We reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees and remand for a determination of an award of fees consistent with this opinion. ANALYSIS [1] The Tacoma ordinances are challenged under both the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech". U.S. Const. amend. 1. The freedom of speech which is secured by the First Amendment is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State." Burson v. Freeman, U.S. , 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 12, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (quoting Thornhill v.Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940)). Article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides that"[e]very person may freely speak,write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." [2, 3]As we stated in O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)), '[t]his court has a duty, where feasible, to resolve constitutional questions first under the provisions of our own state constitution before turning to federal law." We do so because in addition to our responsibility to interpret Washington's constitution, we must furnish a rational basis "for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law." State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). See Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). We recognize that the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions are different in wording and effect, but that the result reached by previous Washington cases in general adopted much of the federal methodology for application to state constitutional cases. The federal cases cited here and in our prior decisions are used for the purpose of guidance and do not themselves compel the result the court reaches under our state constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 775 (1988). With these statements in mind, we turn to our analysis of the Tacoma ordinances. Il [4] The Tacoma ordinances implicate several concerns in our free speech jurisprudence: regulation of political speech, regulation of political speech in a public forum, and regulation based on the content of the speech. The speech restricted by Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 is political speech. The code defines"political signs" and restricts the time and place in which such signs may be posted. Wherever the extreme perimeters of protected speech may lie, it is clear the First Amendment protects political speech, see Carey v. Brown,447 U.S. 455, 467, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263, 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980), giving it greater protection over other forms of speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego,453 U.S. 490, 513, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). The constitutional protection afforded political speech has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35, 91 S. Ct. 621 (1971). [5, 6]The second important feature of the Tacoma ordinances is that they restrict political speech in a traditional public forum. The traditional public forum includes those places 'which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"' such as parks, streets and sidewalks. Burson v. Freeman, supra at 13 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators'Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983)); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). See also Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. III. L. Rev. 949, 951. The parking strips «4» «4»Collier also raises an issue concerning the restriction of political speech on private property.This issue was not adequately addressed in the briefing,is not necessary to our decision in this case,and thus will not be discussed further. http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 5 of 12 in which Collier and his supporters placed his political signs lie between the "streets and sidewalks" and thus are part of the "traditional public forum". Because these places occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection, the government's ability to restrict expressive activity is very limited. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). [7] Since the Tacoma ordinances do not ban political signs altogether, we analyze the ordinances as time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746(1989); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We diverge from the Supreme Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, "as we believe restrictions on speech can be imposed consistent with Const. art. 1, § 5 only upon showing a compelling state interest." «5» e5» Our prior holdings have required counsel to discuss at least the factors enunciated in State v.Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) when they assert the applicability of our state constitution. Counsel's failure in this case to discuss these factors would normally preclude our consideration of the state constitutional issues. State v.Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466,472,755 P.2d 797(1988). Citation of Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212,721 P.2d 918(1986), cert.dismissed,479 U.S. 1050(1987)is not enough. Because Bering is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwail analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwail to reach the state constitutional issue. For future cases,we stress that this court must have the benefit of a state constitutional argument that is of assistance to the court to determine the meaning of the language used as it relates to the state constitutional claim and whether there are factors other than language that should determine the scope of our constitutional provisions.See Utter,The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism:Washington's Experience,65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1160-63(1992). Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The broad language of Const. art. 1, § 5 as compared with the federal constitution compels this result. Tacoma and amid curiae City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys argue that the Tacoma ordinances are constitutionally permissible restrictions on the time, place, and manner of political speech. We disagree.Applying the 3-part test for time, place, and manner regulations outlined above, we conclude that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs is unconstitutional. Our analysis of the Tacoma under each element of the time, place, and manner test follows. Content Neutrality [8] The trial court held that Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 are "not content-neutral, in that they expressly define and regulate 'political' signs."Tacoma and amici argue that the ordinances are content-neutral because the City does not regulate the message conveyed ❑ only the method by which it is conveyed. Collier claims the ordinances are content based because they define and regulate political speech as a class of expression. Constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restrictions may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536, 65 L, Ed. 2d 319, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980). Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and are thus subject to strict scrutiny. Renton, at 46-47; Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14. Under that intense level of review, government must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The Tacoma ordinances do not fit neatly into either the content-based or the content-neutral category. Our review of the case law and commentary on this subject indicates that the distinction is not always transparent. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983-1984). In determining whether a restriction is content neutral or content based, the Supreme Court has held that"[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech."' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791. While the Tacoma ordinances do not regulate political signs in terms of viewpoint, they describe and regulate permissible sign posting in terms of subject matter. Subject-matter restrictions are not directed at "particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of expression."Stone, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 239. In this case, political signs are subject to a 60-day restriction "out-of-doors on real httn://srch.mrsc.or2:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:... 4/1 R/20QR 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046,COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 6 of 12 property", whereas on-site commercial signs identifying a property for sale or for rent are not. TMC 2.05.275; TMC 6.03.070, .080. How long a sign may be maintained depends upon the kind of message the sign seeks to convey. The trial court found that Tacoma Public Works Department personnel have to read the signs in order to determine whether they are prohibited at a particular time. The United States Supreme Court has held that an ordinance is content based if it distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to content. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).As one commentator noted, the United States Supreme Court's prohibition of content- based regulations is based "both on equal protection grounds and on a first amendment grant of equal access to an open forum." (Footnotes omitted.) Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property to Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 208-09 (1984-1985). The question is "not whether all those within the classes defined by the state are treated equally but, rather, whether the classification itself is permissible." Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 276. As the Supreme Court stated in Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13 n.3, content-based restrictions raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection concerns because such restrictions differentiate between types of speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 517-21 (billboard ordinance favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech violated First Amendment neutrality); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (ordinance that prohibited picketing near a school building, but that expressly exempted peaceful labor picketing, held unconstitutional); Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1985) (town bylaw that barred the posting of political signs on residential property but permitted the posting of certain commercial signs held facially unconstitutional because bylaw was concerned with content, as opposed to the time, place, or manner of the speech); People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (ordinance which proscribed political signs but allowed other signs in residential areas subjected to strict scrutiny); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (municipal ordinance which imposed a 60-day limitation on political signs but not on commercial signs discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause). The Tacoma ordinances, by regulating sign posting in terms of subject matter, albeit viewpoint neutral, fall within the realm of content-based restrictions. Tacoma and amici argue that in determining content neutrality, the question is not whether the signs must be read, but whether the City of Tacoma prohibited the signs out of disapproval of the message promoted. «6» «6» The stated purpose of Tacoma's sign code is "to provide minimum standards to safeguard life, health, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design,quality of materials,construction,location,electrification,and maintenance of all signs and sign structures." TMC 2.05.020. Citing Ward, Tacoma claims the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in time, place, or manner cases is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech "because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)). Tacoma contends that since the ordinances serve a purpose unrelated to a sign's content, the ordinances are content neutral. See Ward, at 791. Collier argues that this standard is too subjective, and that a showing_ of "improper legislative intent" would be practically impossible to make. We agree. The Supreme Court has recognized that"even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 592, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983). In some cases, the fact that a regulation is content based and invalid will be apparent from its face. See Simon &Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., U.S. _, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 492, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In other cases, a censorial justification "will not be apparent from the face of a regulation which draws distinctions based on content, and the government will tender a plausible justification unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas." Burson v. Freeman, - U.S. _, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 23, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, they define and regulate a specific subject matter 0 political speech. This content-based distinction, while viewpoint neutral, is particularly problematic because it inevitably favors certain groups of candidates over others. The incumbent, for example, has already acquired name familiarity and therefore benefits greatly from Tacoma's restriction on political signs. The underfunded challenger, on the other hand, who relies on the inexpensive yard sign to get his message before the public is at a disadvantage. We conclude therefore that while aesthetic interests are legitimate goals, they require careful scrutiny http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 7 of 12 when weighed against free speech interests because their subjective nature creates a high risk of impermissible speech restrictions. "[D]emocracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgments in this area". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 519. [9] Finally, Tacoma cites Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), for the proposition that an apparently content-based statute may be content neutral if the restriction on speech is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. In Renton, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult theaters to one area of town. The ordinance was held constitutional because it did not target the content of the films shown at the theaters. Rather, the ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects that adult theaters have on the surrounding community. Renton, at 46. We do not find Renton dispositive since it did not analyze a content-based restriction on political speech. While a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters may be permissible based on a "secondary effects" analysis, drawing a similar distinction between commercial speech and political speech turns the favored status of political speech on its head. We therefore decline to draw such a distinction where a restriction on political speech in a public forum is at issue. [10] In summary, the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, but are content based in that they classify permissible speech in terms of subject matter. Ordinarily this conclusion would take the ordinances out of the domain of time, place, and manner restrictions, Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516-17, and would instead require a strict scrutiny analysis. Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We conclude, however, that the Tacoma ordinances can be reviewed under a time, place, and manner formulation. We hold that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech that are viewpoint neutral, but subject-matter based, are valid so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. This formulation of the standard of review comports with free speech jurisprudence under both article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), and the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that in time, place, and manner cases, since the regulation's justification is a "central inquiry", the compelling interest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law). «7» «7» For cases requiring careful judicial scrutiny of regulations to ensure that no covert content-based restrictions exist,see Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.v. Public Serv.Comm'n,447 U.S.530,65 L.Ed.2d 319, 100 S.Ct.2326(1980);Erznoznik v.Jacksonville,422 U.S.205,45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). See Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns,34 De Paul L.Rev. 197,206(1984-1985). In this manner, we are able to balance the competing interests while recognizing that the burden of justifying a restriction on speech remains on the State. See Burson, at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Compelling State Interest [11, 12] Inasmuch as we have dealt with the first element of the time, place, and manner analysis, content neutrality, we next discuss the state interest element. Applying the standard enunciated above, Tacoma must prove that its ordinances, taken together, are narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. To constitute a compelling interest, the purpose must be a fundamental one and the legislation must bear a reasonable relation to the achievement of the purpose. Adult Entertainment Ctr., Inc. v. Pierce Cy., 57 Wn. App. 435, 439, 788 P.2d 1102, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1006 (1990). See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-25, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480, 80 S. Ct. 412 (1960). We determine the reasonableness of a time, place, and manner restriction by balancing the public interest advanced by the regulation against the extent of the restriction on free speech rights. State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 58, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). [13] Tacoma argues that its interest in city aesthetics and traffic safety is a compelling state interest, and that the. ordinances were "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. We disagree. Although aesthetics has been determined to be a significant governmental interest, Members of City Coun. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), it has not been determined to be an interest sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on political speech in a public forum. The record in this case does not justify such a result. While Tacoma and amici cite Vincent and State v. Lotze, supra, for support, neither decision supports their premise that aesthetics http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121wn2d/121wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:.__ 4/1 R/9onR 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 8 01 12 and traffic safety are state interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the restrictions imposed on Collier's free speech. In Vincent,.the Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of any signs on public property. Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. His political signs were attached to utility poles throughout the city. Pursuant to the ordinance, his signs were removed from the poles. The Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction.Vincent, at 815. Vincent is distinguishable from this case in two important respects. First, Vincent involved a law that prohibited the posting of all signs, regardless of content. Second, the utility poles upon which Vincent's signs were posted were not considered part of the traditional public forum. Vincent, at 814. See also Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 227 (1984-1985) (analyzes Vincent as misapplying First Amendment precedent and the primacy of political speech). In State v. Lotze, supra, we held that aesthetics and, to a greater extent, traffic safety were interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the incidental restrictions on the appellants' exercise of First Amendment speech. Lotze, at 58- 60. In Lotze, the State sought to remove political billboards adjacent to a highway under the authority of Washington's highway sign law (RCW 47.42), which generally prohibits all signs visible from interstate, primary or scenic systems except as permitted under the act. The listed exceptions under the act include signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they are located. We stated that unlike on-premise business signs and realty for sale signs, political messages such as the signs involved in Lotze are addressed "to the general universality of political ideas"and need not be linked with a specific site in order to derive meaning. Lotze, at 59. We held that the statute met the test for a state restraint on First Amendment rights because appellants' speech was not controlled as to content and because alternative means of communicating such views were available. Lotze, at 60. The Supreme Court in Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18, overruled its prior summary approval of State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979). Finding that San Diego's aesthetic interests were sufficiently significant to justify its ban on off-site commercial advertising, but were insufficient to warrant a ban on noncommercial signs, the Court observed that some decisions, including State v. Lotze, supra, have failed to give adequate weight to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18. Other courts have also criticized the analysis in Lotze. In Van v. Travel Information Coun., 52 Or. App. 399, 628 P.2d 1217 (1981), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a 60-day restriction on temporary political signs adjacent to highways was unconstitutional. The Van court relied on a majority of decisions which were contrary to Lotze in order to conclude that aesthetic interests were insufficient to justify the significant restriction on political speech imposed by the 60-day limitation on political campaign signs. Van, at 416. [14] We agree with Collier that Lotze should not be controlling on this issue. We depart from our holding in Lotze to the extent it implies that aesthetics and traffic safety are compelling interests justifying greater restrictions on political speech than on commercial speech. We recognize that Tacoma's ordinances, unlike the statute at issue in Lotze, do. not completely prohibit political sign posting. Given the preferred status of political speech, however, Tacoma has failed to show that its interest in maintaining a clean, litter-free community «8» «8» Indeed,Collier argues that the self-interest and good sense of candidates already serves to regulate political yard signs. is sufficiently compelling to justify its disparate treatment of political speech. In Metromedia, San Diego's allowance of some billboards, but not others, was evidence that its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while "substantial", fell short of "compelling". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520. Likewise, Tacoma's disparate treatment of on-site commercial signs over political signs indicates that its interest in aesthetics is significant, but not compelling. Furthermore, Tacoma has not shown that yard signs create a substantial traffic hazard. There was no evidence that any of Collier's signs were hazardous to traffic or blocked pedestrian access. Mr. Thompson knew of no yard signs that had been found blocking sidewalks, utility lines or poles, or streets. Tacoma's claim that it restricts political yard signs to a 60-day period on behalf of a "compelling state interest" in traffic safety lacks evidentiary support. Once political signs are allowed on a temporary basis, "it is difficult to imagine how prohibiting political signs at other times significantly promotes highway safety."Van, 52 Or. App. at 412. A regulation that serves a compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Ward v. Rock http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 9 of 12 Against Racism,491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 233- 34, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The trial court found that neither ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Tacoma argues that its restrictions are narrowly drawn since they allow political signs to be posted for the duration of a political campaign. We disagree. The Tacoma ordinances restrict political expression by imposing durational limitations on the preelection posting of political campaign signs. Tacoma cites two cases for authority that preelection sign limitations have been upheld. Neither decision provides a satisfactory rationale for upholding such restrictions. In Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 63 Misc. 2d 836, 839, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Dist. Ct. 1970), the court held that a 6-week limitation on political signs was within the scope of the municipality's police powers. The court found that the municipality could use or consider aesthetic considerations in applying such power. Cf. People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 763, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (distinguished Huntington, holding that a similar political sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it made an impermissible distinction between political signs and other signs). In Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955 (D. Hawaii 1972), the court upheld a 60-day restriction, stating only that the ordinance was a "proper balancing of the conflicting interests". We find these decisions unpersuasive since they lack a discussion of the First Amendment and equal protection considerations at issue. Other courts have held that preelection durational limitations on political campaign signs are unconstitutional. In Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982), the court held that the Antioch municipal ordinance, which banned the posting of temporary political signs everywhere in the city for all but a 60-day period before an election, unconstitutionally discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause. The Antioch court viewed the ordinance as a general "ban" on political speech, with a temporary, 60-day suspension, prior to an election. Antioch, at 56. See also Van v. Travel Information Coun., supra at 416 (60-day limitation unnecessarily restrictive in light of the First Amendment interests involved and the State's interests sought to be advanced); Orazio v. North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (ordinance which limited the posting of political wall signs to 6 weeks prior to an election was invalidated on equal protection grounds). See generally Blumoff, After Metromedia: Sign Controls and the First Amendment, 28 St. Louis U.L.J. 171, 194-96 (1984). [15] Tacoma's 60-day restriction, unlike the typical time, place, and manner restriction, does not attempt to determine whether and at what times the exercise of free speech rights is compatible or incompatible with the normal uses of a traditional forum or place. The Tacoma ordinances, like the ordinances in Antioch, Van, and Orazio, unnecessarily restrict the preelection posting of signs promoting the candidacy of certain individuals or advocating a certain viewpoint on an upcoming ballot proposition. Tacoma has not shown that its restrictive time period of 60 days, even if evenhandedly applied to all temporary signs, reasonably and adequately provides for the exercise of political speech. Before the City may impose durational limits or other restrictions on political speech to advance aesthetic interests, it must show that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 60. Accord, Tauber v. Longmeadow, 695 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Mass. 1988). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-31, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (failure to provide adequate justification for a restriction on protected activity merits invalidation of the restriction). Tacoma has made no showing on the record that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic or traffic safety concerns other than through the ordinances in question. While Tacoma is correct that the ordinances are not invalid simply because there may be some "imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech", Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985)), the ordinances fail to provide adequately for Collier's free speech rights. Given the preferred status accorded political speech, and the persuasive authority in other jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue, we conclude the Tacoma ordinances are not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. In balancing the competing interests, we hold that Tacoma's regulatory interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, as demonstrated on the record, do not outweigh Collier's right to political speech. We depart from our decision in Lotze to the extent it conflicts with our decision in this case. Alternative Channels of Communication The third and final element of both the federal and state constitutional tests requires that a time, place, and manner restriction leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234. The trial court found that Collier had not "sustained [his] burden of proof that the ordinances do not leave open . . . an alternative means of communication". Collier assigns error to the trial court's placement of the burden of proof on him. We agree with Collier. • httn://srch.mrsc.ore:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2r1/12.1 wn9df717 htm?hi titp=on11iPr• ail R/')nn5z 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA .Page 10 of 12 [16] Government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech, provided the restrictions meet the standards enunciated above. Because Tacoma seeks to uphold the ordinances as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech, it has the burden of meeting each element of the time, place, and manner test. We conclude the trial court erred in assigning Collier the burden of proving the "availability of alternative channels of communication", the third element of the time, place, and manner test. See Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234;Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. That burden properly rests with Tacoma, and Tacoma has failed to meet it. [17] Both Tacoma and amici argue that politicians have numerous ways of expressing themselves through other media than the posting of signs. Collier does not dispute that he had the right to purchase radio and television time and to engage in direct mail. His argument is that these alternative modes of communication were effectively unavailable to him as an underfunded challenger. Based on our review of the record, we agree with Collier. In Collier's case, the yard sign was the most cost-effective, realistic method of increasing his name familiarity. Because means of political speech are not entirely fungible, the political yard sign offers special advantages to the candidate seeking public office. Political yard signs are relatively cost-effective and can be localized to a high degree. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 59 (citing Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977)). In Col-lier's case, the issue is not whether "ample alternatives" are available, but whether they are practically available. Alternatives are not "alternatives" if they are far from satisfactory. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516. Thus, the "summary seizure of a political sign for even a few days can deprive the sign's owner of an important First Amendment liberty interest." Baldwin, 540 F.2d at 1374. Given the record before us, we conclude that Tacoma's restrictions on political sign posting did not afford Collier adequate alternative channels of communication. In summary, we concur with the trial court that the Tacoma ordinances are invalid time, place, and manner restrictions. Tacoma has failed to prove that its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions imposed on Collier's rights to political expression. Tacoma has also failed to prove that its restrictions left Collier ample alternative channels in which to communicate his message. We conclude, therefore, that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political campaign signs violates the free speech provisions of both the Washington and the United States Constitutions. Ill Tacoma claims the trial court erred in declaring both ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety. We agree. The record indicates that the parties' dispute focused on section (1) of TMC 2.05.275, rather than on the ordinance as a whole._No issue was raised as to section (2) (size limitations), or section (3) (requiring consent of private property owners). Similarly, only those portions of TMC 6.03.070 and .080 that affect political expression are at issue. [18] As a general rule "only the part of an enactment that is constitutionally infirm will be invalidated, leaving the rest intact." National Advertising Co. v. Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988). See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 94 L. Ed. 2d 661, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). We hold unconstitutional only those provisions of the ordinances which impermissibly restrict the scope of political speech through limitations on the time and place for the preelection posting of political signs. Tacoma's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficient to justify reasonable, content-neutral regulation of the noncommunicative aspects of political signs, such as size, spacing, and consent of the private property owner. We are sensitive to the need for judicial restraint in intruding on the exercise of the police power by local governments to regulate land uses in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Consequently, our holding does not compel a change to postevent removal requirements as long as such requirements are reasonable and apply to all temporary events, such as political campaigns, home sales and residential renting. While preelection political speech interests may outweigh a municipality's regulatory interests in a given case, those same interests are not present postevent and may be outweighed by a municipality's demonstrated interests in aesthetics or traffic safety. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra (10-day postelection removal requirement upheld). IV Collier assigns error to the trial court's holding that the "special circumstances" of trial publicity and representation by the ACLU preclude an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Collier also requests additional fees for the purposes of this appeal. [19] A party prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 11 of 12 U.S.C. § 188. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 675, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). A prevailing plaintiff"'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust. Jacobsen, at 675-76 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263, 88 S. Ct. 964 (1968)). [20, 21] In the instant case, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Collier and Beritich. They are"prevailing parties"for the purposes of the statute. The trial court, however, identified publicity gained by the suit and ACLU representation as "special circumstances"which warranted denial of an award of attorney fees. We disagree. In Runyon v. Fasi, 762 F. Supp. 280 (D. Hawaii 1991), the plaintiff requested attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a factually similar action challenging the constitutionality of a city ordinance which prohibited outdoor political signs. The Runyon court addressed the identical issue of public service representation as a "special circumstance". We agree with the Runyon court's conclusion that the fact that the prevailing party was represented by a public service firm or association funded by public funds is irrelevant. See Runyon, 762 F. Supp. at 286 (citing Watkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 632 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980)). As to the issue of trial publicity, Tacoma urges this court to accept the trial court's denial of attorney fees as a proper use of discretion. The trial court, however, made no finding that Collier used the judicial system to gain publicity for political purposes. Tacoma argues that should this court reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees, the court should limit the amount of attorney fees to reflect work performed from the point after which the complaint was amended. Tacoma reasons that until respondents filed the amended complaint which cited 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as statutory authority for attorney fees, Tacoma had no notice of any claim for attorney fees. We disagree. Tacoma had notice of respondents' claim for attorney fees with the filing of Collier's original complaint. Collier's amendment of his complaint to add an additional source of authority for obtaining attorney fees does not alter the fact that Tacoma had sufficient notice to prepare an adequate response to Collier's request for attorney fees. The final issue to resolve is whether the requested fees were reasonable. The trial court found that the plaintiffs' attorney had spent 99.3 hours in the prosecution of this action, and "said hours have been expended reasonably and necessarily in view of the result obtained." The trial court also found that the plaintiffs' attorney's hourly rate of$150 was reasonable compensation for the work performed. These findings were uncontroverted. We will not disturb these findings on appeal. CONCLUSION The Tacoma ordinances impermissibly restrict Collier's right to political expression in violation of article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, and the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States. Constitution. We hold unconstitutional those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impose durational limitations on the preelection posting of political signs. We remand for a determination of a reasonable attorney fee, to include a determination of attorney fees on appeal. UTTER, DOLLIVER, SMITH, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. DURHAM, J. (concurring) 0 For 15 years, this court has wrestled with the difficult concept of independent state constitutional analysis. The circumstances under which it should be applied has been the subject of many divided opinions and considerable acrimony. Finally, in 1986, this court unanimously agreed on a list of six nonexclusive criteria to aid in determining when state constitutional analysis is appropriate. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). Shortly thereafter, in State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), we unequivocally stated the necessity of employing the Gunwall criteria: Wethered urges this court to follow our holding in State v. Lavaris, 99 Wn.2d 851, 664 P.2d 1234 (1983) under Const. art. 1, § 9 and cites State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) as general authority that the Washington Constitution can be and has been interpreted as more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution. He fails to use the Gunwall interpretive principles to assist this court . . .. By failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in Gunwall, he requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority the "adequate and independent state grounds" to support his assertions. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). We decline to do so consistent with our policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued by the parties. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). (Italics mine.) Since Gunwall and Wethered, over 70 Washington appellate decisions have acknowledged our rule barring http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 W11.21:1 /3/,1'.2c1 1U46, UUL1.41LK v. I AUUNJA „rage ui IL consideration of state constitutional issues absent briefing of the Gunwall factors. E.g., State v. Greenwocd, 12e Wn2d 585, 614, 845 P.2d 971 (1993);Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 77, 838 P.2d 111, 845 P.2d 1325 (1992); State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414 n.1, 828 P.2d 636, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1019 (1992). In fact, one noteworthy commentator has explained that: Assistance from counsel in interpreting state constitutional provisions is vitally important. blethered directs counsel to bring the constitutional issues into as sharp a focus as they possibly can by requiring them to fashion a state constitutional argument that addresses textual language, constitutional and common law history, structural differences, and local concerns. Our decision in Wethered reaffirmed that the criteria are a necessary starting point for a discussion between bench and bar about the meaning of a state constitutional provision. (Italics mine.) Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washing- ton's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1162 (1992). This same commentator has recognized that "Gunwall functions as a procedural threshold for considering state constitutional claims". (Italics mine.) Utter, at 1165. Today, however, 8 years of painfully crafted jurisprudence is cast aside in a footnote: "[b]ecause Bering [v. Share, 406 Wn.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)] is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwall analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to reach the state constitutional issue." Majority, at 747-48 n.5. This reasoning completely ignores the Wethered rule, which was adopted 2 years after Bering. Moreover, putting aside the majority's attempt to limit its own case to the facts, there is no principled way to keep this exception from swallowing the rule. Bering was not unique. There were several cases between Gunwall and Wethered that engaged in a state constitutional exegesis without the benefit of the Gunwall factors. See, e.g., Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7); O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 5); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.2d 436(1986) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7). As such,the majority's analysis only serves to.cast doubt on a wide body of law under Const. art. 1, §§ 5 and 7 requiring briefing of the Gunwall factors. If, indeed, it is the intention of a majority of this court to cast aside the Gunwall/Wethered principles, it should be done forthrightly and with reasoned analysis. «9» «9» It is so that"[t]his court has a duty,where feasible,"to consider state constitutional analysis. (Italics mine.) Majority, at 745. However, the case cited in the lead opinion for this proposition, O'Day, 109 Wn.2d at 801-02 (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)),was decided prior to the Wethered rule.In fact,Wethered specifically recognized that this language from O'Day and Coe was limited by and subject to,briefing of the Gunwall factors.See 110 Wn.2d at 471-72. Ironically, the majority's result in negating the Tacoma sign ordinance could be reached under federal law analysis. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, _ U.S.U.S.—, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (both plurality and dissent would require strict scrutiny for content-based, but viewpoint-neutral speech); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (law banning posting of political signs except for 60 days prior to election violated equal protection clause). It is only because of the applicability of federal law that I concur in the result. ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur with DUR-HAM, J. http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d073 7.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 r • s 7l Karen Barrows From: Stacie Hoskins Sent: Wednesday, May 28, 2008 7:33 AM To: 'ptnancy @olypen.com' Cc: Karen Barrows; Jeanie Orr Subject: RE: Signs Hi Nancy, Staff has already completed our recommendation, and the signs section is now with the Board of County Commissioners. Fortunately, you're not too late to provide comment. I anticipate the hearing to be scheduled on June 16th. You may appear in person at the hearing, and/or you may provide written comment to the Board. Karen Barrows is the project planner for this one, and can discuss this further with you if you so desire. Best, Stacie L. Hoskins Planning Manager Jefferson County Department of Community Development 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 Phone 360-379-4463 Fax 360-379-4451 shoskins @co.jefferson.wa.us All e-mail sent to this address will be received by the Jefferson County e-mail system and may be subject to Public Disclosure under Chapter 42.56 RCW Original Message From: Nancy Stelow [mailto:ptnancy @olypen.com] Sent: Tuesday, May 27, 2008 11:44 AM To: Stacie Hoskins Subject: Signs Hi Stacie, I read the article on the JeffCo Website about signs. I am very much in favor of rules relative to real estate signs. Appears the topic is moving to 'exemption' status. I am unclear. We have some real issues with real estate signs, be it Realtors or straight owner sales. Can I set up a meeting with you (and/or appropriate folks) to outline my concerns? Our Multiple Listing Service takes sign issues to a point, then a gap then the JeffCo code covers over 32 sq feet (or 16. . .I am confused) We have a gap for control. As another example: definition on Abandoned signs. Way to many agents leave the signs up to attract phone calls on properties that have been sold for YEARS! We think the rules should be they are down within a week of sale. If you go to the entrance of Tal Shores Drive, there are 3 'arm signs' for sale of homes. They are not ON the property for sale. At the most, it should be just a directional sign. Then, there are "A" Boards that are permanently in the road versus just during open houses. That is just the basic list. I assume the details have not been established for the code, but could be incorrect. I missed that the Public Hearing was taking place in May and was unable to get to the BOCC this am. Am I too late?? Thanks Nancy 1 Nancy Stelow, RealtorR Certified Luxury Marketing Specialist Million Dollar Guild Accredited Buyers Representative ReMax First, Inc 2500 Sims Way Port Townsend, WA 98368 ptnancy @olypen.com 800-714-6499 X207 (Direct) 360-344-3937 www.nancystelow.com 2 /C, Agen a Request 10:30 a.m. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AGENDA REQUEST TO: Board of County Commissioners Dennis Richards, County Administrator • FROM: Al Scalf, Director, Department of Community Development(DCD - Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager(DCD) Karen Barrows, Assistant Planner, Long-Range Planning (LRP)407 DATE: May 27, 2008 SUBJECT: Request for regular agenda item for DCD staff report and Planning Commission recommendation on JCC 18.30.150, development standards for signs STATEMENT OF ISSUE: The Department of Community Development Long-Range Planning Division is requesting that the Board of County Commissioners(BoCC) review the staff report and Planning Commission recommendations on a UDC amendment proposal for JCC 18.30.150,which regulates signs. Please note that the staff recommendation and the Planning Commission recommendation differ. The staff response to the Planning Commission recommendation is consolidated into this request. Attachments: 1) Planning Commission recommendations (including a minority report)from May 15, 2008 2) DCD staff report and recommendation from April 23, 2008 3) Planning Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 4) Staff proposed line-in/line-out code revision 5) Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) 6) Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 7) Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 8) Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 9) Collier v. City of Tacoma ANALYSIS/STRATEGIC GOALS : The following findings of fact inform this issue: 1) Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code regulates signs. Paragraph (2)of this Section designates signs that are exempt from the provisions of this Section. Subsection (f)states, "Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing"or political messages not to exceed eight square feet;" 2) On October 13, 2006, Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing Section 18.30.150(2)(f) of the Jefferson County Code. 3) On February 20, 2007, the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners discussed the issue, and, using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a"Board Initiated Control"found in RCW 36.70.640 (please see attached), decided that it was in the public interest to amend the code regulating signs contained in JCC 18.30.150. The Board then voted unanimously to forward the issue to the Planning Commission for review. 4) On April 18, 2007, staff presented the suggested revisions to the Planning Commission, and explained the chronology of the process. 5) On April 18, 2007, the Planning Commission discussed the issue, heard public comment, and voted to accept staffs recommendation to exempt political signs from size limitations. 6) Following legal review it was determined that the Planning Commission must hold a public hearing. Agenda Request 10:30 a.m. 7) On April 23, 2008, in anticipation of the Planning Commission public hearing, staff published its report and recommendation. The staff recommendation is that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection JCC 18.30.150(2)(g) should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows: "18.30.150(2)(g) Political messages"(please see attached). 8) The Planning Commission held a public hearing on the development standards for signs on May 7, 2008, during which it heard public testimony. After the public hearing was closed, the Planning Commission deliberated and formulated recommendations(please see attached). The Planning Commission recommendation differs from the staff recommendation dated April 23, 2008. Staff has the following concerns with the Planning Commission recommendation: 1) Real estate signs are not exempt under the Planning Commission recommended code language. Real estate signs are a commercial sign. Without an exemption, the amended code does not have any applicable criteria for review of real estate signs. 2) Potential legal problems exist: for example, in the Washington Supreme Court case Collier v. City of Tacoma(used as a basis for legal authority and precedent in the Clallam County Superior Court case enjoining Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f)), it was determined that signs could not be regulated based on content. While the Planning Commission articulated during deliberations a desire to render its proposed revisions"content-neutral,"the phrase"event-based signs" in its proposed subsection (2)(g)would require a person to read the sign in order to determine whether or not it is exempt. This would appear to contradict the conclusions in both the Collier and Clallam County cases. 3) Public Works does not allow signs in the right of way(ROW). The exemption allowed by the Planning Commission for the"6 square feet in the ROW"conflicts with Public Works requirements. 4) Standards for administration are unclear with respect to non-commercial signs exceeding 32 square feet. When non-commercial signs exceed 32 square feet, the existing Unified Development Code(UDC), JCC Title 18, and Planning Commission proposed language lack any standards for review. The Building Official has determined a building permit is required for free-standing signs exceeding 32 square feet, or six feet(6') in height to insure consistency with the International Building Code, as adopted in JCC Title 15. No reference or permit requirement is necessary in the UDC to confirm the safety of a structure with regard to the building code. In other words, planners do not need to oversee that a building permit is regifred or approved under the authority of the Building Official. Staff maintains the recommendation detailed in the DCD staff report and recommendation dated April 23, 2008. FISCAL IMPACT: No fiscal impact is expected as a result of amending JCC 18.30.150. RECOMMENDATION: DCD staff recommends that the BoCC direct staff to schedule a public hearing on JCC 18.30.150, development standards for Signs. REVIEWED BY: Dennis Richards, County Administrator Date (icON O `skINGY JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 (360) 379-4450 MEMORANDUM To: Board of County Commissioners (BoCC); County Administrator From: Jefferson County Planning Commission Date: May 15, 2008 Re: Planning Commission Recommendation for proposed UDC Amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards: 18.30.150: Signs Proposal: Pursuant to RCW 36.70.580 and Chapter 18.45 of the Unified Development Code (UDC), Title 18 of the Jefferson County Code (JCC), the Planning Commission is required to hold a public hearing and transmit a recommendation to the Board of County Commissioners (BoCC)with respect to the proposed UDC amendment to JCC 18.30.150, which regulates signs. In formulating its recommendation, the Planning Commission shall identify findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with and in consideration of the required Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.050(4)(b)(i), JCC 18.45.080(1)(b), and JCC 18.45.090(3). Background: The BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act at RCW 36.70.640 to send an "official control," or an amendment to an "official control"to the Planning Agency (the Department of Community Development (DCD) and the Planning Commission)for a report, which the Planning Commission received in April 2007. On October 13, 2006, Jefferson County was enjoined from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2) as a result of Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7. The DCD staff recommendation is that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection 18.30.150(2) should be created for political signs. The Planning Commission held a duly-noticed public hearing on May 7, 2008, and heard public testimony on the proposed UDC amendment concerning JCC 18.30.150. Commissioner Brotherton offered an amendment to the language proposed by staff. This intent of this amendment is to keep JCC 18.30.150 in compliance with recent court cases but also to recognize that "unlimited growth" of certain signs "negatively impacts residents' quality of life," and that court cases such as "Collier v. City of Tacoma" allow for the reasonable regulation of signs so long as the regulation is "content-neutral". The Planning Commission voted 6-3 to accept this amendment and forward this recommendation on to the BoCC. Recommendation: The Planning Commission also conducted deliberations on May 7, 2008, and formulated the following recommendation: Specified subsections of JCC 18.30.150 should be amended to read as follows: (2)(f) Non-commercial signs on private property measuring less than or equal to 32 square feet. (2)(g) Event-based signs in a public right of way measuring less than or equal to 6 square feet, provided that such signs must be removed no more than 7 days following the event. Delete entirely the following subsection: (2)(i) real estate signs Findings: With regard to findings of fact, the Planning Commission found that the Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.080 are not applicable to this ordinance. Further, the Planning Commission found that unlimited growth of temporary signs negatively impacts residents' quality of life and detracts from commercial growth potential. With regard to conclusions of law, the Planning Commission agreed that freedom of political speech is a highly protected constitutional right, and all residents of Jefferson County are encouraged to exercise that right; and further, that Jefferson County has a reasonable governmental interest in aesthetics and traffic safety and a duty to develop reasonable content-neutral regulations on the size, height, and spacing of temporary signs, and for the post-election removal of signs whose issue has been settled by an election. After conducting a duly-noticed public hearing, and with respect to the timeliness of the issue, the Planning Commission forwards this recommendation to the Board. Peter Downey, Ch. +r'anie Orr, Secretary 2 4 y "sh JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION 621 Sheridan Street Port Townsend, WA 98368 (360) 379-4450 MEMORANDUM To: Board of County Commissioners (BoCC); County Administrator From: Peter Downey, Barbara Nightingale, Henry Werch, Jefferson County Planning Commission Date: May 15, 2008 Re: Planning Commission Minority Report for proposed UDC Amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards: 18.30.150: Signs At the May 8, 2008 Planning Commission meeting, a public hearing was held to consider proposed changes to JCC 18.30.150, the Jefferson County sign ordinance. Following that hearing, Commission member Tom Brotherton introduced two additional proposed revisions to sections (2)(f) and (2)(g) of the ordinance. His revisions were accompanied by two "Conclusions of Law" and one "Findings of Fact". A motion was introduced and amended to accept the proposed ordinance revisions submitted by the DCD along with the additional revisions submitted by Commissioner Brotherton, and including the submitted "Conclusions of Law" and "Findings of Fact", and an additional request to strike (2)(i), which was recommended by Commissioner Henry Werch. The vote was 6 to 3 to approve. We wish to introduce the following "Minority Report" in support of the concerns prompting we three members of the Commission to vote "no" on the measure. The intent of the revised ordinance as submitted by DCD was to exclude "political messages" from the sign ordinance, in order to keep the ordinance in compliance with court cases relating to First Amendment rights. Commissioner Brotherton's changes were submitted to keep JCC 18.30.150 in compliance with recent court » ourt cases but also to recognize that "unlimited growth" of certain signs "negatively impacts residents' quality of life," and that court cases such as "Collier v. City of Tacoma" allow for the reasonable regulation of signs so long as the regulation is "content-neutral". Despite our vote, we do generally endorse the goals reflected in the majority vote and the submitted "Conclusions of Law" and "Findings of Fact" introduced by Commissioner Brotherton. Our separate concerns can be expressed as follows: (1) While the ordinance, as proposed, is, in fact, content-neutral, and it does exclude signs on private property measuring less than or equaling 32 square feet, it would appear to only address free-standing signs and not satisfactorily to address certain other types of"signs" on private property, i.e. signs painted on the side of a building, or banners hung on the side of a building or suspended between trees. (2) We note that although the proposed revised ordinance regulates the size of signs on private property, it does not deal with the number of signs, so we wonder whether it satisfactorily accomplishes its objective. (3) We did not feel that we were presented with sufficient time or documentation prior to the meeting of May 8 to consider, whether, in fact, the regulation of"content-neutral" signs can be adopted into JCC 18.30.150 without reconsidering other sections of the code, and thus meet the objective of properly protecting First Amendment rights. (4) We share concerns, as expressed by DCD Planning Manager Stacie Hoskins, that the new ordinance, as written, seems to create an administrative problem by introducing the need for simultaneous zoning and permitting review processes for signs in excess of 32 square feet. So, while each of us in the minority may not share all of the concerns expressed above, we all would have preferred that the May 8 vote would have been limited to the approval of the revision of JCC 18.30.150 as submitted by DCD. Then, in consideration of the valuable suggestions submitted by Commissioner Brotherton, we would have endorsed a re-evaluation of the sign ordinance in its entirety to make sure that it best supports quality-of-life and commercial growth objectives along with the protection of First Amendment rights. Respectfully, 1 Li*iI�.L Peter Downey, Barbara Nightingale Henry Werch -- rv► 1 41:11 kierv% JEFFERSON COUNTY *11 DEPARTMENT OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT , 621 Sheridan Street• Port Townsend •Washington 98368 o 360/379-4450 . 360/379-4451 Fax www.co.jefferson.wa.us/commdevelopment Staff Report and Recommendation on UDC Amendment, JCC 18.30.150, Signs To: Jefferson County Planning Commission, and Interested Parties Fr: Stacie Hoskins, Planning Manager Date: April 23, 2008 Re: DCD report and recommendation on proposed UDC amendment to Chapter 18.30, Development Standards, specifically 18.30.150: Signs. Background Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code (JCC) regulates signs. On February 20, 2007 the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners(BoCC)discussed with planning and building staff the need for changes to this section of the JCC. Staff findings: 1) Using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a "Board-Initiated Control,"found at RCW 36.70.640 (please see attached), the BoCC decided that it was in the public interest to amend the Sign Ordinance contained in JCC 18.30.150. During discussions, Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining Section (2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as "yard sale"or"no trespassing'; (g)political signs;and (i) real estate signs in one clause. It was moved and voted upon unanimously to forward the Sign Ordinance to the Planning Commission for review, combining (2)(f)(g)and (i) in one clause, to include language that clarifies when zoning review is required and when it is exempt, and further, that(2) Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited;" 2) On April 18, 2007, staff recommended to the Planning Commission that political signs be exempt from size limitations per the zoning code, and that political signs receive a separate subsection: JCC 18.30.150(2)(g). The Planning Commission heard public comment, deliberated, and voted 8-0-0 to accept staffs recommendation; 3) The Planning Commission is required to hold a public hearing and consider public comments on this issue before making a recommendation to the BoCC, in accordance with RCW 36.70.850 and JCC 18.45.090(3); 4) On October 13, 2006, Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f), which limits the size of political signs to eight square feet, based on the conclusion of law that the code "violates plaintiff's rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution because it limits or interferes with constitutionally protected speech"; and 5) An argument used as legal authority and precedent for the Clallam County decision is Collier v. City of Tacoma, 121 Wn.2d 737, 746, 854 P.2d. 1046 (1993), in which it was determined that "Free speech is protected under the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 5 of the Page 1 Washington State Constitution. And political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Article I, Section 5 of the Washington State Constitution and the First Amendment of the Federal Constitution." 6) The Growth Management Act(GMA) contains guidance for controls placed on development or land use activities by counties. The use of the"Board-Initiated Control"with respect to JCC 18.30.150(Signs) is consistent with GMA at RCW 36.70A.030(7). The Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan ensures consistency with GMA with respect to JCC 18.30.150 at LNP 1.2, wherein the rights of private property owners are protected, and at LNP 1.8, wherein it is ensured "that land permitting processes are predictable and timely." 7) Notice of the public hearing was provided via a legal notice published on April 23, 2008, in the official newspaper of record, the Jefferson County-Port Townsend Leader, in accordance with JCC 18.45.090(2)(b). Department of Community Development Recommendation DCD staff recommends that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations, and that a separate subsection 18.30.150(2)(g) should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows: 18.30.150(2)(g) Political messages Staff recommends further that the Planning Commission hold a public hearing on Signs on May 7, 2008, its first regular meeting in May, and that, following the public hearing, the Planning Commission deliberate and formulate a recommendation to the BoCC. During deliberation the Planning Commission will enter findings of fact and conclusions of law in accordance with and in consideration of the required Growth Management Indicators found at JCC 18.45.050(4)(b)(i), JCC 18.45.080(1)(b), and JCC 18.45.090(3). The Planning Commission will then develop and present to the BoCC a recommendation, which, in concert with the DCD staff recommendation, comprises the official recommendation from the Planning Agency. Attachments: • Planning and Enabling Act: RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 • Jefferson County Code: Sections 18.45.050(4)(b)(i); 18.45.080(1)(b); 18.45.090(3) • Proposed line-in/line-out code revision • Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20, 2007 • Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18, 2007 • Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4, 2008 • Collier v. City of Tacoma Page 2 36.'i 0.547 36.70.547 General aviation airports—Siting of light for solar energy systems. [1979 ex.s.c 170§11;1963 c incompatible uses. Every county,city, and town in which 4§36.70.560.Prior. 1959 c 201 §56.] there is located a general aviation airport that is operated for Severability-1979 ex.s.c 170: See note following RCW 64.04.140. the benefit of the general public,whether publicly owned or „Solar en ,sys:em~defined: RCW 36.70.025. privately owned public use,shall,through its comprehensive plan and development regulations,discourage the siting of incompatible uses adjacent to such general aviation airport. 36.70.570 Official controls—Adoption. Official con- Such plans and regulations may only be adopted or amended trols shall be adopted by ordinance and shall further the pur- after formal consultation with: Airport owners and manag- pose and objectives of a comprehensive plan and parts ers,private airport operators,general aviation pilots,ports, thereof. [1963 c 4§36.70.570.Prior. 1959 c 201 §57.] and the aviation division of the department of transportation. All proposed and adopted plans and regulations shall be filed 36.70.580 Official controls—Public hearing by com- with the aviation division of the department of transportation mission. Before recommending an official control or amend- within a reasonable time after release for public consideration ment to the board for adoption,the commission shall hold at and comment.Each county,city,and town may obtain tech- least one public hearing. [1963 c 4§36.70.580.Prior 1959 nical assistance from the aviation division of the department c 201 §58.] • of transportation to develop plans and regulations consistent with this section. Any additions or amendments to comprehensive plans or 36.70.590 Official controls—Notice of hearing. development regulations required by this section may be • Notice of the time,place and purpose of the hearing shall be adopted during the normal course of land-use proceedings. given by one publication in a newspaper of general circula- This section applies to every county, city, and town, bon in the county and in the official gazette,if any,of the whether operating under chapter 35.63,35A.63,36.70, [or] county at least ten days before the hearing.The board may 36.70A RCW,or under a charter. [1996 c 239§2.] prescribe additional methods for providing notice. [1963 c 4 §36.70.590.Prior. 1959 c 201 §59.] • 36.70.550 Official controls. From time to time, the • planning agency may,or if so requested by the board shall, . 36.70.600 Official controls—Recommendation to cause.to be prepared official controls which,when adopted board—Required vote. The recommendation to the board by ordinance by the board,will further the objectives and . of any official control or amendments thereto by the planning goals of the comprehensive plan.The planning agency may agency shall be by the affirmative vote of not less than a also draft such regulations,programs and legislation as may, majority of the total members of the commission. Such in its judgment,be required to preserve the integrity of the approval shall be by a recorded motion which shall incorpo- comprehensive plan and assure its systematic execution,and rate the findings of fact of the commission and the reasons for the planning agency may recommend such plans,regulations, . its action and the motion shall refer expressly to the maps, programs and legislation to the board for adoption. [1963 c 4 , descriptive and other matters intended by the commission to §36.70.550.Prior: 1959 c201 §55.] constitute the plan, or amendment, addition or extension thereto.The indication of approval by the commission shall 36.70.560 Official controls—Forms of controls. Offi- be recorded on the map and descriptive matter by the signor cial controls may include: tures of the chairman and the secretary of the commission and of such others as the commission in its rules may designate. • (1)Maps showing the exact boundaries of zones within [1963 c 4 §36.70.600.Prior: 1961 c 232 §.3; 1959 c 201 § , each of which separate controls over the type and degree of 60.] permissible land uses are defined; (2)Maps for streets showing the exact alignment,gradi- ents,dimensions and other pertinent features,and including 36.70.610 Official controls—Reference to board. A specific controls with reference to protecting such accurately copy of any official control or amendment recommended defined future rights-of-way against encroachment by build- pursuant to RCW 36.70.550, 36.70.560, 36.70.570 and ings,other physical structures or facilities; 36.70.580 shall be submitted to the board not later than four- (3)Maps for other public facilities,such as parks,play- teen days following the action by the commission and shall grounds, civic centers, etc., showing exact location, size, be accompanied by the motion of the planning agency boundaries and other related features,including appropriate approving the same,together with a statement setting forth regulations protecting such future sites against encroachment the factors considered at the hearing,and analysis of findings by buildings and other physical structures or facilities; considered by the commission to be controlling. [1963 c 4§ (4) Specific regulations and controls pertaining to other 36.70.610.Prior: 1961 c 232§4; 1959 c 201 §61.] subjects incorporated in the comprehensive plan or establish- ing standards and procedures to be employed in land devel- 36.70.620 Official controls—Action by board. Upon opment including,but not limited to,subdividing of land and receipt of any recommended official control or amendment the approval of land plats and the preservation of streets and thereto,the board shall at its next regular public meeting set lands for other public purposes requiring future dedication or the date for a public meeting where it may,by ordinance, acquisition and general design of physical improvements, adopt or reject the official control or amendment. [1963 c 4 and the encouragement and protection of access to direct sun- §36.70.620.Prior:. 1959 c 201 §62.] 20 2007 36.70.690 36.70.630 Official controls—Board to conduct hear- shall be sent to the*department of community development ing,adopt findings prior to incorporating changes in rec- by September 30, 1990. ommended control. If after considering the matter at a pub- On or before June 30,1991,each municipality that plans lic meeting as provided in RCW 36.70.620 the board deems a and zones under this chapter shall have adopted an ordinance change in the recommendations of the planning agency to be or ordinances that are necessary to implement the fmdi s of necessary,the change shall not be incorporated in the recom- this review,if the findings indicate that such changes are nec- mended control until the board shall conduct its own public essary, or shall notify the*department of community devel- hearing, giving notice thereof as provided in RCW opment as to why such implementing ordinances were not 36.70.590,and it shall adopt its own findings of fact and adopted. [1989 c 335§6.] statement setting forth the factors considered at the hearing and its own analysis of findings considered by it to be con- Revisers note: Powers,duties,and functions of the department of trolling. [1963 c 4§36.70.630.Prior. 1961 c 232§5;1959 community t weree development o the department ent o fc of community,and trade, n economic conom c C 20.1 63.] depardnent of community,iade,:and economic § ] development by 1993 c 280,effective July 1,1994. Findings—Purpose--Severability-1989 c 335: See notes following 36.70.640 Official controls—Board may initiate. RCW 35.63.170. When it deems it to be for the public interest,the board may Definitions for RCW 36.70.675: See RCW 35.63.170. initiate consideration of an ordinance establishing an official control,or amendments to an existing official control,includ- 36.70.677 Accessory apartments. Any local govern- ing those specified in RCW 36.70.560.The board shall first ment,as defined in RCW 43.63A.215,that is planning under ;, refer the proposed official control or amendment to the plan- this chapter shall comply with RCW 43.63A.215(3). [1993 c �l!''""pin ring agency for report which shall,thereafter,be considered 478§ 10.]. Pa ik and processed in the same manner as that set forth in RCW 36.70.630 regarding a change in the recommendation of the planning agency. [1963 c 4§36.70.640.Prior. 1959 c 201 § 36.70.678 Conditional and special use permit appli- 64, cations by parties licensed or certified by the department of social and health services or the department of correc- tions—Mediation prior to appeal required. A final deci- ;�,�' 36.70.650 Board final authority. The report and rec- sion by a hearing examiner involving a conditional or special -: ommendation by the planning agency,whether on a proposed use permit application under this chapter that is requested by control initiated by it,whether on a matter referred back to it a party that is licensed or certified by the department of social by the board for further report,or whether on a matter initi- and health services or the department of corrections is subject ated by the board,shall be advisory only and the fmal deter- to mediation under RCW 35.63.260 before an appeal may be mination shall rest with the board. [1963 c 4 §36.70.650. filed. [1998 c 119§3.] Prior 1959 c 201 §65.] 36.70.680 Subdividing and platting. The planning 36.70.660 Procedures for adoption of controls lim- agency shall review all proposed land plats and subdivisions ited to planning matters. The provisions of this chapter and make recommendations to the board thereon with refer- with references to the procedures to be followed in the adop- ence to approving,or recommending any modifications nec- lion of official controls shall apply only to establishing offi- essary to assure conformance to the general purposes of the cial controls pertaining to subjects set forth in RCW comprehensive plan and to standards and specifications 36.70.560. [1963 c 4§36.70.660.Prior. 1959 c 201 §66.] established by state law or local controls. [1963 c 4 § 36.70.680..Prior 1959 c 201 §68.] • 36.70.670 Enforcement—Official controls. The board. may determine and establish administrative riles and proce- 36.70.690 County improvements. No county shall dures for the application and enforcement of official controls, improve any street or lay or authorize the laying of sewers or and may assign or delegate such administrative functions, connections or other improvements to be laid in any street powers and duties to such department or official as may be within any territory for which the board has adopted an offs- appropriate. [1963 c 4§36.70.670.Prior: 1959 c 201 §67.] cial control in the form of precise street map or maps,until the matter has been referred to the planning agency by the 36.70.675 Child care facilities—Review of need and department or official having jurisdiction for a report thereon demand—Adoption of ordinances. Each county that does and a copy of the report has been filed with the department or official making the reference unless one of the following con- not provide for the siting of family day care homes in zones that are designated for single family or other residential uses, ditions apply: and for the siting of mini-day care centers and day care cen- (1) The street has been accepted, opened, or has other- ters in zones that are designated for any residential or corn- wise received legal status of a public street; mercial uses,shall conduct a review of the need and demand (2)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on for child care facilities,including the cost of any conditional the official controls applicable to the subject; , or special use permit that may be required.The review shall (3)It corresponds with and conforms to streets shown on be completed by August 30, 1990. A copy of the findings, a subdivision(land plat)approved by the board. [1963 c 4§ conclusions,and recommendations resulting from the review 36.70.690.Prior.. 1959 c 201 §69.] 2007 21 15 45.050 application fee shall be required for applications received by the deadline set forth in subsection for suggested amendments. (2)(a)of this section,shall not be processed. [Ord. (2) Application Deadline—Form. 2-06§ 1] (a) Deadline. All applications for formal site-specific and suggested amendments shall be 18.45.050 Compilation of preliminary docket.. submitted to DCD by March 1st of the current cal- (1) Preliminary Docket—Contents.The prelim- endar year in order to be considered during that inary docket described more fully in subsections year's amendment process; except that county- (2) through(4) of this section shall consist of the sponsored proposals to amend the capital facilities following: element of the Comprehensive Plan may be (a) All proposals for formal site-specific accepted later than other proposed amendments amendments; because of their relationship to the county's annual (b) All proposals for suggested amend- budget process. ments;and (b) Application Forma All proposed amend- (c) When applicable, all amendments rec- ments(i.e.,both formal site-specific and suggested) ommended by the planning commission during its shall be submitted to DCD on forms provided by periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan. the department and shall include the following (2) List of Suggested Amendments.Each year, information,as determined by the administrator to the administrator shall maintain for public review be necessary to evaluate a particular proposal: the annual list of suggested amendments made by (i) Name and address of applicant; citizens, the board of county commissioners or (ii) A description of the proposed Com- members of the board of county commissioners, prehensive Plan amendment and any associated de- county staff,county departments or other agencies. velopment proposals, if applicable. Formal site- By the end of the second full business week of specific or project-related amendments shall in- March of each year, this list of suggested amend- elude plans, infortation and/or studies that accu- ments shall be compiled into a preliminary docket. rately depict existing and proposed use(s) and JCC 18.45.060 sets forth the process for selecting improvements. Proposed site-specific or project- which suggested amendments will be placed on the related.Comprehensive Plan amendments that do final docket to be formally reviewed during the not specify proposed use(s) and potential impacts annual review process. will be assumed to have maximum impact to the en- (3) Formal Site-Specific Amendments. The vironment and public facilities and services; preliminary docket shall also include all formal (iii) Proposed . amendatory language, site-specific applications for Comprehensive Plan preferably shown in a"bill"format(i.e.,new Ian- amendments.Formal site-specific applications for guage underlined; language proposed for deletion amendments that are properly and timely filed in strikeouts); under JCC 18.45.040(2)(a) shall be placed on the (iv) An explanation of the rationale for final docket for consideration during the current the proposed amendment; annual amendment process. (v) An explanation of how the proposed (4) Planning Commission Periodic Assessment amendment and. associated development pro- —Recommendations. posal(s),if any,conform to,conflict with,or relate (a) Periodic Assessment — Timelines. The to the criteria set forth in JCC 18.45.080(1)(c)and• planning commission shall review, and if neces- (1)(d),as applicable; sary, recommend revisions to the Comprehensive (vi).If color copies,maps or other visuals Plan during the periodic assessment in accordance are desired the applicant shall submit 20 color cop- with RCW 36.70A.130.The planning commission ies; shall complete its assessment of the Comprehen- (vii) A completed SEPA checklist sive Plan by November 1st of the year prior to the including the supplement sheet for nonproject assessment. Any amendments recommended by a actions if the application is for a formal site-spe- majority vote of the planning commission shall be cific amendment;and forwarded to the administrator by March 1st of the (viii) Any additional information reason- year in which the periodic assessment is con- ably deemed necessary by the administrator to ducted. The administrator shall place all such rec- evaluate the proposed amendment. ommended amendments on the preliminary docket (3) Failure to Comply — Effect. Applications to be considered during the anal docket selection that do not include the information required under process set forth in JCC 18.45.060. subsection (2)(b) of this section, or which are not (Revised 2/06) 18-260 i Jefferson County Code 18.45.060 (b) Criteria Governing Planning Commis- notice of the joint workshop meeting shall be given sion Assessment.The planning commission's peri- by publication in the county's official newspaper at odic assessment and recommendation shall be least one time 10 days prior to the date of the meet- based upon,but shall not be limited to, an inquiry ing and by posting a copy of the meeting notice.at into the following growth management indicators: the county courthouse,which shall include a state- (i) Whether growth and development as. meat of the purpose of the joint workshop. envisioned in the Comprehensive Plan is occurring (3) Planning Commission Hearing—Report and faster or slower than anticipated, or is failing to Recommendation.The planning commission shall materialize; hold a noticed public hearing to accept public com- (ii) Whether the capacity of the county to ment regarding the suggested amendments on the provide adequate services has diminished or preliminary docket. Following the hearing, the increased; planning commission shall prepare a report and rec- (iii) Whether sufficient urban land is ommendation identifying those suggested amend- designated and zoned to meet projected demand meats that it is recommending for consideration by and need; the board of county commissioners during the (iv) Whether any of the assumptions annual amendment process.The planning commis- upon which the plan is based are no longer found sion's recommendation shall be based upon the per- to be valid; ceived need, urgency and appropriateness of each (v) Whether changes in county-wide atti- suggested amendment.The planning commission's tudes necessitate amendments to the goals of the report and recommendation shall also include those plan and the basic. values embodied within the proposed amendments resulting from the periodic Comprehensive Plan Vision Statement; assessment set forth in ICC 18.45.050(4),as appli- (vi) Whether changes in circumstances cable.Notice of the planning commission hearing dictate a need for amendments; shall be given by publication in the county's official (vii) Whether inconsistencies exist be- newspaper at least one time 10 days prior to the date tween the Comprehensive Plan and the GMA or the of the meeting and by posting a copy of the hearing Comprehensive Plan and the County-wide Plan- notice at the county courthouse,which shall include ring Policy for Jefferson County. [Ord.2-06§ 11 a statement of the purpose of the hearing. (4) Board of Commissioners Decision—Adop- 18.45.060 Review of preliminary docket— Lion of Final Docket. Adoption of final docket. (a) Review and Decision Process. By the (1) DCD Review of Preliminary Docket. After second regular board of county commissioners • compiling the preliminary docket, the administra- meeting in May of each year,the board of county tor shall review the suggested amendments and pre- commissioners shall review and consider the plan- pare a report concerning which suggested amend- ning commissions r port and recommended final ments the administrator believes should be placed docket at a regularly scheduled commissioners on the final docket for consideration during the an- m g The board of county commissioners may nual amendment process.In addition to addressing adopt the planning commission's recommeed the need,urgency and appropriateness of each sug- final docket without a public hearing;however,in gested amendment, the staff report shall include, th ethat a majority of the board of county but not be limited to,a consideration of the follow- commissioners eci es o or subtract sug- ing: gestefamendments,itshall first old a public hear- (a) The availability of sufficient DCD staff in noticed as set forth in subsea ion ( of this to substantively review the suggested amendments section, w is shall be held by the first boar of and manage the public review process with avail- county commissioners meeting in July. able staff;and final ocket — n . The final (b) Anticipated DCD costs and budget for docket as adopted by the board of county commis- processing the suggested amendments. sioners shall include the following: (2) Optional Board of County Commissioners/ (i) All applications for formal site-spe- Planning Commission Workshop. The board of cific amendments timely submitted under JCC county commissioners and planning commission 18.45.050(3); may, but are not required to, hold a noticed joint (ii) Any proposals for suggested amend- workshop �1 J ) ( YP Po � workshop meeting to gather information regarding meats which the board of county commissioners the items on the preliminary docket and the admin- elects to consider during the annual amendment istrator's report and recommendation. If held, process;and 18-261 (Revised 2/06) '. I 18.45.070 (iii) When applicable, any amendments (i) The purpose(s) of amending and/or recommended by the planning commission during updating the Comprehensive Plan; its periodic assessment of the Comprehensive Plan (ii) The deadline for submitting corn- that the board of county commissioners elects to ments on the amendments;and consider during the amendment process. (iii) A tentative hearing schedule;contin- (c) Effect of Final Adopted.Docket. The ued hearings may be held by the planning commis- decision of the board of county commissioners to t no additional notices need be published. , adopt the final docket does not constitute a decision (b) Required Findings — Generally. For all or recommendation that the substance of any for- proposed amendments, the planning commission mal site-specific,suggested, or planning commis- shall develop findings and conclusions and a rec- sion recommended amendment should be adopted. ommendation which consider the growth manage- No additional amendment proposals shall be con- ment indicators set forth in JCC 18.45.050(4)(b)(i) sidered by the county after adoption of the final through(4)(bxvii),as well as the following: docket for that year, except for exceptions and (i) Whether circumstances related to the emergencies as set forth in JCC 18.45.030, and proposed amendment and/or the area in which it is county-sponsored proposals to amend the capital located have substantially changed since the adop- facilities element of the Comprehensive Plan as set tion of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; forth in JCC 18.45.040(2)(a). [Ord.2-06§ 1]. (ii) Whether the assumptions upon which the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan is based 18.45.070 Final docket—DCD review and are no longer valid,or whether new information is recommendation—SEPA review. available which was not considered during the The final docket as adopted by the board of adoption process or any annual amendments of the county commissioners shall first be reviewed and Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan;and assessed by DCD,and the administrator shall pre- (iii) Whether the proposed amendment U pare a staff report and recommendation on each reflects current widely held values of the residents N proposed amendment.DCD shall also be responsi- of Jefferson County. ble for conducting SEPA review of all items on the (c) Additional Required Findings—Formal final docket(see Article X of Chapter 18.40 JCC). Site-Specific Amendments. In addition to the As appropriate,the administrator shall solicit corn- required findings set forth in subsection (1)(b) of meats regarding the proposed amendments from this section, in order to recommend approval of a the public and/or government agencies. The formal site-specific proposal to amend the Corn- administrator shall also provide notice and oppor- prehensive Plan, the planning commission must tunity for public comment as deemed appropriate also make the following findings: given the nature of the proposed amendments and (i) The proposed site-specific amend- consistent with RCW 36.70A.140 and SEPA meat meets concurrency requirements for trans- (Chapter 43.21C RCW and Chapter 197-11 WAC). portation and does not adversely affect adopted a -. --; ; § 1] level of service standards for other public facilities and services(e.g.,sheriff,fire and emergency med- 18.45.080 'i : docket—Planning commission ical services,parks,fire flow,and general govern- d board of county commissioners mental services); review. (ii) The proposed site-specific amend- Planning Commission Review. All pro- meat is consistent with the goals, policies and posed amendments on the final docket shall be re- implementation strategies of the various elements viewed and assessed by the planning commission, ` of the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan; which shall make a recommendation to the board of (iii) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners after holding at least one meat will not result in probable significant adverse open record public hearing. impacts to the county's transportation network, (a) Notice.The hearing before the planning capital facilities,utilities,parks,and environmental commission shall be noticed by one publication in features that cannot be mitigated,and will not place the official newspaper of the county at least 10 days uncompensated burdens upon existing or planned prior to the date of the hearing and by posting a service capabilities; copy of the notice of hearing in the Jefferson (iv) In the case of a site-specific amend- County Courthouse. This notice shall include the meat to the land use map, that the subject parcels following: are physically suitable for the requested land use • (Revised 2/06) 18-262 f • Jefferson County Code • 18.45.090 designation and the anticipated land use develop- Comprehensive Plan amendments may be com- ment,including,but not limited to,the following: bind with any notice or public hearing for pro- (A) Access; posed amendments to the county's Comprehensive (B) Provision of utilities;and Plan implementing regulations(e.g., this code),or (C) Compatibility with existing and for other actions of the board of county commis- planned surrounding land uses; sioners. (v) The proposed site-specific amend- (c) Criteria for Evaluation of Proposed Plan ment will not create a pressure to change the land Amendments.The board of county commissioners use designation of other properties, unless the shall apply the same criteria as the planning com- change of land use designation for other properties mission as set forth in subsections(1)(b)and(1)(c) is in the long-term best interests of the county as a of this section,as applicable. whole; (d) Adoption by Ordinance. The board of (vi) The proposed site-specific amend- county commissioners shall adopt any amend- ment does not materially affect the land use and meats to the Jefferson County Comprehensive Plan population growth projections that are the bases of by ordinance.This final action on the docket must the Comprehensive Plan; be taken by the second regular board meeting i1 (vii) If within an unincorporated urban December of each year. growth area (UGA), the proposed site-specific (e) Transmhtdl to State. The administrator amendment does not materially affect the ade- . shall transmit a copy of any proposed amendment quacy or availability of urban facilities and ser- . of the Comprehensive Plan to the Washington vices to the immediate area and the overall UGA; State Office of Community Development(OCD)at (viii) The proposed amendment is con- least 60 days prior to the expected date of final sistent with the Growth Management Act(Chapter .action by the board of county commissioners, as 36.70A RCW),the County Wide Planning.Policy consistent with Chapter 36.70A RCW.The admin- for Jefferson County, any other.applicable inter- istrator shall transmit a copy of any adopted Com- jurisdictional policies or agreements,and any other prehensive Plan amendment to OCD within 10 local,state or federal laws. days after adoption by the board. (d) Recommendation. The planning com- (f) Appeals. All appeals to the adoption of mission's findings and conclusions shall include a . an amendment to the Jefferson County Compre- . recommendation to the board of county commis- hensive Plan shall be filed with and processed by sioners that the proposed amendment(s)be denied, the Western Washington Growth Management approved, or approved with conditions or modifi- Hearings Board in accordance with the provisions cations. of Chapter 36.70A RCW. [Ord.2-06§ 1] (2) Board of County Commissioners Review— Appeals. 18.45.090 Amendments to GMA implementing (a) Board of County Commissioners Work- regulations. . shop.The board of county commissioners may first (1) Initiation. The text of the county's adopted review the recommendation of the planning com- Comprehensive Plan implementing regulations mission in a workshop meeting(s). (also referred to within this code as"development• (b) Board of County Commissioners regulations") may be amended at any time, pro- Review.The board of county commissioners shall vided the amendment is consistent with the Jeffer- consider the proposed amendments to the Compre- son County Comprehensive Plan and land use map. hensive Plan at a regularly scheduled meeting. If When inconsistent with the Comprehensive Plan after considering the matter at the regularly sched- and land use map, the amendment shall be pro- uled public meeting the board of county commis- cessed concurrent with any necessary plan amend- sioners deems a change in the recommendation of ments using the process and timelines for plan the planning commission to be necessary, the amendments set forth in this chapter. "Implement- change shall not be incorporated until the board ing regulations" means the controls placed on conducts its own public hearing using the proce= development or land use activities by the county, dures set forth under JCC 18.40.310. The hearing including,but not limited to,this Unified Develop- shall be noticed by one publication in the official ment Code,the Jefferson County Shoreline Master newspaper of the county at least 10 days prior to the Program,or any other official controls required to date of the hearing, and by posting copies of the implement the plan (see RCW 36.70A.030). Pm- notice of hearing in the Jefferson County Court- posed amendments,changes,or modifications may house.The notice and public hearing for proposed • be initiated as follows: 18-263 (Revised 2/)6) 18.45.090 (a) When consistent with the plan, at any (b) If after applying the criteria set forth in time at the direction of the board of county coin- JCC 18.45.080(1)(b)and(1)(c), as applicable,the missioners or by the planning commission pursu- board of county commissioners concludes that a ! . ant to RCW 36.70.550; change in the recommendation of the planning (b) When inconsistent with the plan, under commission is necessary, the change shall not be the process and time lines for Comprehensive Plan incorporated until the board conducts its own pub- amendments by any interested person consistent lic hearing using the procedures set forth under with this chapter,or JCC 18.40.310. The hearing shall be noticed by (c) Immediately following or concurrent one publication in the official newspaper of the with an amendment or amendments to the Jeffer- county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- son County Comprehensive Plan, the implement- ing,and by posting copies of the notice of hearing ing regulations shall be amended to be consistent in the Jefferson County Courthouse. The notice with the plan and land use map. and public hearing for proposed amendments to (2) Notice. implementing regulations may be combined with (a) Proposed amendments to the implement- any notice or public hearing for proposed amend- ing regulations pursuant to subsection (1) of this meats to the Comprehensive Plan or for other section which must be processed concurrently with actions of the board of county commissioners. an amendment to the Comprehensive Plan and land (5) Transmittal to State.The administrator shall use map shall be processed and noticed in the same transmit a copy of any proposed amendment(s)to manner as plan amendments consistent with this the implementing regulations at least 60 days prior chapter. to the expected date of final action by the board of (b) Notice of any hearing on amendments to county commissioners,as consistent with Chapter the immplementing---regulations generated by-BCD 36.70A RG The administrator all nsmit-a staff, the board. of county commissioners or the copy of any adopted amendment(s) to the imple- planning commission outside of the annual Com- meeting regulations to OCD within 10 days after prehensive Plan amendment process shall be given adoption by the board. by one publication in the official newspaper of the (6) Appeals.All appeals to the adoption of any county at least 10 days prior to the date of the hear- amendment(s) to the implementing regulations ■ ing and by posting a copy of the notice of hearing shall be filed with and processed by the Western in the Jefferson County Courthouse. Washington Growth Management Hearings Board (c). Any additional notice required by state.. in accordance with the provisions of Chapter or local law(e.g.,statutory notice requirements for 36.70A RCW. [Ord.2-06§ 1] amendments to the Shoreline Master Program),or deemed appropriate by the administrator, shall be paid for by the applicant. (3) Planning Commission Review. The plan- ning commission shall hold a public hearing on any amendment(s)to the implementing regulations and shall make a recommendation to the board of county commissioners using the site-specific crite- ria set forth in JCC 1.845.080(1)(b) and(1)(c), as applicable. (4) Board of County Commissioners Review. The board of county commissioners shall consider the proposed amendments at a regularly scheduled meeting. (a) lfafter applying the criteria set forth in JCC 18.45.0$0(1)(b)and(1)(c), as applicable, the board of.county commissioners concludes that no change in the recommendation of the planning commission is necessary, the board may make a final determination on the proposed amendment(s) and adopt the amendments as recommended by the planning commission. �. (Revised 2/06) 18-264 18.30.150 Signs. No sign shall hereafter be erected or used for any purpose or in any manner except as permitted by the regulations of this section or as specified elsewhere in this code.All signs subject to this section shall be subject to approval and issuance of a sign permit by the administrator according to a Type 1 permit approval process as specified in Chapter 18.40 JCC.The administrator may waive certain requirements of this section or require additional conditions for any sign permit,if deemed necessary to maintain consistency with the Comprehensive Plan. (1) Prohibited Signs.The following signs are prohibited: (a) Abandoned signs; (b) Billboards; (c) Flashing,revolving or moving signs,excepting clocks; (d) Off-site signs which advertise a business; (e) Signs or sign structures,which by coloring,shape,working,or location resemble or conflict with traffic-control signs or devices; (f) Signs which create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic;and (g) Signs attached to utility poles or traffic signs. (2) Exemptions.The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section: (a) Traffic and standardized public signs installed by a government entity; (b) Window and merchandise displays,point of purchase advertising displays such as product dispensers and barber poles; (c) National flags, flags of a political subdivision,and symbolic flags of an institution or business; (d) Legal notices required by law; (e) Historic site plaques and markers and gravestones; (f) Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing",. {Deleted: or (g) political message& De1eted:p Jh) Structures intended for separate use,such as recycling containers and phone Deleted: not to exceed eight square booths; feet (i) Real estate signs;and Deleted: (j) Lettering painted on or magnetically flush-mounted onto a motor vehicle operating in the normal course of business. (3) Design Standards.All signs must meet the following standards: (a) The following standards apply to the illumination and illustration of signs: (i) The illumination of signs shall be shaded,shielded,or directed so the light intensity or brightness shall not adversely affect surrounding properties or public and private rights-of-way or create a hazard or nuisance to the traveling public,or to surrounding properties. (ii) No sign or part thereof shall consist of rotating,revolving,or moving parts; consist of banners,streamers,or spinners;or involve flashing,blinking,or alternating lights.An exception to this standard is temporary signs associated with local festivals, fairs,parades,or special events pursuant to subsection(4)(a)of this section. (b) Sign size shall be regulated as follows: (i) The total square footage of signs shall not exceed 64 square feet for any business within any commercial or industrial land use district.Multitenant developments may have one freestanding sign for each access point,commonly identifying the businesses within multitenant developments provided such signs total no more than 64 square feet in aggregate.The maximum aggregate size for projection signs placed on a building is limited to one percent of the floor areas of the building,except that each occupant is allowed a sign of at least two square feet.In no case may an individual occupant's sign be larger than 15 square feet. (ii) The square footage of signs shall be calculated by the outside dimensions necessary to frame the information displayed.No sign mounted on a building shall extend above or beyond the eave,rake,or parapet of the wall on which it is mounted.Any sign projecting beyond six inches from a perpendicular wall shall be at least seven feet above grade. (iii) Directional,identification or advertising signs for any use located in any rural residential district shall not exceed 32 square feet,with the exception of institutional use signs,which shall not exceed 64 square feet. (c) Uses located in any rural commercial or industrial land use districts shall have no more than two on-premises signs except as allowed in this section for multitenant developments. (d) Signs attached to or painted against the structure to which it relates shall be computed as a part of the overall total square footage,or number of signs allowed. (e) All signs shall be continuously maintained. Signs that present a public hazard as determined by the Jefferson County building official or department of public works shall be subject to abatement. (f) The design of freestanding signs shall include measures to restrict vehicles from passing beneath them,unless otherwise permitted by the Jefferson County department of public works.All free standing pole signs or projecting signs shall provide pedestrian clearance to a minimum of eight feet,where applicable. (g) Signs should be incorporated into the landscaping of the site when landscaping is provided. (h) No signs,other than those related to water dependent uses,such as a marina,are permitted to face seaward,excepting signs relating to safety concerns,such as cable- crossing,construction-dredging,fuel area,etc. (i) No sign shall be placed in the public right-of-way or in the vision clearance triangle of intersections and curb cuts,unless otherwise approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (4) Specialty Signs. Specialty signs may be established when consistent with the standards set forth below: (a) Signs and banners promoting public festivals,community or special events,and grand openings may be displayed up to 30 days prior to the event,and shall be removed no later than seven days after the event.The sponsoring entity is responsible for sign removal.Event signs may be located"off-site." (b) Signs which identify a recognized community or unincorporated place are permitted at each entrance to the community. Said signs are limited to one per entrance, and may not exceed 64 square feet or eight feet in height.Signs relating to clubs, societies,orders,fraternities and the like shall be permitted as part of the community sign (c) Businesses may erect temporary on-site sandwich board signs subject to the following criteria: (i) No more than two sandwich board signs may be erected per business; (ii) Sandwich board signs shall not exceed four feet in height or three feet in width; (iii) Sandwich board signs shall be displayed during business hours only; (iv) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed on sidewalks;and (v) Sandwich board signs shall not be placed in public road rights-of-way unless approved by the Jefferson County department of public works. (d) Off-site signs may only be allowed when they meet all of the following standards: (i) Are directional in nature; (ii) Located on private property along a major or minor arterial; (iii) Located no more than 600 feet from an intersection;and (iv) No larger than 12 square feet. (5) Nonconforming Signs.Legally established signs in place prior to the adoption of these standards and not in conformance with these standards shall be considered legal, nonconforming signs,and may remain as provided below: (a) Nonconforming off-premises signs shall be removed within five years of adoption of this code.Until then,such signs must be continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered.Nonconforming off-premises signs may be replaced by off-site directional signs as allowed in this section. (b) Nonconforming on-premises signs may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered. (c) Billboards which are in place prior to the adoption of the ordinance codified in this code may remain provided they are continually maintained,not relocated,and not structurally altered.[Ord. 11-00§6.15] • District No. 1 Commissioner.Phil Johnson �4gON CDC i District No.2 Commissioner. David W.Sullivan 44:14" r District No.3 Commissioner.John Austin ICounty Administrator: John F.Fischbach Clerk of the Board: Lorna Delaney `SW'N MINUTES Week of February 20,2007 Commissioner Phil Johnson called the meeting to order in the presence of Commissioner David W. Sullivan and Commissioner John Austin. PUBLIC COMMENT PERIOD: The following comments were made by citizens. Several people stated that they support the reappointment of Jim Hagan and Dennis Schultz to the Planning Commission;the people on the Critical Areas Ordinance(CAO)Committee are volunteers and should be commended for their hard work;the County needs to consider the landowners who will be adversely affected by the regulations they adopt;the Washington Environmental Counsel declined to participate on the CAO Committee when they were invited;property rights are civil rights according to recent case law;if the Board accepts the minority report of the CAO,they won't get re-elected;Commissioner Austin's campaign flyer said that he would listen to his constituents;the County needs to stop stonewalling businesses that want to expand;the Commissioners took an oath to uphold the State and the U.S. Constitution;the developers of the Planned Rural Residential Development at the Discovery Bay Golf Course want to change the plan and eliminate the golf course;the Board's meetings should be video taped and put on PTTV;the legislation on the Puget Sound Partnership is being revised,but the end result of usurping local authority is the same;and the majority of the CAO Committee members do not represent the pro-environmental views of the citizens of the County. APPROVAL AND ADOPTION OF THE CONSENT AGENDA:Commissioner Austin moved to approve the Consent Agenda. Commissioner Sullivan seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. 1. RESOLUTION NO. 17-07 re:Adopting a Disbursement Policy 2. RESOLUTION NO. 18-07 re:Authorization for Auditor to Sign Payroll 3. RESOLUTION NO. 19-07 re:Establishing Standard for the Annual Inventory of the Capitalized Fixed Assets 4. NOTICE OF SPECIAL MEETING re: East Jefferson County Off-Highway Vehicle(OHV) Feasibility Study Report; Scheduled for Monday,February 26,2007 at 1:30 p.m.at the Quilcene Community Center 5. AGREEMENT Amendment No.1 re: Educational and Therapeutic Services for Children Age Birth to Three(3)Years and Their Families;Jefferson County Public Health;Holly Ridge Center • Page 1 • • Commissioners Meeting Minutes:Week of February 20,2007 6. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Developmental Disability Educational and Therapeutic Services for South Jefferson County Families and their Children Age*Birth to Three(3)Years; Jefferson County Public Health; Concerned Citizens 7. AGREEMENT Amendment No. 1 re:Voter Registration and Election System; Jefferson County Auditor;DFM Associates 8. AGREEMENT re: Guardrail Installation;Paradise Bay Road Project No. CR1148-4;Jefferson County Public Works;Petersen Brothers,Inc. 9. Payment of Jefferson County Vouchers/Warrants Dated February 13,2007 Totaling$4,531.32 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with vouchers approved and signed by the Board of Jefferson County Commissioners are retained by the Jefferson County Auditor and Public Works Department.) 10. Payment of Jefferson County A/P Warrants Done by Payroll Dated February 6,2007 Totaling $128,766.31 (Records of all claims submitted for payment along with A/P Warrants approved by the Payroll Services Manager are retained in the Jefferson County Auditor's Office.) 11. Letter of Appreciation for Donation of Hand Carved Monkey Tree Wooden Bowl from Courthouse Neighbors 12. Letter Regarding Support of House Bill 1167,Preserving the Viability of Agricultural Lands; Representative Geoff Simpson,Chair, House Local Government Committee APPROVAL OF MINUTES:Commissioner Sullivan moved to approve the minutes of February 5,2007. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. Ferry Advisory Committee Interviews and Possible Appointment: The Board interviewed Peter Bonyun,Tom Thiersch,Tim Snider,Peter Hanke,Dr.Albert Abrams and Fred Beck. Dr Abrams and Fred Beck currently serve on the advisory committee and their terms are expiring. There are also two vacant positions. There are five members on the committee. After the interviews,the Board asked the County Administrator to see if more than five member can serve on the Ferry Advisory Committee. The appointments will be scheduled on next week's agenda. Discussion re:Revisions to Jefferson County Code 18.30.1 S0 regarding Political Signs: Director of Community Development Al Scalf reported that the Board has stated that they think it is in the public interest to amend the Jefferson County Code regarding political sign regulations. Staff has recommended that political signs be exempt unless they exceed the threshold for a building permit. If the Board agrees with the proposed language,it will be forwarded to the Planning Commission for a public hearing and final recommendation. Commissioner Sullivan asked about the sign size limits. Building Official Fred Slota replied that he only deals with the structure of a sign. A 32 square foot sign is engineered and built to withstand the wind. He thinks a sign exceedingl6 square feet would need a permit,but it would not have to be engineered. Page 2 Commissioners Meeting Minutes: Week of February 20,2007 e,,,,,,h,ip The Board noted their concerns about political signs that could create a safety hazard for pedestrians or vehicular traffic. Al Scalf explained that signs that create a safety hazard are prohibited,even if they are listed under Exemptions in the Code. The Board asked that this language be clarified. Commissioner Sullivan suggested combining(2)(f)personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as `yard sale"or "no trespassing"; (g)political signs; and(i)real estate signs in one clause. There was a discussion about the maximum size for all exempt signs. The Building Official stated that the International Building Code(IBC)does not recommend a size. Al Scalf explained that the current County policy requires engineered plans for signs in excess of 32 square feet or six feet above grade. A building permit is required for any freestanding sign with posts if the top of the sign exceeds six feet above grade and the sign exceeds 16 square feet in size. Commissioner Sullivan suggested that all exempt signs not exceed 16 square feet. rte_. Commissioner Sullivan moved to forward the Sign Ordinance(JCC 18.30.150)to the Planking Commission and combine(2)(f)(g)and(i)in one clause,including language that clarifies when a building permit is required and when it is exempt,and that(2)Exemptions read: The following signs are exempt from the provisions of this section provided they do not exceed 16 square feet and are not prohibited. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. L The Board met in Executive Session from 11:30 a.m.to Noon with the Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, Outside Legal Counsel,the County Administrator and the Director of Community Development regarding actual litigation NOTICE OF ADJOURNMENT:Commissioner Sullivan moved to adjourn the meeting at 12:17 p.m. Commissioner Austin seconded the motion which carried by a unanimous vote. The next meeting is schdd'for Monday,February 26,2007 at 9 a.m. •MEE G JOURNEY ;:may \ JEFFERSON COUNTY • .. BOARD 0 CO I SS ONERS SEALi \ ; i:': ' ;' Phi Jo , Chair ATTEST: 5,, ,; j... :..: Davi ft lid em er ulie Matthes, CMC Deputy Clerk of the Board Jo Austin, ember Page 3 I I MEETING AGENDA Wednesday, April 18, 2007 6:30 P.M. WSU Community Learning Center,Port Hadlock 6:30 Call to Order(Roll Call,Quorum,Approve Minutes of February 21,March 7 and March 21) Bud Schindler, Chair Staff Updates Committee Reports General Public Comments A. Public Hearing—2007 Comp Plan Amendments Preliminary Docket(Suggested) Open Public Hearing Staff Report Public Testimony Close Public Hearing Planning Commission Discussion and Recommendation to BOCC for Final Docket B. Proposed Planning Commission By-Law Amendment C. Review Process for CAO Committee Reports to Planning Commission D. Introduction to Sign Ordinance Revisions General Public Comments Summary of tonight's meeting and forward look at agenda issues for the next meeting 9:30 Adjournment NOTE: The Planning Commission may add and take action on other items not listed on this agenda. Guidelines for Public Comment: 1)Be concise. Summarize your questions/concerns. If you have substantial background information to support your comments,please submit in writing. 2)Be civil. Focus on issues not individuals. Personal attacks,derogatory language and threatening remarks will not be tolerated. 3)Speak clearly. Speak loudly&slowly enough so you are heard. Explain any jargon and acronyms you use. 4 Excerpt from Planning Commission Minutes for April 18,2007 Karen Barrows provided an introduction to the sign ordinance revisions. She referred to the BOCC minutes for the week of February 20, 2007, on the issue of JCC 18.30.150 regarding signs. The BOCC thought it was in the public interest to amend the JCC regarding political sign regulations. Al Scalf explained that the BOCC had utilized a provision of the Planning Enabling Act called"A Board Initiated Control". Earlier, staff had done a review of how other jurisdictions regulate political (campaign) signs. As a result, staff provided a recommendation to the BOCC that political messages be allowed as an outright exemption. Staff took this Board initiated control to the BOCC on February 20. The BOCC expressed some concerns, some related to airplane banners or building code issues or real estate signs. He suggested that it may be appropriate for the Building Official to come and meet with the Planning Commission. He suggested that the Planning Commission schedule the issue at a later meeting for deliberations and to make a recommendation to the BOCC. Mr. Scalf referred to a pertinent court case— Collier vs. the City of Tacoma—a suggested the Planning Commission may want to consider it. The commissioners agreed to allow input from a real estate professional who was present. Karen Best said that real estate signs are treated differently than political signs. She urged the Planning Commission to keep realtors involved in the process regarding the sign revisions. This particular proposal does not affect real estate signs. Henry asked if there are issues with real estate signs or if it is only political signs that are at issue. If it is just political signs, he suggested the Planning Commission deal with that and move on. Al Scalf responded that the staff draft proposal only addressed political signs. However, the commission may want to also consider the concerns expressed by the BOCC as reflected in their February 20 minutes. The commission could prepare its own code draft and hold a public hearing. He reported that the BOCC had suggested the Planning Commission examine the code as written for consistency, whether it was fair across the board. He also recommended that the commissioners also read Collier vs. City of Tacoma to see the legal issues surrounding signs, including the Constitutional right of free speech. The commissioners invited Mike Belenski to address the sign issue. Mike Belinski explained that he had contested the recommendation that political signs be reduced to a limit of eight square feet while real estate signs could be larger. He had even gone to court for an injunction. His opinion was that they wanted to limit political signs to 16 square feet and he did not think they could not do that. He thought the First Amendment free speech rights were unlimited. In order to restrict that, you had to show a compelling government interest. He spoke about the amount of money some political candidates may spend on advertising in the media while some other candidate may only be able to afford signs. He said that whatever the county adopted, it should be internally consistent across the board. He also referred to the Collier vs. City of Tacoma case as something the county needed to comply with. He did not think there was any harm with a person putting a political sign in his yard and he did not think someone should have to pay for a permit for the privilege. Motion by Edel Sokol, seconded by Mike Whittaker, to accept staff's recommendation to exempt political signs and to remove the size limitation. The motion carried unanimously (8-0-0). Al Scalf stated that he would review the sizes of 16 square feet versus 32 square feet with the Building Official. He explained that JCC 18.30.150 was the Zoning section of the code. The Building Code was JCC Title 15 and addressed structural issues. Juelanne Dalzell ,,. ' ,'�_, JEFFERSON COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY f_ ., -- Courthouse—P.O.Box 1220 ,.�,. x•• Port Townsend,Washington 98368 4, .'. 'f;- 4'"° +,,' Telephone(360)385-9180 FAX(360)385-0073 David W.Alvarez,Deputy Prosecutor r! �� Katherine Gulmert,Deputy Prosecutor �-•!1- � � Pty a. j `.. j' ' _ Edward B.DeBray,Deputy Prosecutor JPJ'PEIIION COUNT11116AT-PORTTOWN!@O.WAS NOTCH Rafael E.Urquia,Deputy Prosecutor Thomas A.Brotherton,Deputy Prosecutor Lianne Perron-Kossow,Victim Witness Advocate April 4, 2008 NOT CONFIDENTIAL To: County Commission Frank Gifford, T.I. County Admin. Karen Barrows, DCD Stacie Hoskins, DCD Al S calf, DCD From: David Alvarez, Chief Civil DPA Re: Sign Ordinance The need for an amendment to the JCC at§18.30.150(2),an amendment that would remove the 8 square feet size limitation on political signs,a limitation only impacting political signs, was prompted by Mr.Belenski's lawsuit in Clallam County(Cause#06-2-00894-7)and the injunction against enforcing that rule entered against the County under that cause number in October 2006. Note,however that the BoCC is authorized under the Planning Enabling Act of 1963 at RCW 36.70.640 to send an"official control"or,in this case,an amendment to an"official control" to the "planning agency" (DCD and the PC combined) for a report. Pursuant to that authority,the BoCC discussed the need for changes to this section of the JCC with planning and building/inspection staff from DCD on February 20,2007 and subsequent to that discussion passed a motion forwarding their proposed text changes for JCC §18.30.150(2) [known as the "Sign Ordinance"] to the Planning Commission or"PC." The PC deliberated on the proposal on April 18, 2007 and voted 8-0 to accept staff's —>recommendation that simply removed the size cap on political signs and gave political signs their own subsection under JCC §18.20.150(2). In sum,DCD proposed and the PC approved and recommended something different than what the BoCC had originally sent to the planning agency. Note well that the PC did NOT hold a noticed public hearing on this issue. My review of both RCW 36.70.580 and JCC 18.45.090(3)indicates that the PC"shall hold a public hearing" before making any recommendation to the BoCC. So there has to be a public hearing before the PC prior to the"planning agency"forwarding its recommendation to the BoCC. After that hearing,the recommendation of the planning agency,referred to as a report in the Planning Enabling Act,will be brought to the BoCC via an Agenda Request Item from DCD. The BoCC is required to deliberate on the an of .fir public per RCW 36.70.620. If the BoCC wants to adopt subst precisely ce the the text reportat that the was recommended st meeting to them, then they can adopt the "official control" at a second public meeting WITHOUT holding a public hearing. If the BoCC wants to adopt any different text,then it must hold a public hearing before adopting its preferred text at a second public meeting. See RCW 36.70.620 and RCW 36.70.630. That public hearing would need the normal not less than 10 days' notice in order to comply with the notice requirements found in RCW 36.70.590 and JCC 18.45.090(4). Following this process would also represent compliance with the"public participation"requirements of Ch. 36.70A RCW(GMA)which also apply but don't go into detail about the precise steps that equate with sufficient public participation. Text changes to fix typographical errors or to,for example,reorder the exemptions would not require a public hearing. David Alvarez. 2 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046,COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 1 of 12 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA July 1993 [No. 59442-2. En Banc. July 1, 1993.] COLLIER v. TACOMA MICHAEL COLLIER, ET AL, Respondents, v.THE CITY OF TACOMA,Appellant. [1] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Federal Constitution 0 Application to State. Freedom of speech as guaranteed by the First Amendment applies to the states by operation of the Fourteenth Amendment. [2] Constitutional Law ❑ Construction 0 Priority of Consid-eration. When feasible, a court will decide constitutional issues under the state constitution before considering the federal constitution. [3]Constitutional Law❑ Construction 0 State and Federal Provisions 0 Independent State Interpretation 0 Federal Precedent ❑ Effect.When reviewing a state constitutional provision that is interpreted differently from its federal counterpart,a court may cite federal cases for the purpose of guidance;federal cases do not,however,compel a result under the state constitution. [4] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech 0 Degree of Protection. Political speech is afforded the greatest degree of protection under Const.art. 1,§5 and the First Amendment. [5] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum ❑ Right To Restrict.The government has only a very limited right to restrict political speech in a traditional public forum, i.e., a place that by tradition or government fiat has been devoted to assembly and debate. [6] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 What Constitutes ❑ Parking Strips. The area between public streets and public sidewalks constitutes a traditional public forum for purposes of the constitutional guaranty of free speech. [7] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Test. Under Const.art. 1,§5,time, place,and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum are valid only if they(1)are content neutral,(2)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest,and(3)leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [8] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Content Neutrality 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression, a restriction is not content neutral if it defines and regulates(1)a particular viewpoint or(2) a particular subject matter or class of expression.The intent of the enacting body is not determinative of the issue of content neutrality. [9]Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions ❑ Content Neutrality ❑ Secondary Effects. A time, place, and manner restriction on political speech in a traditional public forum is not content neutral merely because it is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. [10] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Content Neutrality ❑ Subject-Matter Based ❑ Test. Under Const. art. 1, §5 and the First Amendment,time, place, and manner restrictions that are viewpoint-neutral, but subject-matter based,are valid only if they(1)are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and (2) leave open ample alternative channels of communication. The State has the burden of proving the validity of such restrictions. [11] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining the validity of time, place, and manner restrictions on freedom of expression, legislation serves a compelling state interest if its purpose is a fundamental one and it bears a reasonable relationship to the achievement of the purpose. [12] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest 0 Balancing Test. When determining the validity of time,place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,a court will balance the public interest advanced by the legislation against the extent of its restriction on free speech rights. [13] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech ❑ Traditional Public Forum ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions ❑ Compelling State Interest ❑ Aesthetics 0 In General. A government's interest in aesthetics, such as maintaining a clean and litter-free community, is not sufficiently compelling to justify a time, place, and manner restriction, that is content based,on political speech in a traditional public forum. [14] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest ❑ Aesthetics 0 Traffic Safety 0 Favoring Commercial Speech Over Political Speech.A government's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not compelling and does not justify a greater restriction on political speech than on commercial speech. (State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52 is overruled insofar as it is inconsistent.) [15] Constitutional Law ❑ Freedom of Speech 0 Political Speech 0 Traditional Public Forum 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Compelling State Interest ❑ Aesthetics 0 Traffic Safety. A government's interest in aesthetics and traffic safety is not sufficiently compelling to justify time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech in a traditional public forum absent a showing that the government has seriously and comprehensively addressed such aesthetic and traffic safety concerns other than through the restrictions in question. [16] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech ❑ Time, Place,and Manner Restrictions ❑ Alternative Channels of Communication 0 Burden of Proof. For purposes of determining the validity of time,place,and manner restrictions on freedom of expression,the government has the burden of establishing that the restrictions leave open ample alternative channels of communication. [17] Constitutional Law 0 Freedom of Speech 0 Time, Place, and Manner Restrictions 0 Alternative Channels of Communication 0 What Constitutes. For purposes of determining whether a time, place, and manner restriction on freedom of expression leaves open ample alternative channels of communication,the alternatives must be practically available. [18]Statutes 0 Validity 0 Invalidity ❑ Partial Invalidity❑ Effect.As a general rule,a court will invalidate only that portion of an enactment that is unconstitutional;the remaining valid portions of the enactment survive and are enforceable. [19] Civil Rights 0 Deprivation ❑ Attorney Fees 0 In General.A prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983 is entitled to an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C.§1988 unless special circumstances would render an attorney fee award unjust. [20] Civil Rights 0 Deprivation 0 Attorney Fees ❑ Special Circumstances for Denial 0 Outside Funding for Attorney.The fact that a prevailing party in an action under 42 U.S.C. §1983 is represented by an association funded by someone other than the party does not constitute a special httn://srch.mrsc.ore:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:___ 4/1 R/200R 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 2 of 12 circumstance for not awarding the party attorney fees under 42 U.S.C.§1988. [21] Civil Rights ❑ Deprivation 0 Attorney Fees 0 Special Circumstances for Denial ❑ Publicity. Publicity gained from an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not grounds for denying the prevailing party an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 absent a finding that the party used the judicial system to gain publicity for personal benefit. DURHAM, J., ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur in the result by separate opinion; MADSEN, J.,did not participate in the disposition of this case. Nature of Action: A candidate for Congress claimed that city ordinances prohibiting the posting of political signs more than 60 days before the election violated his right of free speech. Superior Court: The Superior Court for Pierce County, No. 90-2-06091-3, Frederick B. Hayes, J., on February 15, 1991, entered a judgment in favor of the plaintiff but refused to award attorney fees. Supreme Court: Holding that the ordinances restrict the right to political expression in violation of the federal and state constitutions, that only those portions of the ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech are invalid, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an attorney fee award under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the court affirms the judgment in part, reverses it in part, and remands the case for an award of attorney fees. William J. Barker, City Attorney, and John C. Kouklis, Patricia Bosmans, and Heidi Ann Horst, Assistants, for appellant. Adam Kline, for respondents. Richard L. Andrews, on behalf of the City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys, amici curiae. GUY, J. ❑ Michael Collier, a candidate for Congress, posted his political campaign signs in residential areas within the city of Tacoma more than 60 days prior to the 1990 primary election. City workers removed Collier's signs from residential yards and parking strips in accordance with two Tacoma ordinances that restrict the preelection posting of political signs in such areas to a 60-day campaign window. Collier sued Tacoma claiming the ordinances violated his free speech rights. The trial court entered judgment in favor of Collier, holding the ordinances unconstitutional. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTS Michael Collier was a candidate for the Democratic Party's nomination for Congress in the Sixth Congressional District of Washington in 1990. Collier had not previously held or run for any elective office. He was not considered a public figure or well known in political circles. Collier's opponent in the primary election was Representative Norm Dicks, a 14-year incumbent. The primary election was scheduled for September 18, 1990. Collier began to plan his campaign in December 1989 and began fundraising in February 1990. Collier identified that the greatest obstacles to his campaign were lack of name familiarity and funding. During the course of the primary campaign, Collier raised and spent a total of $29,000. Representative Dicks spent$329,000 in his primary campaign. Given his resources, Collier determined that yard signs were the most cost-effective means of communicating his political message. At the beginning of May 1990, the Collier campaign assembled some 700 2-sided yard signs. The first of these was posted outdoors between May 20 and 30. Collier supporters placed "Mike Collier for Congress"signs in their front yards and parking strips. Tacoma Municipal Code (TMC) 2.05.275 defines and regulates political signs. The ordinance defines political signs as "[a]II signs which are displayed out-of-doors on real property relating to the nomination or election of any individual for a public political office or advocating any measure to be voted on at any special or general election". The ordinance limits the posting of such political signs to a period of not more than 60 days prior to and 7 days after the date of the election for which the signs are intended. TMC 2.05.275(1). «1» «1»The full text of TMC 2.05.275(1)provides: http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 3 of 12 "(1) Such political signs shall not be displayed more than sixty days prior to and seven days after the date of the election for which intended. In cases where a general election follows within 55 days of a primary election,those signs for candidates whose names will appear on the ballot in the general election may be displayed during the interim period and up to seven days after the general election. In all instances herein in which political signs are required to be removed within seven days after the election for which the political sign was displayed, if said signs are not removed, they will be subject to removal by the City of Tacoma Public Works Department. Provided, however, that this provision shall not prohibit political signs in areas where other provisions of the Official Code of the City of Tacoma allows the same as legally licensed outdoor advertising displays." Tacoma Municipal Code 6.03.070 prohibits any person, firm, or corporation from posting any signs on any public street or highway or upon any curbstone,lamp post, street sign,pole,hydrant,bridge,tree,or other thing situated upon any public street or highway or any publicly owned property within the City of Tacoma,except as may be authorized by ordinances of the City of Tacoma . . . PROVIDED,HOWEVER,the prohibition contained herein shall not apply to political signs placed on parking strips preceding a primary or general election where such political signs are installed pursuant to the permission of the owner of the property abutting said parking strip and installed in such a manner as not to constitute a traffic hazard . . .. Real estate signs advertising the sale or rent of the property upon which they stand or to which they are attached, and other signs attached to any building or sidewalk advertising the business carried on in the building, are exempt from the provisions of this chapter. TMC 6.03.080. Pursuant to these ordinances, Tacoma Public Works Department employees removed signs displaying "Mike Collier for Congress" from residential yards and parking strips within the city of Tacoma that were posted more than 60 days prior to the primary election. Mr. Benjamin Thompson, City Engineer for Tacoma, testified that he directed personnel from his department to pick up all signs in the public right of way «2» «2» Mr.Thompson defined public"right-of-way"as"that area within a development that is set aside for and dedicated for use of a public street, sidewalks, and public utilities."Report of Proceedings,at 11. Mr.Thompson testified that the public right of way extends 15 feet from the curb: 5 feet for the parking strip,5 feet for the sidewalk,and an additional 5 feet into the homeowner's front yard. throughout the city. Mr. Thompson testified that his department also removes commercial signs from residential areas since commercial signs are not permitted in those areas. Mr. Thompson understood that the ordinance allows an exception for on-site commercial signs pertaining to the sale or rent of private property. He testified that in order to enforce the ordinances, he differentiates between commercial and political signs by reading them. Collier filed this action in July 1990 seeking a temporary restraining order, an injunction against the ordinances' enforcement, a declaratory judgment that the ordinances are unconstitutional, and attorney fees. The complaint was subsequently amended to include plaintiff«3» «3»Hereafter, both plaintiffs are identified collectively as"Collier". Joel Beritich, a Collier supporter who had political signs removed from his yard and parking strip. The amended complaint also cited 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as an additional source of protection for the rights involved and 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as the statutory basis for the claim of attorney fees. On February 15, 1991, the trial court entered judgment in favor of Collier, holding that the ordinances were unconstitutional, but denied Col-lier's claim for attorney fees. Tacoma appealed the trial court's judgment as to the ordinances, and Collier cross-appealed the trial court's denial of attorney fees. We accepted certification from the Court of Appeals and now affirm in part and reverse in part. ISSUES This case presents three issues for review. First, do the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutionally restrict Collier's free speech rights? We hold that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs unconstitutionally restricts Collier's right to political expression. httn:/lsrch.mrsc.ora:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm.lulrte =collier:... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 4 of 12 Second, did the trial court err in declaring the Tacoma ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety? We answer in the affirmative and hold unconstitutional only those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impermissibly restrict political speech. Third, did the trial court err when it denied plaintiffs' request for attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988? We reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees and remand for a determination of an award of fees consistent with this opinion. ANALYSIS [1] The Tacoma ordinances are challenged under both the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution, and article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution. The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech". U.S. Const. amend. 1. The freedom of speech which is secured by the First Amendment is "among the fundamental personal rights and liberties which are secured to all persons by the Fourteenth Amendment against abridgment by a State." Burson v. Freeman, - U.S. _, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 12, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (quoting Thornhill v.Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95, 84 L. Ed. 1093, 60 S. Ct. 736 (1940)). Article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution provides that"[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of that right." [2, 3] As we stated in O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)), "[t]his court has a duty, where feasible, to resolve constitutional questions first under the provisions of our own state constitution before turning to federal law." We do so because in addition to our responsibility to interpret Washington's constitution, we must furnish a rational basis "for counsel to predict the future course of state decisional law." State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 60, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). See Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153 (1992). We recognize that the free speech clauses of the state and federal constitutions are different in wording and effect, but that the result reached by previous Washington cases in general adopted much of the federal methodology for application to state constitutional cases. The federal cases cited here and in our prior decisions are used for the purpose of guidance and do not themselves compel the result the court reaches under our state constitution. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983); Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 456, 755 P.2d 775 (1988). With these statements in mind, we turn to our analysis of the Tacoma ordinances. [4] The Tacoma ordinances implicate several concerns in our free speech jurisprudence: regulation of political speech, regulation of political speech in a public forum, and regulation based on the content of the speech. The speech restricted by Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 is political speech. The code defines "political signs" and restricts the time and place in which such signs may be posted. Wherever the extreme perimeters of protected speech may lie, it is clear the First Amendment protects political speech, see Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 467, 65 L. Ed. 2d 263, 100 S. Ct. 2286 (1980), giving it greater protection over other forms of speech. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 513, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). The constitutional protection afforded political speech has its "fullest and most urgent application precisely to the conduct of campaigns for political office." Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 28 L. Ed. 2d 35, 91 S. Ct. 621 (1971). [5, 6] The second important feature of the Tacoma ordinances is that they restrict political speech in a traditional public forum. The traditional public forum includes those places "which by long tradition or by government fiat have been devoted to assembly and debate,"' such as parks, streets and sidewalks. Burson v. Freeman, supra at 13 (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 103 S. Ct. 948 (1983)); Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 307 U.S. 496, 515, 83 L. Ed. 1423, 59 S. Ct. 954 (1939). See also Buchanan, The Case of the Vanishing Public Forum, 1991 U. III. L. Rev. 949, 951. The parking strips «4» «4»Collier also raises an issue concerning the restriction of political speech on private property.This issue was not adequately addressed in the briefing, is not necessary to our decision in this case,and thus will not be discussed further. http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 5 of 12 in which Collier and his supporters placed his political signs lie between the "streets and sidewalks" and thus are part of the "traditional public forum". Because these places occupy a special position in terms of First Amendment protection, the government's ability to restrict expressive activity is very limited. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 318, 99 L. Ed. 2d 333, 108 S. Ct. 1157 (1988). [7] Since the Tacoma ordinances do not ban political signs altogether, we analyze the ordinances as time, place, and manner restrictions. See, e.g., Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 46, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986). The United States Supreme Court has held that even in a public forum, the government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, and manner of protected speech, provided the restrictions are content neutral, are narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental interest, and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746(1989); Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We diverge from the Supreme Court on the state interest element of the time, place, and manner test, "as we believe restrictions on speech can be imposed consistent with Const. art. 1, § 5 only upon showing a compelling state interest." e5» «5» Our prior holdings have required counsel to discuss at least the factors enunciated in State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986) when they assert the applicability of our state constitution. Counsel's failure in this case to discuss these factors would normally preclude our consideration of the state constitutional issues. State v.Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466,472, 755 P.2d 797(1988). Citation of Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert.dismissed,479 U.S. 1050(1987) is not enough. Because Bering is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwall analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to reach the state constitutional issue. For future cases,we stress that this court must have the benefit of a state constitutional argument that is of assistance to the court to determine the meaning of the language used as it relates to the state constitutional claim and whether there are factors other than language that should determine the scope of our constitutional provisions. See Utter,The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism:Washington's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1160-63(1992). Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The broad language of Const. art. 1, § 5 as compared with the federal constitution compels this result. Tacoma and amici curiae City of Bellevue and Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys argue that the Tacoma ordinances are constitutionally permissible restrictions on the time, place, and manner of political speech. We disagree. Applying the 3-part test for time, place, and manner regulations outlined above, we conclude that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political signs is unconstitutional. Our analysis of the Tacoma. ordinances under each element of the time, place, and manner test follows. Content Neutrality [8] The trial court held that Tacoma Municipal Code sections 2.05.275 and 6.03.070 are "not content-neutral, in that they expressly define and regulate 'political' signs." Tacoma and amici argue that the ordinances are content-neutral because the City does not regulate the message conveyed ❑ only the method by which it is conveyed. Collier claims the ordinances are content based because they define and regulate political speech as a class of expression. Constitutionally permissible time, place, or manner restrictions may not be based upon either the content or subject matter of speech. See Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 536, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319, 100 S. Ct. 2326 (1980). Content-based restrictions on speech are presumptively unconstitutional and are thus subject to strict scrutiny. Renton, at 46-47; Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14. Under that intense level of review, government must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end. Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. The Tacoma ordinances do not fit neatly into either the content-based or the content-neutral category. Our review of the case law and commentary on this subject indicates that the distinction is not always transparent. See, e.g., Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 189 (1983-1984). In determining whether a restriction is content neutral or content based, the Supreme Court has held that"[g]overnment regulation of expressive activity is content neutral so long as it is 'justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech.' Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. at 791. While the Tacoma ordinances do not regulate political signs in terms of viewpoint, they describe and regulate permissible sign posting in terms of subject matter. Subject-matter restrictions are not directed at"particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of information, but at entire subjects of expression."Stone, 25 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. at 239. In this case, political signs are subject to a 60-day restriction "out-of-doors on real httn://srch.mrsc.or2:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:... 4/18/200 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 6 of 12 property", whereas on-site commercial signs identifying a property for sale or for rent are not. TMC 2.05.275; TMG 6.03.070, .080. How long a sign may be maintained depends upon the kind of message the sign seeks to convey. The trial court found that Tacoma Public Works Department personnel have to read the signs in order to determine whether they are prohibited at a particular time. The United States Supreme Court has held that an ordinance is content based if it distinguishes between permissible and impermissible signs at a particular location by reference to content. Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 516-17, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981); FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 383-84, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278, 104 S. Ct. 3106 (1984).As one commentator noted, the United States Supreme Court's prohibition of content- based regulations is based "both on equal protection grounds and on a first amendment grant of equal access to an open forum." (Footnotes omitted.) Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property to Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 208-09 (1984-1985). The question is "not whether all those within the classes defined by the state are treated equally but, rather, whether the classification itself is permissible." Stone, Fora Americana: Speech in Public Places, 1974 Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 276. As the Supreme Court stated in Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13 n.3, content-based restrictions raise Fourteenth Amendment equal protection concerns because such restrictions differentiate between types of speech. See Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 517-21 (billboard ordinance favoring commercial speech over noncommercial speech violated First Amendment neutrality); Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 33 L. Ed. 2d 212, 92 S. Ct. 2286 (1972) (ordinance that prohibited picketing near a school building, but that expressly exempted peaceful labor picketing, held unconstitutional); Matthews v. Needham, 764 F.2d 58, 60 (1st Cir. 1985) (town bylaw that barred the posting of political signs on residential property but permitted the posting of certain commercial signs held facially unconstitutional because bylaw was concerned with content, as opposed to the time, place, or manner of the speech); People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (ordinance which proscribed political signs but allowed other signs in residential areas subjected to strict scrutiny); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (municipal ordinance which imposed a 60-day limitation on political signs but not on commercial signs discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause). The Tacoma ordinances, by regulating sign posting in terms of subject matter, albeit viewpoint neutral, fall within the realm of content-based restrictions. Tacoma and amici argue that in determining content neutrality, the question is not whether the signs must be read, but whether the City of Tacoma prohibited the signs out of disapproval of the message promoted. «6» 4» The stated purpose of Tacoma's sign code is "to provide minimum standards to safeguard life, health, property and public welfare by regulating and controlling the design,quality of materials,construction, location,electrification,and maintenance of all signs and sign structures." TMC 2.05.020. Citing Ward, Tacoma claims the principal inquiry in determining content neutrality in time, place, or manner cases is whether the government has adopted a regulation of speech "because of disagreement with the message it conveys." Ward, 491 U.S. at 791 (citing Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 295, 82 L. Ed. 2d 221, 104 S. Ct. 3065 (1984)). Tacoma contends that since the ordinances serve a purpose unrelated to a sign's content, the ordinances are content neutral. See Ward, at 791. Collier argues that this standard is too subjective, and that a showing of "improper legislative intent" would be practically impossible to make. We agree. The Supreme Court has recognized that "even regulations aimed at proper governmental concerns can restrict unduly the exercise of rights protected by the First Amendment." Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Rev., 460 U.S. 575, 592, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295, 103 S. Ct. 1365 (1983). In some cases, the fact that a regulation is content based and invalid will be apparent from its face. See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of New York State Crime Victims Bd., U.S. 116 L. Ed. 2d 476, 492, 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (Kennedy, J., concurring). In other cases, a censorial justification "will not be apparent from the face of a regulation which draws distinctions based on content, and the government will tender a plausible justification unrelated to the suppression of speech or ideas." Burson v. Freeman, U.S. _, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 23, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring). Although the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, they define and regulate a specific subject matter 0 political speech. This content-based distinction, while viewpoint neutral, is particularly problematic because it inevitably favors certain groups of candidates over others. The incumbent, for example, has already acquired name familiarity and therefore benefits greatly from Tacoma's restriction on political signs. The underfunded challenger, on the other hand, who relies on the inexpensive yard sign to get his message before the public is at a disadvantage. We conclude therefore that while aesthetic interests are legitimate goals, they require careful scrutiny http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d'737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 7 of 12 e •: when weighed against free speech interests because their subjective nature creates a high risk of impermissible speech restrictions. "[D]emocracy stands on a stronger footing when courts protect First Amendment interests against legislative intrusion, rather than deferring to merely rational legislative judgments in this area". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 519. [9] Finally, Tacoma cites Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47, 89 L. Ed. 2d 29, 106 S. Ct. 925 (1986), for the proposition that an apparently content-based statute may be content neutral if the restriction on speech is targeted at the speech's secondary effects. In Renton, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult theaters to one area of town. The ordinance was held constitutional because it did not target the content of the films shown at the theaters. Rather, the ordinance was aimed at the secondary effects that adult theaters have on the surrounding community. Renton, at 46. We do not find Renton dispositive since it did not analyze a content-based restriction on political speech. While a distinction between adult theaters and other kinds of theaters may be permissible based on a "secondary effects" analysis, drawing a similar distinction between commercial speech and political speech turns the favored status of political speech on its head. We therefore decline to draw such a distinction where a restriction on political speech in a public forum is at issue. 110] In summary, the Tacoma ordinances are viewpoint neutral, but are content based in that they classify permissible speech in terms of subject matter. Ordinarily this conclusion would take the ordinances out of the domain of time, place, and manner restrictions, Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516-17, and would instead require a strict scrutiny analysis. Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 13-14. See Perry Educ. Ass'n, 460 U.S. at 45. We conclude, however, that the Tacoma ordinances can be reviewed under a time, place, and manner formulation. We hold that time, place, and manner restrictions on speech that are viewpoint neutral, but subject-matter based, are valid so long as they are narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest and leave open ample alternative channels of communication. This formulation of the standard of review comports with free speech jurisprudence under both article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 234, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987), and the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See Burson v. Freeman, 119 L. Ed. 2d at 23 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (recognizing that in time, place, and manner cases, since the regulation's justification is a "central inquiry", the compelling interest test may be one analytical device to detect, in an objective way, whether the asserted justification is in fact an accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law). «7» «70 For cases requiring careful judicial scrutiny of regulations to ensure that no covert content-based restrictions exist, see Consolidated Edison Co. of N.Y., Inc.v. Public Serv.Comm'n,447 U.S. 530,65 L. Ed.2d 319, 100 S. Ct.2326(1980); Erznoznik v.Jacksonville,422 U.S.205,45 L. Ed. 2d 125, 95 S. Ct. 2268 (1975). See Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns,34 De Paul L.Rev. 197,206(1984-1985). In this manner, we are able to balance the competing interests while recognizing that the burden of justifying a restriction on speech remains on the State. See Burson, at 32 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Compelling State Interest [11, 12] Inasmuch as we have dealt with the first element of the time, place, and manner analysis, content neutrality, we next discuss the state interest element. Applying the standard enunciated above, Tacoma must prove that its ordinances, taken together, are narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. To constitute a compelling interest, the purpose must be a fundamental one and the legislation must bear a reasonable relation to the achievement of the purpose. Adult Entertainment Ctr., Inc. v. Pierce Cy., 57 Wn. App. 435, 439, 788 P.2d 1102, review denied, 115 Wn.2d 1006 (1990). See Bates v. Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 524-25, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480, 80 S. Ct. 412 (1960). We determine the reasonableness of a time, place, and manner restriction by balancing the public interest advanced by the regulation against the extent of the restriction on free speech rights. State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 58, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979); Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981). [13] Tacoma argues that its interest in city aesthetics and traffic safety is a compelling state interest, and that the ordinances were "narrowly tailored" to serve that interest. We disagree. Although aesthetics has been determined to be a significant governmental interest, Members of City Coun. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 805, 80 L. Ed. 2d 772, 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984), it has not been determined to be an interest sufficiently compelling to justify restrictions on political speech in a public forum. The record in this case does not justify such a result. While Tacoma and amici cite Vincent and State v. Lotze, supra, for support, neither decision supports their premise that aesthetics http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier:... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 8 of 12 and traffic safety are state interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the restrictions imposed on Collier's free speech. In Vincent,.the Court upheld a municipal ordinance prohibiting the posting of any signs on public property. Roland Vincent was a candidate for election to the Los Angeles City Council. His political signs were attached to utility poles throughout the city. Pursuant to the ordinance, his signs were removed from the poles. The Court concluded that the ordinance was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. Vincent, at 815. Vincent is distinguishable from this case in two important respects. First, Vincent involved a law that prohibited the posting of all signs, regardless of content. Second, the utility poles upon which Vincent's signs were posted were not considered part of the traditional public forum. Vincent, at 814. See also Note, Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent: The Constitutionality of Prohibiting Temporary Sign Posting on Public Property To Advance Local Aesthetic Concerns, 34 De Paul L. Rev. 197, 227 (1984-1985) (analyzes Vincent as misapplying First Amendment precedent and the primacy of political speech). In State v. Lotze, supra, we held that aesthetics and, to a greater extent, traffic safety were interests sufficiently compelling to outweigh the incidental restrictions on the appellants' exercise of First Amendment speech. Lotze, at 58- 60. In Lotze, the State sought to remove political billboards adjacent to a highway under the authority of Washington's highway sign law (RCW 47.42), which generally prohibits all signs visible from interstate, primary or scenic systems except as permitted under the act. The listed exceptions under the act include signs advertising the sale or lease of property upon which they are located. We stated that unlike on-premise business signs and realty for sale signs, political messages such as the signs involved in Lotze are addressed "to the general universality of political ideas"and need not be linked with a specific site in order to derive meaning. Lotze, at 59. We held that the statute met the test for a state restraint on First Amendment rights because appellants' speech was not controlled as to content and because alternative means of communicating such views were available. Lotze, at 60. The Supreme Court in Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18, overruled its prior summary approval of State v. Lotze, 92 Wn.2d 52, 593 P.2d 811, appeal dismissed, 444 U.S. 921 (1979). Finding that San Diego's aesthetic interests were sufficiently significant to justify its ban on off-site commercial advertising, but were insufficient to warrant a ban on noncommercial signs, the Court observed that some decisions, including State v. Lotze, supra, have failed to give adequate weight to the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 513 n.18. Other courts have also criticized the analysis in Lotze. In Van v. Travel Information Coun., 52 Or. App. 399, 628 P.2d 1217 (1981), the Oregon Court of Appeals held that a 60-day restriction on temporary political signs adjacent to highways was unconstitutional. The Van court relied on a majority of decisions which were contrary to Lotze in order to conclude that aesthetic interests were insufficient to justify the significant restriction on political speech imposed by the 60-day limitation on political campaign signs. Van, at 416. [14] We agree with Collier that Lotze should not be controlling on this issue. We depart from our holding in Lotze to the extent it implies that aesthetics and traffic safety are compelling interests justifying greater restrictions on political speech than on commercial speech. We recognize that Tacoma's ordinances, unlike the statute at issue in Lotze, do not completely prohibit political sign posting. Given the preferred status of political speech, however, Tacoma has failed to show that its interest in maintaining a clean, litter-free community «8» «8» Indeed,Collier argues that the self-interest and good sense of candidates already serves to regulate political yard signs. is sufficiently compelling to justify its disparate treatment of political speech. In Metromedia, San Diego's allowance of some billboards, but not others, was evidence that its interests in traffic safety and aesthetics, while "substantial", fell short of "compelling". Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 520. Likewise, Tacoma's disparate treatment of on-site commercial signs over political signs indicates that its interest in aesthetics is significant, but not compelling. Furthermore, Tacoma has not shown that yard signs create a substantial traffic hazard. There was no evidence that any of Collier's signs were hazardous to traffic or blocked pedestrian access. Mr. Thompson knew of no yard signs that had been found blocking sidewalks, utility lines or poles, or streets. Tacoma's claim that it restricts political yard signs to a 60-day period on behalf of a "compelling state interest" in traffic safety lacks evidentiary support. Once political signs are allowed on a temporary basis, "it is difficult to imagine how prohibiting political signs at other times significantly promotes highway safety."Van, 52 Or. App. at 412. A regulation that serves a compelling state interest must be narrowly tailored to serve that interest. Ward v. Rock http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn•2d 737, P.2d 1046,COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 9 of 12 a . Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791, 105 L. Ed. 2d 661, 109 S. Ct. 2746 (1989); Bering v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 233-. 34, 721 P.2d 918 (1986), cert. dismissed, 479 U.S. 1050 (1987). The trial court found that neither ordinance is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest. Tacoma argues that its restrictions are narrowly drawn since they allow political signs to be posted for the duration of a political campaign. We disagree. The Tacoma ordinances restrict political expression by imposing durational limitations on the preelection posting of political campaign signs. Tacoma cites two cases for authority that preelection sign limitations have been upheld. Neither decision provides a satisfactory rationale for upholding such restrictions. In Huntington v. Estate of Schwartz, 63 Misc. 2d 836, 839, 313 N.Y.S.2d 918 (Dist. Ct. 1970), the court held that a 6-week limitation on political signs was within the scope of the municipality's police powers. The court found that the municipality could use or consider aesthetic considerations in applying such power. Cf. People v. Middlemark, 100 Misc. 2d 760, 763, 420 N.Y.S.2d 151 (Dist. Ct. 1979) (distinguished Huntington, holding that a similar political sign ordinance was unconstitutional because it made an impermissible distinction between political signs and other signs). In Ross v. Goshi, 351 F. Supp. 949, 955 (D. Hawaii 1972), the court upheld a 60-day restriction, stating only that the ordinance was a "proper balancing of the conflicting interests". We find these decisions unpersuasive since they lack a discussion of the First Amendment and equal protection considerations at issue. Other courts have held that preelection durational limitations on political campaign signs are unconstitutional. In Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982), the court held that the Antioch municipal ordinance, which banned the posting of temporary political signs everywhere in the city for all but a 60-day period before an election, unconstitutionally discriminated in the exercise of First Amendment rights in violation of the equal protection clause. The Antioch court viewed the ordinance as a general "ban" on political speech, with a temporary, 60-day suspension, prior to an election. Antioch, at 56. See also Van v. Travel Information Coun., supra at 416 (60-day limitation unnecessarily restrictive in light of the First Amendment interests involved and the State's interests sought to be advanced); Orazio v. North Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (ordinance which limited the posting of political wall signs to 6 weeks prior to an election was invalidated on equal protection grounds). See generally Blumoff, After Metromedia: Sign Controls and the First Amendment, 28 St. Louis U.L.J. 171, 194-96 (1984). [15] Tacoma's 60-day restriction, unlike the typical time, place, and manner restriction, does not attempt to determine whether and at what times the exercise of free speech rights is compatible or incompatible with the normal uses of a traditional forum or place. The Tacoma ordinances, like the ordinances in Antioch, Van, and Orazio, unnecessarily restrict the preelection posting of signs promoting the candidacy of certain individuals or advocating a certain viewpoint on an upcoming ballot proposition. Tacoma has not shown that its restrictive time period of 60 days, even if evenhandedly applied to all temporary signs, reasonably and adequately provides for the exercise of political speech. Before the City may impose durational limits or other restrictions on political speech to advance aesthetic interests, it must show that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic concerns with respect to its environment. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 60. Accord, Tauber v. Longmeadow, 695 F. Supp. 1358, 1362 (D. Mass. 1988). See also Metromedia, Inc. v. San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 528-31, 69 L. Ed. 2d 800, 101 S. Ct. 2882 (1981) (Brennan, J., concurring in judgment) (failure to provide adequate justification for a restriction on protected activity merits invalidation of the restriction). Tacoma has made no showing on the record that it is seriously and comprehensively addressing aesthetic or traffic safety concerns other than through the ordinances in question. While Tacoma is correct that the ordinances are not invalid simply because there may be some "imaginable alternative that might be less burdensome on speech", Ward, 491 U.S. at 797 (quoting United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689, 86 L. Ed. 2d 536, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985)), the ordinances fail to provide adequately for Collier's free speech rights. Given the preferred status accorded political speech, and the persuasive authority in other jurisdictions which have dealt with this issue, we conclude the Tacoma ordinances are not narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. In balancing the competing interests, we hold that Tacoma's regulatory interests in aesthetics and traffic safety, as demonstrated on the record, do not outweigh Collier's right to political speech. We depart from our decision in Lotze to the extent it conflicts with our decision in this case. Alternative Channels of Communication The third and final element of both the federal and state constitutional tests requires that a time, place, and manner restriction leave open ample alternative channels for communication. Ward, 491 U.S. at 791; Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234. The trial court found that Collier had not "sustained [his] burden of proof that the ordinances do not leave open . . . an alternative means of communication". Collier assigns error to the trial court's placement of the burden of proof on him. We agree with Collier. httn://srch.mrsc.ori?:8080/wacourts/DocView/sunremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0717.htm?hilite=collier:._. 4/1 R/2008 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA .Page 10 of 12 [16] Government may impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of speech, provided the restrictions meet the standards enunciated above. Because Tacoma seeks to uphold the ordinances as reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on political speech, it has the burden of meeting each element of the time, place, and manner test. We conclude the trial court erred in assigning Collier the burden of proving the "availability of alternative channels of communication", the third element of the time, place, and manner test. See Bering, 106 Wn.2d at 234; Ward, 491 U.S. at 791. That burden properly rests with Tacoma, and Tacoma has failed to meet it. [17] Both Tacoma and amici argue that politicians have numerous ways of expressing themselves through other media than the posting of signs. Collier does not dispute that he had the right to purchase radio and television time and to engage in direct mail. His argument is that these alternative modes of communication were effectively unavailable to him as an underfunded challenger. Based on our review of the record, we agree with Collier. In Collier's case, the yard sign was the most cost-effective, realistic method of increasing his name familiarity. Because means of political speech are not entirely fungible, the political yard sign offers special advantages to the candidate seeking public office. Political yard signs are relatively cost-effective and can be localized to a high degree. Antioch, 557 F. Supp. at 59 (citing Baldwin v. Redwood City, 540 F.2d 1360, 1368 (9th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 913 (1977)). In Col-lier's case, the issue is not whether "ample alternatives" are available, but whether they are practically available. Alternatives are not "alternatives" if they are far from satisfactory. Metromedia, 453 U.S. at 516. Thus, the "summary seizure of a political sign for even a few days can deprive the sign's owner of an important First Amendment liberty interest." Baldwin, 540 F.2d at 1374. Given the record before us, we conclude that Tacoma's restrictions on political sign posting did not afford Collier adequate alternative channels of communication. In summary, we concur with the trial court that the Tacoma ordinances are invalid time, place, and manner restrictions. Tacoma has failed to prove that its interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficiently compelling to justify the restrictions imposed on Collier's rights to political expression. Tacoma has also failed to prove that its restrictions left Collier ample alternative channels in which to communicate his message. We conclude, therefore, that Tacoma's durational limitation on the preelection posting of political campaign signs violates the free speech provisions of both the Washington and the United States Constitutions. III Tacoma claims the trial court erred in declaring both ordinances unconstitutional in their entirety. We agree. The record indicates that the parties' dispute focused on section (1) of TMC 2.05.275, rather than on the ordinance as a whole. No issue was raised as to section (2) (size limitations), or section (3) (requiring consent of private property owners). Similarly, only those portions of TMC 6.03.070 and .080 that affect political expression are at issue. [18] As a general rule "only the part of an enactment that is constitutionally infirm will be invalidated, leaving the rest intact." National Advertising Co. v. Orange, 861 F.2d 246, 249 (9th Cir. 1988). See Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684, 94 L. Ed. 2d 661, 107 S. Ct. 1476 (1987). We hold unconstitutional only those provisions of the ordinances which impermissibly restrict the scope of political speech through limitations on the time and place for the preelection posting of political signs. Tacoma's interests in aesthetics and traffic safety are sufficient to justify reasonable, content-neutral regulation of the noncommunicative aspects of political signs, such as size, spacing, and consent of the private property owner. We are sensitive to the need for judicial restraint in intruding on the exercise of the police power by local governments to regulate land uses in the interest of public health, safety, and welfare. Consequently, our holding does not compel a change to postevent removal requirements as long as such requirements are reasonable and apply to all temporary events, such as political campaigns, home sales and residential renting. While preelection political speech interests may outweigh a municipality's regulatory interests in a given case, those same interests are not present postevent and may be outweighed by a municipality's demonstrated interests in aesthetics or traffic safety. See Baldwin v. Redwood City, supra (10-day postelection removal requirement upheld). IV Collier assigns error to the trial court's holding that the "special circumstances" of trial publicity and representation by the ACLU preclude an award of attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Collier also requests additional fees for the purposes of this appeal. [19] A party prevailing in an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 may recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to 42 http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocV iew/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d073 7.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737,P.2d 1046, COLLIER v. TACOMA Page 11 of 12 U.S.C. § 1988. Jacobsen v. Seattle, 98 Wn.2d 668, 675, 658 P.2d 653 (1983). A prevailing plaintiff"'should ordinarily recover an attorney's fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust."' Jacobsen, at 675-76 (quoting Newman v. Piggie Park Enters., Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 402, 19 L. Ed. 2d 1263, 88 S. Ct. 964(1968)). [20, 21] In the instant case, the trial court ruled in favor of plaintiffs Collier and Beritich. They are"prevailing parties"for the purposes of the statute. The trial court, however, identified publicity gained by the suit and ACLU representation as "special circumstances" which warranted denial of an award of attorney fees. We disagree. In Runyon v. Fasi, 762 F. Supp. 280 (D. Hawaii 1991), the plaintiff requested attorney fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 in a factually similar action challenging the constitutionality of a city ordinance which prohibited outdoor political signs. The Runyon court addressed the identical issue of public service representation as a "special circumstance". We agree with the Runyon court's conclusion that the fact that the prevailing party was represented by a public service firm or association funded by public funds is irrelevant. See Runyon, 762 F. Supp. at 286 (citing Watkins v. Mobile Housing Bd., 632 F.2d 565 (5th Cir. 1980)). As to the issue of trial publicity, Tacoma urges this court to accept the trial court's denial of attorney fees as a proper use of discretion. The trial court, however, made no finding that Collier used the judicial system to gain publicity for political purposes. Tacoma argues that should this court reverse the trial court on the issue of attorney fees, the court should limit the amount of attorney fees to reflect work performed from the point after which the complaint was amended. Tacoma reasons that until respondents filed the amended complaint which cited 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as statutory authority for attorney fees, Tacoma had no notice of any claim for attorney fees. We disagree. Tacoma had notice of respondents' claim for attorney fees with the filing of Collier's original complaint. Collier's amendment of his complaint to add an additional source of authority for obtaining attorney fees does not alter the fact that Tacoma had sufficient notice to prepare an adequate response to Collier's request for attorney fees. The final issue to resolve is whether the requested fees were reasonable. The trial court found that the plaintiffs' attorney had spent 99.3 hours in the prosecution of this action, and "said hours have been expended reasonably and necessarily in view of the result obtained." The trial court also found that the plaintiffs' attorney's hourly rate of$150 was reasonable compensation for the work performed. These findings were uncontroverted. We will not disturb these findings on appeal. CONCLUSION The Tacoma ordinances impermissibly restrict Collier's right to political expression in violation of article 1, section 5 of the Washington Constitution, and the first and fourteenth amendments to the United States Constitution. We hold unconstitutional those portions of the Tacoma ordinances that impose durational limitations on the preelection posting of political signs. We remand for a determination of a reasonable attorney fee, to include a determination of attorney fees on appeal. UTTER, DOLLIVER, SMITH, and JOHNSON, JJ., concur. DURHAM, J. (concurring) ❑ For 15 years, this court has wrestled with the difficult concept of independent state constitutional analysis. The circumstances under which it should be applied has been the subject of many divided opinions and considerable acrimony. Finally, in 1986, this court unanimously agreed on a list of six nonexclusive criteria to aid in determining when state constitutional analysis is appropriate. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808, 76 A.L.R.4th 517 (1986). Shortly thereafter, in State v. Wethered, 110 Wn.2d 466, 472, 755 P.2d 797 (1988), we unequivocally stated the necessity of employing the Gunwall criteria: Wethered urges this court to follow our holding in State v. Lavaris, 99 Wn.2d 851, 664 P.2d 1234 (1983) under Const. art. 1, § 9 and cites State v. Simpson, 95 Wn.2d 170, 622 P.2d 1199 (1980) as general authority that the Washington Constitution can be and has been interpreted as more protective of individual rights than the United States Constitution. He fails to use the Gunwall interpretive principles to assist this court . . .. By failing to discuss at a minimum the six criteria mentioned in Gunwall, he requests us to develop without benefit of argument or citation of authority the "adequate and independent state grounds" to support his assertions. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L. Ed. 2d 1201, 103 S. Ct. 3469 (1983). We decline to do so consistent with our policy not to consider matters neither timely nor sufficiently argued by the parties. In re Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 616, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986). (Italics mine.) Since Gunwall and Wethered, over 70 Washington appellate decisions have acknowledged our rule barring http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocView/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d0737.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 121 Wn.2d 737, P.2d 1046, COLLIER v.TACOMA Page 12 of 12 consideration of state constitutional issues absent briefing of the Gunwall factors. E.g., State v. Greenviobd, 120 Wn.2d 585, 614, 845 P.2d 971 (1993); Tellevik v. 31641 West Rutherford St., 120 Wn.2d 68, 77, 838 P.2d 111, 845 P.2d 1325 (1992); State v. Rodriguez, 65 Wn. App. 409, 414 n.1, 828 P.2d 636, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1019 (1992). In fact, one noteworthy commentator has explained that: Assistance from counsel in interpreting state constitutional provisions is vitally important. Wethered directs counsel to bring the constitutional issues into as sharp a focus as they possibly can by requiring them to fashion a state constitutional argument that addresses textual language, constitutional and common law history,structural differences, and local concerns. Our decision in blethered reaffirmed that the criteria are a necessary starting point for a discussion between bench and bar about the meaning of a state constitutional provision. (Italics mine.) Justice Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in State Constitutionalism: Washing- ton's Experience, 65 Temp. L. Rev. 1153, 1162 (1992). This same commentator has recognized that "Gunwall functions as a procedural threshold for considering state constitutional claims". (Italics mine.) Utter, at 1165. Today, however, 8 years of painfully crafted jurisprudence is cast aside in a footnote: "[b]ecause Bering [v. Share, 106 Wn.2d 212, 721 P.2d 918 (1986)] is a post-Gunwall case without Gunwall analysis, it might be construed not to call for such an analysis. For this reason, in this case only, we will not require a separate analysis of the nonexclusive factors in Gunwall to reach the state constitutional issue." Majority, at 747-48 n.5. This reasoning completely ignores the Wethered rule, which was adopted 2 years after Bering. Moreover, putting aside the majority's attempt to limit its own case to the facts, there is no principled way to keep this exception from swallowing the rule. Bering was not unique. There were several cases between Gunwall and Wethered that engaged in a state constitutional exegesis without the benefit of the Gunwall factors. See, e.g., Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wn.2d 454, 755 P.2d 775 (1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7); O'Day v. King Cy., 109 Wn.2d 796, 801-02, 749 P.2d 142 (1988) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 5); State v. Stroud, 106 Wn.2d 144, 720 P.20:1436 (1986) (plurality opinion) (interpreting Const. art. 1, § 7). As such,the majority's analysis only serves to cast doubt on a wide body of law under Const. art. 1, §§ 5 and 7 requiring briefing of the Gunwall factors. If, indeed, it is the intention of a majority of this court to cast aside the Gunwall/Wethered principles, it should be done forthrightly and with reasoned analysis. «9» «9» It is so that"[t]his court has a duty, where feasible,"to consider state constitutional analysis. (Italics mine.) Majority, at 745. However, the case cited in the lead opinion for this proposition, O'Day, 109 Wn.2d at 801-02 (citing State v. Coe, 101 Wn.2d 364, 373-74, 679 P.2d 353 (1984)),was decided prior to the Wethered rule. In fact,Wethered specifically recognized that this language from O'Day and Coe was limited by, and subject to,briefing of the Gunwall factors.See 110 Wn.2d at 471-72. Ironically, the majority's result in negating the Tacoma sign ordinance could be reached under federal law analysis. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, _U.S._, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5, 112 S. Ct. 1846 (1992) (both plurality and dissent would require strict scrutiny for content-based, but viewpoint-neutral speech); Antioch v. Candidates' Outdoor Graphic Serv., 557 F. Supp. 52 (N.D. Cal. 1982) (law banning posting of political signs except for 60 days prior to election violated equal protection clause). It is only because of the applicability of federal law that I concur in the result. ANDERSEN, C.J., and BRACHTENBACH, J., concur with DUR-HAM, J. http://srch.mrsc.org:8080/wacourts/DocV iew/supremearchive/121 wn2d/121 wn2d073 7.htm?hilite=collier;... 4/18/2008 To: Port Townsend&Jefferson County Leader LEGAL NOTICE Publish one(1)time: Wednesday,April 23,2008 Please use 7-point font. Bill: Jefferson County Department of Community Development 621 Sheridan St.,Port Townsend,WA 98368 Account No. #15832 Staff Contact: Jeanie On,Planning Clerk,(360)379-4488 Date: April 16,2008 NOTICE OF PUBLIC HEARING BEFORE THE JEFFERSON COUNTY PLANNING COMMISSION REGARDING A PROPOSED UDC AMENDMENT NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the Jefferson County Planning Commission will hold a public hearing on Wednesday,May 7,2008,beginning at 6:30 PM at the WSU Community Learning Center, Spruce Room, Shold Business Park,201 West Patison,Port Hadlock. The purpose of the public hearing is to hear testimony regarding proposed changes to the Srse,found at JCC 18.30.150, • - . . _. v^lnr) ,rec,wA. 'C Lu n3 cotrvkzA.A4 L)../Li For further information please contact the Dept. of Community Development, 621 Sheridan Street, Port Townsend,WA 98368, (360)379-4450,or Karen Barrows at kbarrows a,co jefferson.wa.us. Page l of i Karen Barrows From: David Alvarez Sent: Friday, April 04, 2008 10:29 AM To: John Austin; Phil Johnson; David Sullivan Cc: Frank Gifford; Lorna Delaney; Leslie Locke; Al Scalf; Stacie Hoskins; Karen Barrows; Julie Matthes Subject: Sign Ordinance Memo-minor correction Colleagues: The last paragraph on page 2 of the memo refers to the need for a BoCC public hearing. No need for a BoCC public hearing to correct typos, for example. There are no circumstances where a PC public hearing is not needed. David Alvarez From: David Alvarez Sent: Friday, April 04, 2008 10:03 AM To: John Austin; Phil Johnson; David Sullivan Cc: Frank Gifford; Lorna Delaney; Leslie Locke; Al Scalf; Stacie Hoskins; Karen Barrows; Julie Matthes Subject: Sign Ordinance Colleagues: Here is a NOT-CONFIDENTIAL memo on the status of the amendments to the Sign Ordinance prompted by the Belenski lawsuit. Karen: Note the conclusion reached in this memo is quite different than what you and I talked about on the phone. David Alvarez. Ext. 219 4/4/2008 Agenda Request 10:30 a.m. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS AGENDA REQUEST TO: Board of County Commissioners Dennis Richards,County Administrator FROM: Al Scalf,Director,Department of Community Development(DCD) Stacie Hoskins,Planning Manager(DCD) Karen Barrows,Assistant Planner,Long-Range Planning(LRP) DATE: May 27,2008 SUBJECT: Request for regular agenda item for DCD staff report and Planning Commission recommendation on JCC 18.30.150,development standards for signs STATEMENT OF ISSUE: The Department of Community Development Long-Range Planning Division is requesting that the Board of County Commissioners(BoCC)review the staff report and Planning Commission recommendations on a UDC amendment proposal for JCC 18.30.150,which regulates signs. The staff recommendation and the Planning Commission recommendation differ. The staff response to the Planning Commission recommendation is consolidated into this request. Attachments: 1) Planning Commission recommendations(including a minority report)from May 15,2008 2) DCD staff report and recommendation from April 23,2008 3) Planning Enabling Act:RCW 37.70.560 and RCW 36.70.640 4) Staff proposed line-in/line-out code revision 5) Minutes from Board of County Commissioners meeting on February 20,2007 6) Minutes from Planning Commission meeting on April 18,2007 7) Legal memorandum from David Alvarez dated April 4,2008 8) Collier v.City of Tacoma ANALYSIS/STRATEGIC GOALS : The following findings of fact inform this issue: 1) Section 18.30.150 of the Jefferson County Code regulates signs. Paragraph(2)of this Section designates signs that are exempt from the provisions of this Section. Subsection(f)states,"Personal signs on private property displaying personal messages such as"yard sale"or"no trespassing"or political messages not to exceed eight square feet;" 2) On October 13,2006,Clallam County Superior Court Order 06-2-00894-7 enjoined Jefferson County from enforcing Section 18.30.150(2Xf)of the Jefferson County Code. 3) On February 20,2007,the Jefferson County Board of County Commissioners discussed the issue,and, using a provision of the Planning and Enabling Act called a"Board Initiated Control"found in RCW 36.70.640(please see attached),decided that it was in the public interest to amend the code regulating signs contained in JCC 18.30.150. The Board then voted unanimously to forward the issue to the Planning Commission for review. 4) On April 18,2007,staff presented the suggested revisions to the Planning Commission,and explained the chronology of the process. 5) On April 18,2007,the Planning Commission discussed the issue,heard public comment,and voted to accept staff's recommendation to exempt political signs from size limitations. 6) Following legal review it was determined that the Planning Commission must hold a public hearing. 7) On April 23,2008,in anticipation of the Planning Commission public hearing,staff published its report and 5 2c-c C, t (ACLU • Agenda Request 10:30 a.m. recommendation. The staff recommendation is that the amendment to JCC 18.30.150 should consist only of exempting political signs from size limitations,and that a separate subsection JCC 18.30.150(2)(g) should be created for political signs. The proposed language is as follows:"18.30.150(2)(g) Political messages"(please see attached). 8) The Planning Commission held a public hearing on the development standards for signs on May 7,2008, during which it heard public testimony. After the public hearing was closed,the Planning Commission deliberated and formulated recommendations(please see attached). The Planning Commission recommendation differs from the staff recommendation dated April 23,2008.L tall has the following concerns with the Planning Commission recommendation: 1) Real estate signs are notpxempt under the Plannin• Commission recommended code lan•ua•e. Real {Deleted: longer estate skins are a commercial sign. Without an exemption,the amended code does not have any applicable criteria for review of real estate signs. 2) Potential legal problems exist:for example,in the Washington Supreme Court case Collier v.City of Tacoma(used as a basis for legal authority and precedent in the Clallam County Superior Court case enjoining Jefferson County from enforcing JCC 18.30.150(2)(f)),it was determined that signs could not be regulated based on content. While the Planning Commission articulated during deliberations a desire to render its proposed revisions"content-neutral,"the phrase"event-based signs"in its proposed subsection (2)(g)would require a person to read the sign in order to determine whether or not it is exempt. This would appear to contradict the conclusions in both the Collier and Clallam County cases. 3) Public Works does not allow signs in the right of way(ROW). The exemption allowed by the Planning Commission for the"6 square feet in the ROW"conflicts with Public Works requirements. 4) Standards for administration are unclear with respect to non-commercial signs exceeding 32 square feet, Deleted:: When non-commercial signs exceed 32 sot,the existing Unified Development Code,JCC Title 18,and _ Deleted:if not exempt Planning Commission proposed language lack any,standards for review, The Building Official has determined a building permit is required for free-standing signs exceeding 32 sq.ft or six feet(6')in height -- Deleted:what to insure consistency with the International Building Code,as adopted in JCC Title 15. No reference or {Deleted:are to be used for review? permit requirement is necessary in the UDC to confirm the safety of a structure with regard to the building code. In other words,planners do not need to oversee that a building permit is required or approved under the authority of the Building Official. Staff maintains the recommendation detailed in the DCD staff report and recommendation dated April 23,2008. FISCAL IMPACT: No fiscal impact is expected as a result of amending JCC 18.30.150. RECOMMENDATION: I DCD staff recommends that the BoCC,direct staff to schedule a public hearing on JCC 18.30.150,development Deleted:adopt the staff standards for Signs. recommendation of April 23,2008; however,given that staff and the Planning Commission recommendations differ,staff further REVIEWED BY: recommends that the BoCC first hold Dennis Richards,County Administrator Date Page 1 of 1 Karen Barrows From: Stacie Hoskins Sent: Monday, May 12, 2008 4:45 PM To: Karen Barrows Cc: Al Scalf Subject: RE: draft Signs PC rec. Hi Karen, Thanks for calling attention to your questions. 1. You could email Peter to see if he's comfortable signing. If not, he could direct the vice chair to sign it. 2. Yes 3. That's fine. Format: I'd suggest breaking up the memo to subsections such as: Proposal Background Findings Recommendation Thanks, Stacie From: Karen Barrows Sent: Friday, May 09, 2008 2:48 PM To: Stacie Hoskins Cc: Al Scalf Subject: draft Signs PC rec. Hi Stacie, Attached for your review is a draft recommendation letter on signs from the Planning Commission (which I thought I should complete before beginning work on the agenda request/staff report to the Board). I should call your attention to three points pertaining to the draft(the first of which I addressed to you in an earlier email): 1) Who should sign the letter? 2) I noticed that JCC 18.30.150(2)(i), recommended by the Planning Commission for deletion, reads differently in the line-in/line-out version in their packets than in the existing code, due to the deletion of(2)(h) in the line-in/line-out version; I assume it is o.k. to leave it reading "real estate signs" in the recommendation letter since that is what the PC intended to delete; 3) I dated the letter May 13, 2008, since that is the soonest I thought it would be approved and signed. (Sorry for the flurry of emails today; I'm trying to ensure that there are fewer loose ends on Monday when I'm not here.) Thank you. Karen 5/13/2008 Page 1 of 1 Karen Barrows From: Stacie Hoskins Sent: Friday, May 09, 2008 10:47 AM To: Karen Barrows Subject: sign agenda request Hi Karen, The next step for the UDC amendment regarding signs is to prepare a consolidated agenda request and staff report that addresses staff concerns with the Planning Commission recommendation. Examples where we differed from the PC recommendation you may read to obtain guidance include the Brinnon Master Planned Resort and the recent 2008 CPA Suggested Amendment agenda requests. I propose staff recommend the Board adopt the staff recommendation from your staff report dated April 23, 2008. Please elaborate in the staff report on concerns with the PC recommendation. They include: • Real estate signs are no longer exempt • Belinski's concerns: legality • Public Works does not allow signs in the right of way. The exemption for the 6 sq ft in ROW conflicts with their requirements. • Administration of signs exceeding 32 sq ft. If not exempt, what standards are they reviewed for? I look forward to seeing the draft. Thanks Karen, Stacie 5/9/2008 Page 1of2 ,K Rose- arroll From: Leslie Locke Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2008 9:08 AM To: Phil Johnson; David Alvarez; David Sullivan; John Austin; Al Scalf; Jeanie Orr; Stacie Hoskins; Dennis Richards; Roseann Carroll Subject: FW: Sign Ordinance/Bad Faith From:jeffbocc Sent: Thursday, May 08, 2008 8:02 AM To: Leslie Locke Subject: FW: Sign Ordinance/ Bad Faith From: MBelenski @aol.com [mailto:MBelenski @ aol.com] Sent: Wednesday, May 07, 2008 11:17 PM To: jeffbocc; MBelenski @aol.com Subject: Sign Ordinance/ Bad Faith Dear BoCC.... I just got home from the Planning Commission meeting involving the Sign Ordinance and what I witnessed was more Bad Faith. The Planning Commission ignored staff recommendations and a Planning Commission member named"Tom",who stated that he is also a lawyer, provided a handout with his recommendations. He supposedly came up with it after talking to people. I'm not going to comment in detail to you about the Planning Commission recommendations because I have written you letters, provided public comment at your meetings and obtained a permanent injunction (Clallam County Superior Court Cause#06-2- 00894-7), involving my Constitutionally Protected Right of Free Speech, and you ignore what is said and do as you please as you violate my Rights. Even after the Court issued the permanent injunction the County continued to hand out public records to the public stating political signs were limited to 8 square feet, which violated the Court's Order. Now, for example, the Planning Commission changed JCC 18.30.150 2(g)to read: "Event based signs in a public right of way measuring less than or equal to 6 square feet provided that such signs must be removed no later than 7 days following the event." The Planning Commission determined a political sign is an "event based sign". First, this is unconstitutionally vague because it would not be apparent to a person of average intelligence that a political sign is an "event based sign". A garage sale sign or a sign advertising days the Jefferson County Fair would be held, are the types of signs that would come to the minds of most people. Further, JCC 18.30.450 2(g) is not content neutral. An enforcement person is required to read the sign in order to determine if the sign violates the Code. Therefore, JCC 18.30.150 2(g) is not content neutral. If the sign is a"Event based sign" it will be removed. If it is not an "Event based sign"then it is allowed to stay. "Tom"states he ran his changes by DPA Alvarez and implied they were acceptable to DPA Alvarez. Is this correct? The changes submitted by"Tom", apparently found acceptable by DPA Alvarez, and adopted by the Planning Commission, do not even come close to complying with the mandates of Collier v. City of Tacoma and the Court Cases cited therein. And who did "Tom"talk to about his changes to the Sign Ordinance? Did"Tom"talk to Commissioner Sullivan and/or Commissioner Johnson to get their input regarding changes to the Sign Ordinance ? Both Commissioners think large campaign signs are a blight on the community. Didn't Commissioners Sullivan and Johnson appoint"Tom"to the Planning Commission ? 5/8/2008 Page 2 of 2 Tht changes to the Sign Ordinance violate my Constitutionally Protected Right of Free Speech. Mike Belenski Wondering what's for Dinner Tonight?Get new twists on family favorites at AOL Food. 5/8/2008