HomeMy WebLinkAbout042Michelle Farfan
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Philip Hunsucker
Friday, February 09, 201-8 2:26 PM
Patty Charnas; Nicole Allen; Michelle Farfan
FW: Pleasant Harbor MPR Draft development regulations
Hunsucker memo 2-9.pdf
All:
Please add these comments on the DR from Carol Morris, Esq. to the public comments. Thanks.
Philip
Philip C. Hunsucker
Chief Civil Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Le ffe rs o n County Pros ecuti ng Atto rn ey's O ffice
P.O. Box 1220,PortTownsend, WA 98368
Ph: 360-385-9180 Fax: 360-385-0073
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From : Ca rol Morris Ima ilto :ca rol_a_morris@ msn.com]
Sent: Friday, February 09, 201-8 2:05 PM
To: Ph il i p H u nsucker <PH unsucker@co.jefferson.wa. us>
Subject: Pleasant Harbor MPR Draft development regulations
Please see the attached.
Carol Morris, Mords Law, P.C,
3304 Rosedale Street N.W., Suite 200
Gig Harbor, WA 98335
(253) 8s1-s090
F: (360) 8s0-1099
carol@carolmorislaw.com
Website: carolmorrislaw.com
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1
Morris Law p.C.
MEMORANDUM
DATE:
TO:
X"ROM:
Febnrary 9,2018t
Phillip Hunzucker, Civil Prosecutor, Jefferson County
Carol Morris, Monis [aw, P.C.
RE:Dreft development regulations - Pleasant Harbor Master Planned Resort
Version updated l2l l0l 17
The County's website provides notice of an upcoming public hearing on the draft development
agr€ement for Pleasant Harbor. However, nothing in this notice provides any information about
the prqpose of this public hearing. Does the Cormty plan to approve the developnent
agreement? What is the proposed action?
The County needs to carefully consider the timing of the adoption of the development
regulations and approval ofthe dwelopment agreemenl Development agreernents ale
authorized under RCW 36.708.170 - 210. RCW 36.708.170(1) provides that "a development
agr€ement shall be consisteNrt with the applicable development regulations adopted by a locat
government planning under [the Crrowth Management Act]." Jefrerson County plans under
GT{A.
It is impossible to determine whether or not the development agreement is consistent with the
applicable development regulations, if they haven't been adopted. The County doesn't explain
whethe,r it plans to adopt the development agreement first or concument with the proposed
dwelopment regulations. To make rnatters worse, the County doesn't even havd one version of
the dwelopmeirt regulations for the public to review. There ae two different versions (one
proposed by staffand another prcposed by the Planning Commission).
The County's disilibution of two different versions of dwelopnent regulations to the public, as
well as a development agreement which purports to inolude the development regulations in a
blaok exhibit violatcs due process and firndamental faimess, Glaspey & Sons, Inc. v. Conrad 83
t I prepared another memo dated Febnrry 7,2018. This memo supersedes that ealier memo. Sorry for the
inconvenience
3304 Rosedale StestN.W., Suite 200, Gig Hafto, WA 98335
Pbone: 253-851-5090 Fax: 360-850-1099 Emaik oarol@carolmorrislaw.com
MEMO2-8-18
Wn.2d 707,712,521P.2d ll73 (1974). Providing a 60 day comment period doesn't solve this
problem.
Here are my comments on the l2ll0tl7 draft of the development regulations prepared by the
County staff:
17.60.020: *The regulations in this title shall be known as the Pleasant Harbor Master Planned
Resort Code, ..." The *ti.le'is Title 17, which includes more than the Pleasant Harbor Mast€r
Ptanned Resort Code, it also includes the Port Ludlow MPR It appears that the County has
divided up the Title into Articles, so if Port Ludlow MPR is Article I, then it should be stated
here that the Pleasant Harbor regulations in chapters 17.60,17.65,17.70,17,75,17.80 and 17.85
are in Article II of this Title.
17.60.030: The former language stated thatthe purpose ofthis chapter was to set forth
developme,lrt regulations that comply with and are consistent with the Comprehensive Plan. The
language has been changed in a way that makes no sense: "The purpose . . . is to regulate land
development uses that comply with and are consistent with the Jefferson County Compr,ehe,nsive
Plan for future developme,nt . . ." So, does this mean that these regulations only apply to those
'tses" that are consiste,nt with the Comp Plan? It doesn't apply and can't be enforced where the
'lrse" is inconsistent?
17.60.M0: Here, it states that the Master Plan for Pleasant Harbor consists of: (l) regulations
(the ones inthis chapter?); (2) the conditions andrequirements of Ordfuunce 01-0128-08; (3)
Final Environmental Impact Statements (how many are there? There is no ide,ntiSing
informdion here, like the dates ofthe EIS's or what they cover); (a) Final Supple,mental hpast
Statement (agairU there is no identiSing informatiorL no dates); (5) maps (uthichmaps?); (Q
mitigation measures (in what? The unidentified EIS's and FSIS?); and the Development
Agegment. This vague language does not provide sufficient information for the public to
understand what applies to this development - and it is too vague for the Corxrty to enforce
against the developer.
ln Section 17.60.060, there is another list of the codes, regulations, etc. that apply to the Pleasant
Harbor MPR. This list is more detailed and includes additional regulations. Why are these two
sections (17.60.040 and .060) different?
17.60.050: The provisions of this title apply to all *land use actions and siting of infrastructure
..." Thetre are no definitions.in the County's code for *land use astions" and "siting of
infrasmcture." A definition is needed so thatthere is no confirsion inthe futurc about
applicability. The public shouldn't have to guess about the situations that will tigger
e,nforcement ofcertain codes based on ambiguous language.
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MEMO 2-8-18
17.6t0.060: Here, the County states that "any land distubrng activity" must comply with ottrer
titles of the Code, and various other documents. If there is some reason to distinguish betwen
the undefined *land use actions" in 17.60.050 and the *land disturbing activity" in 17.60.060,
why isn't the refere,nce to Title 18 of the Jefferson County Code included in 17.60.050? My
point is that the developer must comply with cbapter 18.35 JCC, Land Divisions, to divide the
prop€rty prior to any sale, lease or tansfer of any parcel or lot. Division of land is not a *land
disturbing activity." (See, 18.10.120.)
Although Tifle l8 is mcntioned hene, the procedure in chapter 18.15 JCC doesn't contemplate
any zuMivisions, short plats, or binding site ptans in a MPR. (Ihe Planning Commission's drafr
mentioned a binding site plan, but this appears to have been rcrnoved in the staffversion of the
development regulations.)
It is stated that '\r,here conflicts occur bet\ileen the provisions of this title and other applicable
code provisions or other regulations, the more restrictive sball apply." Are the documents list€d
in I tbrough 4 covered by this? They are not all codes or regulations.
17.60.06i0: Why were the oremptions deleted? Ifthey were deleted because'tt is confusing and
potentially difficult to interpref," (staffcomment on matix), I have the same corrcem wittl 050
and 060 above, unless the activities that this "title" tiggers are defined.
17.60.070: Where did the 890 residential unit cap come from? More terms are used herp, and .
they need to be defined so tbat this can be enforwd. What is a "short term visitor
accommodation unit? Is that the same as a "short-terrr rental?" There are no definitions of these
tsms.and they will be difficult to enforce.
17.60.080 and 17.60.090: Here, the County is establishing new regulations for legatly
nonconforming uses and sfiuctutps. Given that the County has already adopted regulations for
nonconforuring uses and stnrctures in Section l8.21.26},and incorporated Tifle 18 into this
chapter or Article, the County is creating confusion abotrt which apply and how tbnnicting
language must be interpreted. Has the County inserted these regulations because only *land
aisturUing activities" (in 17.60.060) have to comply with Sectionl8.20.260?
17.60.100: Why are "sfructures" exernpt?
17.65;010: The "purpose" section in a particular zoning disfiict is zupposed to elrplain the
pupose of the distict For example, in a residential dishict, it might be: "This f,-l Tsning
district is intended to accommodate apattern of land use that is predominately single-family."
The purpose section is needed for each zoning disnid becatse the development regulations
cannot list every single tlpe of use that may be proposed in the future. When a property oumer
proposes a particular use that is not listed in the development regulations as either a'lermittd"
q'conditional" or'lrohibited" use in tbat district, the Planning Diregtor is required to iszue an
administrative interpretation of the code and make a decision whether the proposed use is
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MEMO 2.E.18
compatible with the pUE of the distrist and the other uses allowed in the distict If ttre
County doesn't describe the purpose of the district" then only the permitted uses provide the basis
for the administrative interpretation
This problem is exacerbated here, because the tlpes of uses'!€rmitted" (there are no
"conditional" or "prohibitcd" uses) arc widcly different in nature. As a result, it is possible tlnt
the Planning Staffcould allow any twe of use not listed as oermitted. For example, the land use
impa6,ts of a tavern are totally different from a more sensitive use like a single family home, yet
they are permitted outright in the sarne zone.
17.60.020(5): Here, 'lublic facilities" are permitted outright (there arc no conditional uses
liste{ which would allow the decision-maker to address needed mitigation m, aznne tbat also
allows sensitive residential uses). The County has procedures for conditional use permits in Tifle
18, so the question is why all uses, even the most intense, are permitted outight in the same zone
as single family uses.
The definition of "public facilities" in JCC 18.10.160 demonstates that no one bas spent any
1i6s \inking about whether or not these uses are compatible with each other or the other
allowed uses in this zone. (The definition includes: 'Tacilities serving the general public, streets,
roads, ferries, sidewalks, str€et and road lighting systems, traffic signals, cornmunity water
systems, community sewage treafue rt systems, storm water systems, park and recreational
facilities, libraries, fire and police stations, emerg€ncy medical services, municipal and county
buildings, pow€r houses, cemetsries and public schools." In other words, the developer could
build single family homes irnmediatcly adjacent to a community sewage teatment system. Or, a
county jail (county building) could be built right next to a public school.
ln,Niemi, et al. v. Northwest Cascade, et al.,Pierce County Superior Court Cause No. 16-2-
11216-7 (currenfly pending), a class action suit was brought by owners of single family homes
surrounding a FloHawks facility which collects and tueats sewage from honey buckets. Even
ttpugh the City of Pacific imposed numerou, conditions on the Flollawks f,acilrty tbrough a
conditional use permi! it is alleged to have released odors, gases and firmes which substantially
interfere with the property oumctrs' enjoyrnent of their properties. The neighborc ane suing,
a[eeing nuisance, negligence and heqpass as a result of the activities of this facility, which is
located in close proximity to single family uses. This lawsuit was filed even after installaion of
upgrades to the odor suppressing equipment.
In (6), the County hao allowed, as uses permitted oufight, "oth€,r similar uses consisteirt with the
puqpose of this zone and MPR as determined bythe Deparhent of Community Development."
Again, 17.65.010, which is zupposed to describe the 'lurpose" ofthis zone, does not include any
purpose stdeNnent. It only describes the uses that are allowed in the zone, and these uses are
entensive and varied. The County doesn't even require that ttre most intense uses obtain a
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MEMO 2-8-18
conditional use permit, so that the impacts of the use can be mitigaed on a site-specific, ad hoc
basis.
If the County allows every possible use of property other than heary industial in this zone, what
does the Commmity Development nepartn€nt need to do wtren the dweloper prcposes an
intense use not listed in 17.67.020? Nothing, other than to rubber stamp an approval. We
question why there ar€ no conditional uses in the MPR zoning disuicts, when the County
actually implerrents a conditional use permit process in other areas ofthe County.
17.55.030: Here, the County is allowing the developer to build a building of any height as long
as the developer buys a ladder tnrck or other equipment for the Fire Distict A variance isn't
even required, so the adjacent property owne( will have no notice of the developer's receip of a
blilding permit to construot a structure that will dwarf others in the neighborhood. The fact that
the Fire Disfiict may need additional equipmenttoput out afire in abuilding over a certain
height is not the only negaive land use impact resulting from excessive height, especially
adjacent to singile family uses.
17.55.040: So that there is no question thd no consideration whatsoever was give,n to the
penrcns who would evenfually visit, live and work in this zone, all yard and setbacks have been
eliminated. 'We aszume that this has been added in order to eliminate any restrictions on the
developer's ability to manimize its investment.
17.70.010: Here, there actually is apurpose section. It also states: "The dimensions ofthe
lvPR-0SR zone do not preclude applicable buffers and setbacks as required underthis title or
under Title l8 Jefferson County Code." However, in Section l7.75.A4O,it states that "there are
no yard or setback pncvisions int€rnal to the MPR-IVw zorte," but'trew stnrctures located within
the shoreline shall oomply with the setbaok requirements ofthe" SMP. Does this mean that there
are setbacks for new constnrc'tion in this zone or not?
17.75.010: The purpose ofthe MPR-VM zone is 4garn, not stated. Instead, there is a summary
of the tlpes of uses allowe4 totally eliminating any mention of the fact tbat there are few
differcnces in the uses permitted in this zone and the MPR4R zfine.
17.75.0202 Again, my concern is that all list€d us€s arc permitt€d outight in the MPR-tvfV zone.
Thsr€ are two prohibited uses, but the Countyhas not classified any us6 as a "@nditional use."
A conditional use is not a permitted use. It is listed in the zone as a use that may be made within
amnu,but only upon the grant of a conditional use permit by the Hearing Exanriner or other
decision-maker (after a hearing). The reason certain us€s are permitted only upon the grant of a
conditional use pqrmit, is because there are c€rtain uses that rnay be desirable, but are not
completely consistent with the permitt€d uses. Therefore, the zoning code requires that the
decision-maker evaluate the proposed developme,nt under certain criteria for approval, which
allorus the decision-maker to consider the fasts relating to the property and the proposed use.
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MEMO2-8-18
For examFle, schools are not normally allowed in a single family resideutial zone as apermitted
use. They may be allowed with a conditional use permit which would consider wtrether the
piece of property for the school is large enough to absorb all of the land use impacts relating to a
school, such as noise, parking and taffic circulation.
It is difficult to understand why the County would allow a marina as apermitted use, not a
conditional use, in this zone. While it does appear that the developer would have to obtain a
shoreline permit for the marina, it is diffrcult to say whetlrcr the shoreline permit would address
the impacts of a marina tha would normally be addressed under znurgregulations.
The words "overwater strucfir€s" have be.en eliminated here (17.75.020(l). However, in
17.75.020(4), there is a reference to how "oven rater buildings" shall be consfiucted. Does this
mean that "ovenilater strustures" or "ovenilater buildings" can or can't be constnrcted in this
zone?
Agai& 17.75.020(10) allows trses of wery type and description, rlany of which are not
compatible with each other or the residential uses allowed outight n 17 .7 5.020Q).
Same oommelrt with regard to 17,75.(120(12). There is no purpose section, only a summary of
the uses allowed in this zone. Thereforc, any tlpe of tue can be allowe4 as long as the
Departrrent of Commtrnity Developme,nt approves. There fie no criteria for DCD to use in such
approvals.
yhrt is the procedure for the County to make the decision whether or not a use is allowed in a
particular zoning distict? I could not find any procefine for an adrninisffiive code
inrcrpretation. State law requires that ttre City adopt this procedure: "As part of its prcject
review pro@ss, a local government shall provide a procedure for obtaining a code interpretation
as pnovided in RCW 36.708.110." RCW 36.708.030(3). If the Cormty doesn't have this
procedure (as required by state law), then the ptrblic will have no notice or oppoitrmity to apply a
decision of the Director to allow an unlisted use within one of these MPR zones.- The developer
could propose an outdoor shooting raoge thd will cause herre,ndous noise and pollute the grorurd
waterwith lead, and the Cotrnty may permit it, claiming that it is consistent with Sestion
17.65.020(4), as an *outdoor resort-related remedional facility."
17.75.030: In 17.65.030, no buildinp could be constnrcted in the MPR-GR zone ovcr 35 fect in
height unless the Fire Distict approved. Here, "one structre may orceed 35 feet, but may not
exceed 45 feet." No approval is required from the Fire Distuict to exceed 35 feet in height. So, it
appears that the limit in the previous zone was not based on any safety issue (like the fact that the
Fire Distict didn't have a ladder such that firefighters could fight a fire in a building over 35 feet
high) and was totally arbitary. Also, wtrd does it mean that *one structure" can exceed 35 feet
in height? One stnrcttne in the e,ntire zone?
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MEMO 2-8-18
.17.t0.010: Here, the County has established the process for'teviewing major or minor rwisions
to the Resort Plan." Wouldn't the developer also need to obitain ap,proval of a major or minor
revision to any subdivision or binding site plan approval for any of these activities?
17.t0.020: It appears that this section has been added so that everyone can just see a sampling of
the mitigation measunes that 4ply to the proposed developnent. (.Ihe mitigation measunes are
listed but it also states that they are not limited to these measunes, yet these measures are listed
'for reference.') Given that the County has deterrrined that it will impose mitigation or
conditions on tbe developm.ent from at least four different documents, is there some reason that
the County can't simply list all of therr here, so that everyone knows what they are? It would
also be helpful to look at them in oneplace, so that we could determine whether any measur€xr
conflictwith each other orthiiiproposed oode.
Also, this list of documents is not the same as the list of documents in 17.60.040 and 17.60.060.
What is the reason for the difference?
17.80.020(1): Here, the developcr is required to put the southern shoreline abutting Hood Caoal
into a permanent consenation easerrent. Who will be the ownetr ofthe underlyrng propert5r?
Who will be responsible for maintaining this easement?
17.E0.020@[a): The Couty should charge the developer for the County's costs relating to the
hiring of an independent consultant wtro wilt perform water quallty monitoring and to submit a
summary water quality report to the County.,
17.E0.020(2)(d): Here, it states tha the permits "shall require implementation of appropriate
mitigation measures to alleviate any water quality issues caused by the Pleasant tlarbor MPR"
First, has anyone done any testing of the current situation? If not, won't the developer argue
later, if the water quatity dsteriorates, that it was not responsible, and the County can't prove
othenuise? Secon{ why would the Cotmty only state that the permitr rcquire implementafron
of apprcpriate mitigation measures? The permits will issue and then the dweloperwill be
requir€d to do some water quality testing. There isn't much to this testing progr*e-r4n o16sr thnn it
has to be done monthly. If the development agreement is signed and the permits issue, how will
the Cormty require additional mitigation?
The developme,nt agreemelrt has becn crafted such that the dwelopcr is not only vesrcd to every
development regulation administ€red by the County, but also includes aparagraph thd covers
.any developrnent regulation that the developer forgot to include. It is diffrcult to understand why
the County wouldn't adopt a water quality strndarq and then use its enforcennent procednres if
the development doesn't meet the standad.
The public receives little, if any benefit from this dwelopment, Sven all of the many
concessions provided to the developer. Therefore, public fllnds shouldn't be spent on the
enforce,ment ofthe development agreerrent. The County should require that the developer pay
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MEMO2-8-t8
the County's costs associated with hfuing an independent consultant to do this uder quality
monitoring. There is no other way for the publio to know that the water testing is accurate.
17.E0.020(3): As I pointed out in my comm€nts on the development 4greement property own€rs
can'tvest o storm water drainage regulations, regardless of the language of that agleement.
Here, it states that the developer will only be required to capture and ted the stotm water to the
'host current edition of the Stormwater Ndanual of Westemr Washington" before discharge.
Does this mean that the County acknowledges tlat the developer is not vested to stormwater
regulations?
17.E0.020(3)O) and (d): So the County states that there shall be no discharge of sewage or
bilge waters at the marina, and that fish cleaning can't take place in the contolled access areas of
the marina There doesn't app€ar to be any progam that the developer is required to adopt to
enforce this. These are issues that will be diffrcult for the County to enforce with limited time
and resources.
In 3(n): What does it mean that "lhe marina operations shall collect $rater quality data from
State sources so long as available . . ." The County should be charging the developer for the
County's costs relating to hiring an independent consultant to perform this watsr quahty testing.
These conditions are drafted so that the developer can claim thet it isn't required to comply -
and instea4 it is the 'trarina operatot'' who hasn't complied with the conditions. It is important
to identifr the entity/individual that the County will bring its enforcement action against if these
conditions are not met.
17.80.020(4)(b): Again, "tlre golf course and resort facilities will be requircd to participate in
any adaptive management prograns required by the County, as a result of the watsr quality
monitoring program . . ." More details are needed, such as the entity/individual &at must
perform this condition should be identified. The developme,nt agleemelrt has added language
that prohibits the public from enforcing the terms and conditions of developmeir! app,roval, so the
public's hands are tied if the County does nothing
17.E0.020(4)(d): The location(s) for water qualrty testing to take place should bl identified so
thd it can be determined whether or not the developer is compllng with the prohibition on any
storm water discharge into Hood Canal.
17.E0.020(O: We question why the developer would comply with this condition, requiring
calculation of greenhouse gatps, if all it was requiled to do is "id€Nrti8r techniques to mitigate
such emissions." Clearly, there is no need to identiff any techniques if there is no requireme,lrt to
actually imple,ment them.
17.E0.020(6): This section is not enforceable. The County can't enforpe a requirement that the
developer "elr;r", to do anything.
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MEMO2-8-18
17.80.020(OG) The conservation easement is granted to Jefferson County, and lhe County is
required to 'lrwe,lrt any activity within the Easement Area thd is inconsisteirt with the purpose
of this Easement and to require restoration of the Easement Area damaged by activif or use that
is inconsistent with the purpose of this Easeme,nt." In other words, the County is required to
spend prblic fimds to monitor this ease,ment and address any damage to it. Apparenfly, this is
the only consideration obtained by the County in exchange for the MPR and its ioncessions to
the developer in the development agreernent.
17.E0.030: Did the environmental documents address the impacts associated with 890
residential units? Is there something in these documents which requires not less than 65 perc€nt
of the total units be "shortterm visitor accorrunodation units?"
What is the County's enforre,ment plan for determining wheth€r or not the developer has short
term visitor accommodation that con*itutes less than 65 percent of the total units? It will likely
be difficult for the County to monitor all sales and rentals to det€rmine whether or not this
condition is satisfied.
17.80.060: What is the duration of the MPR? We already know that the County doesn't plan to
impose any deadlines on the constnrction of any phase, and so the development qgreement could
be in place for 100 years or more (whatever is 5 years longer than the completion of all phases).
Under 17.80.070(1)(i), the Planning Staffcan even grant extensions to the nondeadlines for
"timing of approved development."
17.80.070: The procedwe for the adoption of development regulations md a developrnent
agrc€rneot associatod withthe adoption of developme,nt regulations is legislative. not quasi-
judicial. Take alook at 18.15.129.
Here, the County plans to adopt a quasi-judicial procedrne to amend legislative dwelopment
rcgulations. This is like establishing a procedure for the adoption of development regulations
tbat is legislative (and follows all procodures for the adoption of development regulations in a
GI{A County), but allowing the planning staffor hearing examiner to modifi the same
development regulations throWh an administative, quasi-judicial process.
17.E0.0E0: Again, the County provides a quasi-judicial procedure that will purportedly amend
legislatively adoptcd develorpmeirtregulations. Aprparently, the County recognizes this problern
in (2), and stdes ttnt if the proposed major revision involves a change to the boundaries of the
MPR mlne, tcomprehensive plan ame,ndment is also required, and it is processed as a legislative
action. lhis doesn't cure the fact that other revisions (rnajor and minor) are still described as a
guasi-judicial proce&re
It is rlifffcult to undcrstand how these procedures mesh with the development agreemen! which
requirgs that "lhe Board of County Commissioners must approvc all amendments to this
Agreement by ordinance or resolution and only after notice to the public and a public hearing."
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MEMO 2-8-18
17.85.010: Here, it states thd a MPR approved with a phasing plan shall be null and void if the
applicant fails to mcet the conditions in the approved phasing plan. Apparently, the developer
cantake 50 years to constnrst apbase, butthe MPR is onlynull andvoid if the developer fails to
meet some other condition of the approved phasing plan. This needs to be eliminated so that it is
not interpreted as some exclusive basis for enforcement. The County can revoke the MPR for
other reasons
18.15.129: Here is the procedure for approval of a MPR. If the County wants to establish
oiteda for amendment (major or minor), this criteria should be in chapter 18.15. Otherwise, it
appears that the County is establishing different criteria for major and minor ame,ndments only
for the Pleasant Harbor MPR in chapte( 17.85.
Why are the criteria for a major amendment of the Pleasant Harbor MPR in 17.80.080(l)(a)
through(i)ditrerentfromthecritsriaforthe origrnalMPRapprovalin 18.15.135? Thedangerin
establishing differ€nt criteria for a major arnendment is that the developer ruay propos€ a
small€,r, less intense development initially, md then once approved, use the less btinge,lrt criteria
for a major amendme,nt to obtain massive changes to the original MPR
The procedure for approval for a major revision should not be different from the original
approval of a MPR. In 17.80.080, the Planning Commission has bem eliminated from the
legislative process. In 18.15.132,the Planning Commission holds a public hearing and makes
reoommendations. If the activity is legislative therc is no deadline for a final decision (as would
othertvise be required by RCW 36.708.080), so it app€ars that the rcason the Planning
Commission has been removed from the proccss is to reduce public awareiress of chm,ges
proposed within the Pleasant tlarbor MPR
Thank you for allowing me to comment on the Staffversion of the development regulations.
cc: Client
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