HomeMy WebLinkAbout072222 FW_ Meeting _7_25_22_ Jefferson County Fire Marshal _ Trail Nine fire hazard
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From: bertl@cablespeed.com
Sent: Friday, July 22, 2022 10:30:00 AM (UTC-08:00) Pacific Time (US & Canada)
To: Brent Butler
Cc: Greg Brotherton; Kate Dean; Heidi Eisenhour; Mark McCauley; Philip Hunsucker; Diana Smeland; tcrosby; Marco de Sa e Silva; Michael P. Brown; Marcia Kelbon
Subject: Meeting [7/25/22] Jefferson County Fire Marshal / Trail Nine fire hazard
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ALERT: BE CAUTIOUS This email originated outside the organization. Do not open attachments or click on links if you are not expecting them.
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Re: 'Office of the Fire Marshal - explanation of Fire Marshal roles and responsibilities and Community Wildfire Protection Plan'
Brent,
I received the invitation to meet at your office. I am very willing to discuss what the County's plans are to finally address the Trail Nine fire hazard. However, if as I suspect,
you are simply going to parrot Commissioner Brotherton's demonstrably false statements, a meeting would be pointless. Please let me know what the specific subject details are that you
wish to discuss (before noon on the 25th), before I agree to attend. Also, I've included information for your review.
Regards,
Bert
Review these cities:
Riverview Community Group, a non-profit Washington Corporation, vs. Spencer & Livingston / Deer Meadows Golf, Inc., In The Supreme Court of The State of Washington (No. 88575-3) [11/20/2014].
& RCW 76.04.495“Negligent starting of fires or allowing extreme fire hazard or debris-Liability” RCW 76.04.660 & RCW 76.04.650 [06/30/1993]
RCW 76.04.495 Negligent starting of fires or allowance of extreme fire hazard or debris—Liability—Recovery of reasonable expenses—Lien. (1) Any person, firm, or corporation: (a) Whose
negligence is responsible for the starting or existence of a fire which spreads on forestland; or (b) who creates or allows an extreme fire hazard under RCW 76.04.660 to exist and which
hazard contributes to the spread of a fire; or (c) who allows forest debris subject to RCW 76.04.650 to exist and which debris contributes to the spread of fire, shall be liable for
any reasonable expenses made necessary by (a), (b), or (c) of this subsection. The state, a municipality, a forest protective association, or any fire protection agency of the United
States may recover such reasonable expenses in fighting the fire, together with costs of investigation and litigation including reasonable attorneys' fees and taxable court costs, if
the expense was authorized or subsequently approved by the department. The authority granted under this subsection allowing the recovery of reasonable expenses incurred by fire protection
agencies of the United States shall apply only to such expenses incurred after June 30, 1993.
(2) The department or agency incurring such expense shall have a lien for the same against any property of the person, firm, or corporation liable under subsection (1) of this section
by filing a claim of lien naming the person, firm, or corporation, describing the property against which the lien is claimed, specifying the amount expended on the lands on which the
firefighting took place and the period during which the expenses were incurred, and signing the claim with post office address.
Community Group May Sue to Impose an Equitable Servitude
Posted in Washington Supreme Court; By Rita Latsinova
In Riverview Community Group v. Spencer & Livingstone, NO. 88575-3, the Washington Supreme Court held that an equitable servitude may arise by implication. The developer of a golf course
complex and surrounding residential lots built in the 1980s sought to close down the golf complex and to plat the course into new residential lots. Some of the homeowners formed a
community group for the purpose of maintaining the golf course as a permanent feature of the community, and sued to impose an equitable servitude and for injunctive relief.
The community group has organizational standing to bring these claims because the equitable and injunctive relief it requested did not require the participation of individual homeowners.
The evidence offered by group, including the plat identifying the golf course and old advertisements, could support an equitable covenant limiting the use of the land as a golf course,
if not in perpetuity, then for a certain period of time. The dismissal of the community’s group’s complaint was reversed. [1993 c 196 § 2; 1986 c 100 § 33.]
Letter from my attorney [8/1/19] to the Jefferson County Administrator:
“Bert and Julie Loomis purchased their golf course lot in 2005. They designed and constructed a custom home with the expectations that the golf course would remain a golf course. That
expectation arose from representations made in promotional materials, a recorded Long Plat
(#377273) that makes several references to the golf course, the MPRC, Edgewood Village CC&R 377272 (Article 2 Section 2.2). and the Port Ludlow Development Agreement (“PLDA”).
As you are aware, The Trail Nine golf course was part of the “MPR Recreational Area Zone” that is recognized and authorized under Section 3.6 of the MPRC. That zone “recognizes, maintains,
and promotes the existing and future active recreation activities and areas within the Port Ludlow master Planned Resort.” MPRC 3.601. The course was operated as a golf course until
2009, when PLA decided to close it for financial reasons. Since that time, PLA has allowed the Five Acres to grow wild with grass and noxious weeds, resulting in a drastic change to
the Port Ludlow Master Planned Resort---one that is inconsistent with the documented Resort Plans set forth in the MPRC. As such, Section 3.905(2) of the MPRC required that PLA obtain
the County’s approval before making that change. Specifically, PLA was required to submit proposed revisions to the Department of Community Development (“DCD”), whereupon the DCD Director
was to determine whether the proposed change was “major” or “minor.” MPRC 3.905(3). Section 3.906 and 3.907 set forth, respectively, clear, and mandatory procedures that were to be
followed depending on that “major vs. minor” determination.
The proposal to abandon the Trail Nine Golf Course, and allow it to grow wild, was clearly a major revision under the MPRC. In the language of the MPRC, that transition represented
“a substantial change to the resort” regarding “change in use.” MPRC (“Major Revisions”). But putting the major-vs, -minor question to the side, it appears the County allowed PLA to
make this substantial change without going through the mandated revision process at all.
This failure on the part of the County fits into a long and unfortunate pattern of the County placing the interest of PLA (or its predecessor developer) ahead of the interest of the
community, and in the process failing to discharge its legal obligations with respect to overseeing the development. You are no doubt aware of the following example:
“Mr. Loomis’ successful challenge to Ordinance No. 01-0117-95, which designated a Port Ludlow Interim Urban Growth Area. We represented Mr. Loomis in this matter. The Growth Management
Hearings Board ruled in favor of Mr. Loomis, finding that the County had made this designation on “fatally flawed” premises and without the evidence required to support it.”
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